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Summary 
 
A number of established planning theorists have sought a connection between 
Deleuzian philosophy and planning to create new practices and tools to increase the 
effectiveness of [the discipline]’ (de Roo et al, 2012: 20; Hillier, 2007, 2011; Van 
Wazemael, 2010; Mark Purcell, 2013). This Deleuze-planning link introduces a number 
of unique considerations, not least because it must account for theoretical as well as 
practical concerns, and explore processes of analysis as well as processes of 
engagement. To date these efforts remain tentative, exposing such studies to Forester’s 
critique that most planning theorists use philosophical concepts to ‘deconstruct’ rather 
than ‘reconstruct’ methods of engagement (Forester, 2007).  
 
This study responds to this gap by showing how some of Deleuze’s most abstract 
philosophical concepts can be translated into a new, practicable assessment tool useful 
to actors working in development and regulatory processes. It shows what is needed to 
make this transition, and when such tools might usefully contribute to ‘real’ situations. 
 
This thesis explores this experimental line of enquiry through two research stages. The 
first stage focuses on developing a Deleuze-inspired alternative to the Building 
Research Establishment’s ‘universal method’ for assessing the sustainability of a given 
building or urban design. This proposal is constructed on the basis that all assessments 
should be undertaken within the design process; by those responsible for making these 
design decisions; and based on their speculations about what might become of the 
scheme. The study goes on to test the practicable viability of this proposed method, 
termed the ‘Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method’ (SIAM), through a series 
of interviews with professional actors working in design, development, assessment and 
regulatory roles.  
 
The results of these two research stages suggest that Deleuze’s concepts can be made 
useful to practice, but doing so demands that the researcher adapts, re-creates and 
expands Deleuze’s concepts to meet the specific, practical demands of the field. 
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Introduction 
 
1. Objective.  
 
The objective of this study is to explore whether Deleuze’s philosophical concepts can 
be usefully translated into planning, and, if so, to identify the measures needed to create 
a Deleuze-inspired planning tool for use in planning / development practice. 
 
2. Why Deleuze? 
 
The most obvious starting point for this introduction is to explain why I have decided to 
look at Deleuze’s philosophy. This introduction chapter sets out a broad argument; and 
a specific, problem-based argument for linking and operationalising Deleuze’s concepts 
in planning.  
 
2.1 Why Deleuze and planning? 
 
Cross-disciplinary by ‘design’  
 
The first part of my argument can be found in Deleuze’s philosophy itself and his 
insistence that applying concepts across different bodies of knowledge was integral to 
his own method. In his interview with Clare Parnet, Deleuze notes, 
 
It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity
1
. What defines 
it is the AND, as something which has its place between the elements or 
between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering (Deleuze and Parnet 
2002: 26). 
 
In this quotation, Deleuze argues that concepts should not be created and used within 
one field alone. Rather, concepts created in one body of knowledge, such as philosophy, 
should be added to concepts found in other bodies of knowledge, such as planning. 
Deleuze goes on to suggest that the relationships formed by such ‘encounters’ offer new 
directions for development that do not belong to either field, but ‘work between the 
                                                     
1 The concept of the ‘multiplicity’ is explained and discussed in Chapter 3 
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two’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 13). This additive, ‘AND, AND, AND’ process, can be 
seen across all of Deleuze’s seminal texts. One of Deleuze and Guattari’s most cited 
works, A Thousand Plateaus, for example, is formed as a series of chapters, or plateaus 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). Each plateau reveals an encounter between Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophical concepts and the concepts created and used within a specific 
field, or milieu, such as linguistics, archaeology, geology and psychology. Thus, it 
seems that Deleuze created his concepts by drawing on links with other fields of 
knowledge, and intended these concepts to be used in the same way. In other words, 
Deleuze’s concepts are ‘designed’ to be used both outside, and within philosophy.  
 
A growing trend towards Deleuzian philosophy 
 
This intellectual agenda of applying Deleuze to other disciplinary spheres, including 
planning, has already been growing apace. This trend has been actively encouraged by 
key figures in the Deleuzian community. The Deleuze Connections series, for example, 
uses the above quotation to introduce each of its publications. Commenting on this 
approach the series editor, Ian Buchanan, notes that such studies have, 
 
… already placed Deleuze's thought in connection with feminist theory, 
music, space, geography, queer theory, performance, postcolonial studies, 
contemporary art, and is constantly opening new frontiers in Deleuze 
Studies. (Buchanan, no date) 
 
The list of fields noted by Buchanan demonstrates how broad these encounters have 
become. Several studies in the series, such as Martin-Jones and Brown’s study of film 
(2012) build on conceptual relationships already explored within Deleuze’s seminal 
texts, whilst others, such as Frichot and Loo’s study of architecture (2013), build on less 
prominent fields in his philosophy.  
 
This cross-disciplinary approach is not limited to this growing community of 
academics. In 2002, the esteemed Deleuzian scholar, Manual Delanda, outlined 
Deleuze’s ontology from within the sciences (2002) and went on to develop a ‘neo-
Deleuzian’ assemblage theory by working within a range of spatial disciplines (2006), 
and spatial planning in particular (2010). In 2007, the planning theorist, Jean Hillier, 
published a detailed proposal for a new Deleuze-inspired approach to strategic planning 
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(Hillier, 2007). Several years later, Hillier’s co-edited book on planning theory included 
a further development of these ideas (Hillier, 2010) alongside several other articles that 
used Deleuze’s concepts to critically engage with issues particular to the field (Van 
Wazemael, 2010; Pløger, 2010). These efforts have been expanded by other, more 
recent articles in planning theory (Purcel, 2013 for example). This study, therefore, is 
supported by this growing trend seen in a range of disciplines including planning 
theory. 
 
Gaps in knowledge 
 
My third argument for focusing on Deleuze’s philosophy relates to the gaps left 
unanswered in this growing trend towards, what one might term, a Deleuze-inspired 
approach to planning. One such gap can be seen in the seemingly obscure and abstract 
terminology surrounding Deleuzian philosophy. Looking through Deleuze’s 
philosophical texts, it is difficult to imagine how his concepts could relate to debates in 
planning literature, and even more difficult to link these concepts to the day-to-day 
work of the planner, masterplanner and architect sat at their desk or drawing board.  
 
Whilst some efforts have been made to improve these links (Parr, 2005; Bonta and 
Protevi, 2004; Hillier, 2007), many of the definitions offered for concepts like 
‘assemblages’, ‘multiplicities’ and ‘becomings’ draw on other parts of Deleuze’s 
philosophy, and do not acknowledge or explain why a range of meanings can be found 
in different texts. This problem stems, in part, from the fact that Deleuze’s concepts are 
used to discuss very abstract ideas and problems. However, one might also conclude 
that this reflects an oversight amongst this growing community of planning theorists 
that prevents others from linking Deleuze’s philosophical ideas to ‘real’2 situations. 
 
Building on this final point, another gap in the literature surrounds questions of 
usefulness. Such questions include: What are the situations and problems for which 
Deleuze’s concepts can be made useful? Can Deleuze’s philosophy be translated into 
planning theory and practice or just the former? What is required to make these 
transitions? Taken together, these questions respond to a much broader issue about what 
                                                     
2 The use of the term ‘real’ in this sense should be understood as the common usage of 
the term and should be distinguished from the ontological use of the term, discussed 
later in the thesis.   
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can be reasonably expected from planning’s engagement with Deleuze’s philosophy as 
well as when and where these expectations can be met. Answering these kinds of 
questions would help planning theorists to speculate about the future of this growing 
trend in Deleuze-inspired planning and whether or not it can be used to meet the 
aspirations of some of its key figures, namely, to draw on Deleuze’s concepts to create 
‘…new practices and tools to increase the effectiveness of [the discipline]’ (de Roo et 
al, 2012: 20).   
 
To date, these aspirations have gone largely unfulfilled. One explanation for this can be 
seen in a continued reluctance to adapt and expand these concepts to meet the specific 
demands of engagement rather than analysis and critique (see Chapter 3). Probably the 
most successful and convincing attempt can be seen in Hillier’s proposals for a new 
‘muliplanar’ approach to strategic planning (2007; 2011). However, as I will show in 
Chapter 3, these attempts remain tentative and do not, as yet, show how Deleuze’s 
concepts can be used to engage with, rather than analyse existing forms of planning 
practice (see Chapter 3). 
 
The concerns I raise above reflect a much broader, on-going concern in the discipline, 
as expressed by the planning theorist, John Forester. For Forester, the weighting 
towards Deleuze-inspired planning theory rather than Deleuze-inspired planning 
practice reflects a historical pattern in the field. In his critique of planning theory, 
Forester argues that most planning theorists use philosophical concepts to ‘deconstruct’ 
existing tools and practices, but very rarely develop these critiques further by 
‘reconstructing’ new methods of engagement (Forester, 2007).  
 
This critique reflects a further gap in the literature surrounding the use of Deleuze’s 
concepts. Planning theorists are yet to offer a thorough critical engagement with the 
relationship between Deleuze and planning. Whilst previous studies questioned the use 
of post-structuralism and post-modernism in planning and geography (Martin, 2001; 
Hamnett, 2003), these efforts failed to appreciate Deleuze’s unique position in this 
broad group. As DeLanda notes,  
 
When confronted with Deleuze’s original texts this audience is bound to be 
puzzled, and may even be repelled by the superﬁcial similarity of these texts 
with books belonging to what has come to be known as the ‘post-modern’ 
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tradition. Although … Deleuze has absolutely nothing in common with that 
tradition, his experimental style is bound to create that impression (DeLanda, 
2002: 1).  
 
Looking at this relationship from another angle, there have been equally few efforts 
made to critically review, or understand proposals made to link Deleuze’s philosophy to 
planning processes and problems. Nyseth et al provide the only notable attempt to 
review Hillier’s proposal in the context of planning (Nyseth et al, 2009). This review 
successfully connects Hillier’s Deleuze-inspired framework with existing processes of 
strategic planning, but fails to explain how Hillier makes the transition from philosophy 
to planning theory and practice, what adaptations were made, what gaps and questions 
were left unanswered, and what this tells us about the viability of making Deleuze’s 
philosophy useful to planning practice. 
 
These three gaps in knowledge provide the basis for, and the principle contributions of 
this thesis. I make these contributions to knowledge by,  
 
1. Providing a clearer understanding of Deleuze’s key philosophical concepts. This 
is achieved by relating them to ‘real’ situations, and offering guidance about 
how one might use these concepts in subsequent studies. 
2. Exploring possibilities for translating Deleuze’s concepts from philosophy to 
planning theory and planning practice, and showing what is needed to 
operationalise these concepts in order to create ‘…new practices and tools to 
increase the effectiveness of [the discipline]’ (de Roo et al, 2012: 20).   
3. Critically engaging with other Deleuze-inspired studies, and developing my own 
Deleuze-inspired study to offer subsequent theorists a realistic expectation about 
what can be achieved by this Deleuze/planning link, as well as where and when 
this link might prove useful and effective.  
 
2.2. What is the specific problem, and why might Deleuze help to resolve this 
problem? 
  
Above I set out a broad argument for looking at Deleuze’s philosophy in the field of 
planning and show how this argument is used to direct the thesis as a contribution to 
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knowledge. In my second response to the question, ‘why Deleuze’ I will briefly show 
how Deleuze relates to a specific problem within this field. 
 
A problem 
  
A number of pragmatists in planning theory have argued against the use of simple, 
essentialist definitions as ‘first principles’ in ‘designing practice’ (Healey, 2009). Such 
‘essentialist’ definitions reflect the idea that concepts can be defined according to their 
inherent features or traits (see Chapter 2). The results of such principles have been well 
documented by this, and other areas of the planning community. Planning tools derived 
from these essentialist definitions are thought to be overly rigid and unable to account 
for the subtle differences in meaning held by different parties or reflecting different 
contextual features. Such rigidity has, in several documented instances, exacerbated 
conflicts during planning discussions (Stein and Harper, 2012), has marginalised certain 
interest groups within such discussions (Richardson and Jensen, 2001; 2003: 19) and 
has concluded in actions that could not be implemented in specific contexts (Jamal, et 
al, 2002). These documented problems are reflected in the experiences of other actors 
working in the design and development process (including my own) (Schweber, 2013) 
and form the basis for proposed changes to the use of regulation in the UK (DCLG, 
2013; DCLG, 2014). 
 
These calls for a new approach to the way planning tools are conceived are equally 
captured in planning assessment literature (Borri, 1998). As in the proposals made by 
pragmatists like Stein and Harper (2012), these calls point to a flexible, context 
sensitive form of assessment designed to accommodate the differing and changing 
values of actors working on a specific scheme. To date, these calls have gone mostly 
unrealised (Alexander, 2006). A number of explanations and arguments have been made 
to explain (Borri, 1998; Lichfield and Prat, 1998; Baum, 1996) or justify (Fischer, 2003) 
this resistance to such contextually sensitive assessments and to highlight the important 
role played by essentialist assessment, namely their links to broader policy objectives 
and their suitability to cross-site comparison. Such efforts do not, however, satisfy the 
continuing demand placed on assessment methodologists to meet these calls 
(Alexander, 2006; Richardson, 2005). This debate is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
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Why Deleuze’s philosophy might help contribute to a new, non-essentialist form of 
assessment 
 
The search for solutions within planning theory and philosophy are reflected in 
Richardson’s calls for new ways of ‘seeing’ and developing assessment methods 
(Richardson, 2005; Lawson, 2000). Deleuze’s relevance to, what one might broadly 
term, the essentialist problem, can be found in DeLanda’s detailed review and 
reconstruction of Deleuze’s philosophy. In this study DeLanda argues that many of 
Deleuze’s concepts are conceived as a response against essentialism. Concepts like ‘the 
assemblage’, ‘multiplicities’ and ‘becomings’ are, he demonstrates, the result of non-
essentialist lines of argument. These concepts, therefore, offer new opportunities for 
tackling the dominant role played by essentialist principles in assessment design and the 
problems that result from the rigidity of an essentialist definition unable to account for 
different meanings and the unique issues and opportunities of a given context.  
 
By exploring this essentialist problem in assessment design, and considering how 
Deleuzian concepts might help direct new, non-essentialist tools this thesis makes a 
second set of contributions to knowledge by, 
 
1. Offering new conceptual frameworks for distinguishing between and discussing 
essentialist and non-essentialist assessment methods 
2. Offering new insight into the role played by these different kinds of assessment, 
as well as the role played by planning 
 
3. Two research questions 
 
The line of enquiry outlined above is articulated in the following two research 
questions: 
 
1) Can Deleuze’s philosophical concepts be translated into a new theoretical 
framework for constructing formal assessments? 
 
2) If so, can this be translated into a practical tool useful to actors in the 
planning and development process?  
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For the purposes of this thesis ‘formal’ assessments refers to assessments that relate to a 
regulatory framework and, are distinguished from ‘informal’ assessments which might 
include assessments undertaken as part of an office’s internal quality management 
process, or by an individual working within a company or institution and their own 
means of assessing a scheme. 
 
4. Structuring a response to the research questions. 
 
As noted above, the principle objective of the thesis is to consider whether Deleuze’s 
concepts can be translated from philosophy into planning theory and into a practicable 
planning tool. This broad objective points to established research practice, in which one 
moves from the abstract/conceptual/theoretical to the detailed/practical/empirical. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that such transitions are best achieved by starting 
from the specific and moving between the abstract and the practical. In their 
introduction to the French edition of A Thousand Plateaus, they note that one should  
 
…partir au milieu, par le milieu, entrer et sortir, non pas commencer ni 
finir… Ils ont su faire une pragmatique. C'est que le milieu n'est pas du tout 
une moyenne, c'est au contraire l'endroit où les choses prennent de la 
vitesse
3
. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980:37) 
 
In this quotation, Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of starting from within a 
specific field of knowledge or situation (a milieu), and then developing the study by 
moving in and out of the field: from specific concerns, relationships and debates 
identified in the field, to concerns, relationships and debates in associated fields. It is 
only by starting from a milieu and keeping it in the forefront of one’s mind, they argue, 
that ideas can be developed quickly and effectively. This structure provides a general 
                                                     
3 I translate this as follows: ‘Start from a specific field, by that field, enter and leave it 
without starting or finishing…. This is how one acts pragmatically.  This field (also 
translates as middle) should not be understood as an average. It is quite the contrary, for 
it is in this place that things achieve the greatest speed’. Please note that my decision to 
draw on the original, French text rather than the English translation is based on the 
definition of the term ‘milieu’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). As my translation notes, 
the French use of this term has two meanings, which were not fully captured in the 
English translation, yet are important to the points raised in this chapter. 
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methodology for undertaking and organising this thesis, as shown in the following 
breakdown of the chapters. 
 
Part 1: Essentialism, assessments and Deleuze 
 
As per Deleuze and Guattari’s quote above, the first chapter starts from within a specific 
milieu identified from my eight years of professional experience working as an 
architect. I use this milieu to outline a problem related to existing sustainable building 
assessments and expand this into broader literature. As Deleuze and Guattari note, I 
keep this milieu at the forefront of my mind and return to it in different instances to 
make sense of abstract, theoretical concepts (Chapter 2), to form comparisons with the 
way others have used these theoretical concepts (Chapter 3) or to work through a 
developing theoretical framework (Chapter 7). As per Deleuze and Guattari’s comment, 
it was in such instances that I felt that the study gained the greatest clarity, which, in 
turn helped me develop and test ideas efficiently and effectively. To expand on this 
observation, this chapter shows how the problem is not limited to my own experiences 
but representative of a broader concern held by other actors working in the design and 
development process, but also in broader assessment methodology debates (Chapter 2).  
 
In the second chapter I expand this problem further. By relating it to literature from 
within planning theory I show that the problem results from the essentialist principles 
used to construct and operationalise a definition of ‘the sustainable home’. I develop 
this second chapter by reviewing some of the key challenges to essentialism within 
planning literature.  The limitations I identify in this literature provide a framework for 
introducing and framing the concepts that form Deleuze’s ontology.  
 
To establish this link between planning theory and Deleuzian philosophy I was keen to 
avoid the dictionary definition format seen in a number of other Deleuze-inspired 
studies, such as those discussed in Chapter 3 (Bonta and Protevi, 2004; Halsey, 2006; 
Hillier, 2007). Whilst dictionary definitions provide a useful reference point for the 
reader, they suggest that such concepts have a clear definition outside of their use. Yet, 
as noted earlier in this introduction, Deleuze argues that concepts alone do not define a 
framework. Rather, such concepts have meaning only when they assume their place 
‘between’ the elements that form a particular field (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 26). With 
this in mind, I define Deleuze’s key ontological concepts within the flow of the text, 
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illustrated, as Deleuze and Guattari suggests, through constant shifts between the 
abstract ideas presented in their work and the specific milieu discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
Taken together these two chapters demonstrate the width and breadth of a problem that 
spans between philosophy, different areas of planning theory and planning practice. 
 
Part 2: How to make Deleuze useful 
 
The third chapter reflects on the process of translating Deleuze’s philosophy into a 
theoretical framework applicable to a given line of enquiry. This is a key aspect of the 
two research questions, which I explore by drawing lessons from a detailed review of 
three Deleuze-inspired studies positioned within the spatial disciplines. Unlike 
‘traditional’ literature reviews, this approach allows for a much more detailed 
understanding of the relationship formed between a specific problem and Deleuze’s 
philosophical concepts. In doing so, I am able to explain how these studies make the 
transition from philosophy to their respective field of interest, what adaptations were 
made, what gaps and questions were left unanswered, and what this tells us about the 
viability of making Deleuze’s philosophy useful to spatial problems. In doing so, this 
approach helps respond to one of the gaps noted above. 
 
My review of these Deleuze-inspired studies suggests that, to make Deleuze’s 
ontological concepts useful, one cannot rely on the definitions inferred from Deleuze’s 
texts alone. Doing so leads to significant gaps and unanswered questions in the resulting 
theoretical framework. Rather, the review suggests that Deleuze’s concepts must be 
adapted, re-created and expanded to respond to the demands of a specific field whilst 
retaining a broader sense of their ontological role in Deleuze’s philosophy. 
 
Part 3: A case study of BRE assessments 
 
The five chapters that form Part 3 ‘return’ to the milieu identified in Chapter 1. Drawing 
on the broader, theoretical lessons learned from the preceding two chapters, this part of 
the study asks whether Deleuze’s concepts can be translated into a theoretical proposal 
for a new assessment tool, and whether there is any empirical evidence to suggest that 
this tool could be operationalised in practice.  
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Chapter 4 explains why I have decided to focus on BRE assessments over other 
essentialist tools used in planning practice such as the Environmental Impact 
Assessments and European Territorial Cohesion Indicators, and identifies a research 
strategy for responding to the two research questions above.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 explore and develop a methodological proposal for developing and 
testing a new Deleuze-inspired assessment tool. The first of these chapters presents the 
method used to develop a theoretical alternative to BRE assessments research. Whilst 
Chapter 6 presents the method used to develop an empirical method of enquiry in-
keeping with Deleuze’s stance on transcendent empiricism.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 set out, analyse and discuss the results of the case study. The first of 
these two chapters (Chapter 7) presents the results of my proposals that I have termed 
SIAM: a Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method. This proposal takes its name 
from the principles used in its construction. It is an assessment method undertaken by 
key members of the design and development team; a method based on speculations 
about what might become of the project rather than the resulting properties of a 
completed design (Speculative); a method undertaken as part of, and during the design 
and development process rather than at pre-conceived stages of development 
(Immanent). Chapter 8 outlines and analyses the results of the empirical ‘testing stage’ 
(Research Stage B) using a group of methods known as ‘the Delphi techniques’. This 
stage draws on interviews and subsequent feedback from a sample of professionals 
working in design and regulatory roles.  
 
Taken together these four chapters show how Deleuze’s concepts can be adapted, re-
created and expanded to form a theoretical tool for planning practice and what further 
changes might be needed to operationalise this tool. 
 
Part 4: Synthesis, discussion and conclusions 
 
In Chapter 9 I return to the two research questions noted above and consider what the 
study into sustainable assessments tells us about making Deleuze useful to planning 
theory and practice. More broadly, I explore what other issues are revealed through 
these questions: issues relating to the way we think about the link between theory and 
practice, as well as the facilitating and regulatory roles of planning.  
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The concluding chapter, Chapter 10, brings together the points raised across the thesis 
as a whole to indentify and review the contributions to knowledge made by this study. 
As noted above, these include:  
 
1. Providing a clearer understanding of Deleuze’s key philosophical concepts. 
2. Showing what is needed to operationalise Deleuze’s concepts in planning 
practice  
3. Critically engaging with other Deleuze-inspired studies, 
4. Offering new conceptual frameworks for assessment methods 
5. Offering new insight into the role played by assessments and planning  
 
It goes on to identify the study’s limitations, as well as opportunities to overcome these 
limitations in future research. In doing so, this chapter provides direction for those 
working in Deleuzian scholarship, planning theory and planning practice, and, more 
importantly, for a small and growing community interested in translating Deleuze’s 
concepts across all three of these fields. 
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Part 1: 
Assessments, essentialism and Deleuze 
 
Deleuze argued that one should start a study by placing oneself within a specific milieu. 
This argument is particularly poignant for this study as the problem that first drew me to 
Deleuze’s philosophy is one that I identified during my professional experiences as a 
practicing architect. In the first chapter of part 1, I will delve into one experience from 
my professional career to reveal a discrepancy between two ways of making 
assessments in design and regulatory practice: an assessment undertaken during and 
within the design and development process, and an assessment undertaken outside of the 
design and development process. As I will show later in this first part of the thesis, these 
two ways of thinking about assessments can be distinguished in several different ways, 
but the one that I find most compelling looks at the philosophical ideas used to create 
the two respective methods, namely an essentialist approach and a non-essentialist 
approach. As this first part of the thesis develops I will show how and why I believe 
Deleuze’s philosophical concepts can contribute to a formal assessment method that is 
constructed around the latter, and thus, meet some of the aspirations of pragmatic 
planning theorists such as Stein and Harper (Stein and Harper, 2012), whilst capturing 
the concerns of discourse analysts like Fainstein (Fainstein, 2000) and the broader 
ontological arguments put forward by realists such as Van Wazemael (Van Wazemael, 
2012). In doing so, this first part of the thesis sets the scene for an exploratory study into 
Deleuzian philosophy and how it might contribute to the tools used in planning. 
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Chapter 1: A problem with assessments 
 
Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find 
an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of 
deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow 
conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by 
segment, have a small plot of new land at all times  
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a:178). 
 
1. Identifying a problem ‘…par le milieu4’. 
 
In 2007/2008 I acted as Project Architect for a proposed apartment block situated on the 
English Channel. This was one of many schemes in which I noted a clear discrepancy 
between the way members of the design and development team formed assessments and 
decisions as part of the design process, and the way an appointed Code for Sustainable 
Homes assessor
5
 judged those decisions. The following overview of the scheme 
illustrates this discrepancy, why I believe it to be problematic and worth pursuing as a 
line of enquiry. 
 
The apartment block was to be designed for wealthy downsizers from London and was 
supported, in principle, by the Local Planning Authority, who saw the scheme as a 
valuable contribution to a broader regeneration strategy for the area.  The apartments 
were designed as a contemporary and luxury development using a steel frame structure, 
with concrete beam and block floors, and a flat roof concealed at ground level by a 
parapet. The external façade was formed from rendered panels, and slit glazing afforded 
views to the sea. Given the contemporary style of the development the design team 
undertook an extensive process of public consultation, which resulted in a range of 
design changes. One year after commencing the initial sketch proposal, the scheme was 
awarded planning approval under delegated powers. As with most schemes of this size 
and type, planning approval was subject to a list of conditions. One of these conditions 
                                                     
4
 I translate this as, Identifying a problem… ‘from within the specifics of a field / 
situation’ 
5
 In the UK, a Code for Sustainable Homes assessor is a specialist role in the project 
team whose responsibilities lie in assessing and advising the project team on a 
development’s sustainability rating  
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noted that the scheme would need to meet Code for Sustainable Homes level 4 (see 
below).  
 
The following text details the design decisions made in two particular areas of the 
scheme: the foundation and the structural frame.  
 
1.1. Designing the foundation.  
 
After achieving planning approval, the project team began the detailed design stages 
(RIBA stages E-F
6
). I started this process by commissioning a survey to identify the 
structural stability of the site. The survey revealed deep layers of sandy ground below 
the proposed building footprint. This sandy ground was the result of several key factors: 
the relief of the land, the kind of stone that formed the land and the corrosive tendencies 
of waves from the English Channel. In terms of the design, sand offers poor structural 
stability for a building proposal designed to be over five storeys above ground level and 
one storey below ground level.  
 
The structural engineer suggested that this constraint would be best accommodated by 
designing the building around a deep piled foundation. This provided us with, what 
Deleuze and Guattari term, ‘an advantageous position’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004a:178)
7
 from which to explore three design options: steel driven piles, pre-cast 
concrete driven piles and contiguous piling. Each option was explored as a design 
sequence by experimenting with different materials, methods of construction and the 
entities that formed them. 
 
The first option, steel driven piles, was deemed unsuitable due to the risks of corrosion 
from a high water table and the building’s proximity to the sea front. A second option 
was to use pre-cast concrete driven piles. Whilst concrete piles would not corrode, they 
introduced other design and construction issues. This option would demand that the 
contractor excavate a large area of land, drive the piles at regular intervals, build a 
concrete block wall between the piles, and treat the wall with a water resistant 
                                                     
6 Please note that these stages have since been revised from Stages A-L to Stages 1-8.  
http://www.architecture.com/TheRIBA/AboutUs/Professionalsupport/RIBAOutlinePlan
ofWork2013.aspx#.U2n1dfldV8q [Last accessed: 07
th
 May, 2014] 
7
 As per quotation used to introduce the chapter 
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membrane before back filling around the perimeter. This sequence of work would have 
had an impact on the estimated construction programme, the number of specialist trades 
needed, the amount of working space needed around the foundations and so forth.  
 
A third option was to use contiguous, in-situ poured concrete piling. In this option, piles 
would be driven around the perimeter of the building and then filled with in-situ 
concrete, mixed with a water resistant chemical to avoid subsequent damp proofing. 
Once the concrete was set, the ground within this perimeter could be safely removed to 
form the basement level. This third option would have less impact on the programme, 
introduced fewer specialist trades, avoided risks associated with corrosion, could be 
adapted to suit the building footprint and the ground conditions below. Taking these 
points into consideration, the design team agreed that this third option was the most 
efficient and effective design solution.  
 
1.2. Designing the structural frame.  
 
This decision led us to consider the design of the structural frame. The sketch scheme 
had been conceived using a steel frame. However, as with the steel driven piles, this 
steel frame would be at risk of corrosion from airborne salt from the sea. 
 
The design team agreed that the most effective method for reducing the risks of 
corrosion was to treat the steel frame with a protective paint. After further consideration 
it was noted that, if this treatment was undertaken on an erected frame, there was a 
significant potential that connections, both to the concrete foundation and between steel 
sections, would be only partly covered. Discussion with steel fabricators provided us 
with a number of other opportunities. Anti-corrosion treatment could be applied off site, 
and special measures undertaken to avoid chipping the paint during transit.  
 
Erecting the frame and subsequent phases of construction were less easy to resolve. To 
avoid chipping the paint during construction, the design team worked with the principle 
contractor, the curtain wall specialists, the cold steel partition specialists, and the 
cladding panel and insulated render specialists to consider a number of changes to 
aspects of the frame and methods of erection. These included the use of pre-cast fixing 
angles, protective covers, heightened site supervision and so forth. Such measures only 
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partly resolved the corrosive tendencies of airborne salt and affected other parts of the 
design adding further complexity to the design and construction process. 
 
The risk of damaging the protective paint was all the more pronounced when we 
considered the subsequent maintenance of the building. The design team explored 
different options for replacing cladding and windows panels. These revisions to the 
detailed design demanded a number of bespoke materials installed by a range of 
specialist trades over a much longer construction programme.  
 
With this in mind, the design team agreed to explore more fundamental design changes, 
namely, the use of a concrete rather than a steel structural frame. Unlike steel, concrete 
has a high resistance to the corrosive tendencies of airborne salt, thus avoiding the 
problems associated with specialist paints. Members of the design team noted other 
advantages and limitations resulting from this design change. 
 
If the concrete frame was cast in-situ, it could be designed as an extension of the 
concrete foundation, thus avoiding vulnerable connections. This solution also reduced 
the number of trades working on site at any given time and reduced the amount of the 
transport associated with its construction. A concrete frame has better thermal and 
acoustic properties than a steel frame, thus reducing the demand for thermal and 
acoustic insulation. However, concrete columns take up more space than an equivalent 
steel column. Thus, to maintain the position and overall design of the windows, the 
columns would need to be positioned further into the building. This had implications on 
the proposed furniture layouts. It also increased the cantilever needed for the external 
balconies, and thus, the thickness of the concrete floor needed to achieve this cantilever. 
This thicker floor would result in a deeper floor zone and a lower floor to ceiling height. 
Whilst this was not problematic in terms of intended use, it increased the space between 
floors, which impacted on the stair design. Our design experiment led us to re-design 
the stair by introducing more steps, which demanded more space. This had a knock-on 
effect on the space planning of the apartment corridors, the position of the lift and the 
layout of post boxes at ground level.   
 
These two connected extracts from the design process highlight an ongoing sequence of 
assessment and experimentation, not dissimilar to the creative process described by 
Deleuze and Guattari in the quotation introducing this chapter. It shows how designers 
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identified a key area of the design (such as the foundations and the structural frame), 
identified factors that influenced this design (such as sandy ground conditions and 
airborne salt), assessed how they affected their proposals, and explored a sequence of 
design changes that responded to these factors (changing the material or position of the 
structure, introducing protective paint, welded angles, protective sheeting, additional 
stairs and so forth).  
 
However, this was not the only form of assessment applicable to this scheme. At pre-
conceived stages in this process, the design was also assessed according to formal 
criteria, including those set out in the Code for Sustainable Homes.  
 
2. The Code for Sustainable Homes.  
 
In the UK, the Code for Sustainable Homes is a building industry approved measuring 
tool for the concept of a ‘sustainable home’. It was developed as a supplement to 
Planning Policy Statement 1, ‘Delivering sustainable development’ (DCLG, 2005) 
published by UK central government. This Code identifies nine categories of 
sustainable design. Each of these categories is broken down into contributing design 
issues (Table 1). 
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Table 1: The Code for Sustainable Homes categories and issues. 
Category Issue 
Energy and CO2 Emissions  Dwelling emission rate (M)  
 Fabric energy efficiency (M)  
 Energy display devices  
 Drying space  
 Energy labelled white goods  
 External lighting  
 Low and zero carbon technologies  
 Cycle storage  
 Home office 
Water  Indoor water use (M)  
 External water use 
Materials  Environmental impact of materials (M)  
 Responsible sourcing of materials – 
basic building elements  
 Responsible sourcing of materials – 
finishing elements 
Surface Water Run-off  Management of surface water run-off 
from developments (M)  
 Flood risk 
Waste  Storage of non-recyclable waste and 
recyclable household waste (M)  
 Construction site waste management  
 Composting 
Pollution  Global warming potential (GWP) of 
insulants  
 NOX emissions 
Health and Well-being Management  Daylighting  
 Sound insulation  
 Private space  
 Lifetime Homes (M) 
Management  Home user guide  
 Considerate Constructors Scheme  
 Construction site impacts  
 Security 
Ecology.  Ecological value of site  
 Ecological enhancement  
 Protection of ecological features  
 Change in ecological value of site  
 Building footprint 
(DCLG, 2010: 10) 
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These categories and issues are weighted to reflect their respective contribution to the 
concept of the ‘sustainable home’. By comparing these factors against the properties of 
a design, an appointed Code for Sustainable Homes assessor is able to assign points 
and, thus, classify the scheme as more or less ‘sustainable’.  
 
In the project outlined above, the assessor’s report discussed the decision to change 
from steel piling to contiguous concrete piling and the decision to change from a steel 
frame to a concrete frame. Because concrete produces higher CO2 emissions than a 
comparable unit of steel, the assessor suggested that these changes to the design reduced 
the building’s fabric energy efficiency. As the category, CO2 emissions, is weighted to 
account for 34.6% of the total sustainability assessment, this decision was deemed 
highly ‘unsustainable’. The report suggested re-considering this design decision, or to 
re-design other areas of the scheme to better reflect the criteria. 
 
These conclusions and recommendations in the assessor’s report highlight an interesting 
difference between the formal method of assessment and the assessments made as part 
of the design and development process. By drawing on a universal set of criteria for a 
‘sustainable home’, the assessor was unable to appreciate why steel was rejected in 
favour of concrete. In other words, this formal assessment method did not take full 
account of the integral and on-going approach to assessment used within the design 
process as noted above.  
 
Secondly, it is questionable whether re-visiting the design using a steel foundation and 
structural frame as per the assessor’s advice would have resulted in a more sustainable 
building. Whilst, concrete does have higher CO2 emissions than steel, the extract above 
revealed a number of other implications that might be deemed less ‘sustainable’ when 
considered against a broader definition of the term.  
 
For example, a steel solution would have introduced higher levels of maintenance, and 
thus, higher fabric-related CO2 emissions over the lifetime of the building. It would 
have also demanded far more time on site, longer road closures, more bespoke materials 
each made and installed by different specialists coming from a much wider geographical 
area. The building would be at far greater risk of corrosion which may have affected its 
durability, and constant maintenance could have affected the amount of time residents 
were prepared to stay in the apartments.  
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3. Support from wider literature.  
 
This example from my own, professional experiences is not unique. Other studies have 
identified conflicts between these two forms of assessments. Schweber’s 2013 study, for 
example, is formed from a selection of interviews with key design professionals 
working on eight schemes formally assessed using methods similar to the Code for 
Sustainable Homes (BREEAM). These interviews highlight instances when design 
measures were introduced to meet universal sustainability criteria. These included the 
addition of, 
 
…refrigerant leak detection, flood risk surveys and flood alleviation 
measures, reduction in available parking spaces, cyclist facilities, and 
additional drinking fountains (Schweber, 2013: 137).  
 
Many of the practitioners interviewed by Schweber suggested that these changes 
resulted in questionable ‘trade-offs’ within the design as a whole (Schweber, 2013: 
137). The respondents in Schweber’s study traced these ‘trade-offs’ to a discrepancy 
between an official, universal understanding of ‘sustainability’ and the many different 
interpretations of ‘genuine sustainability’ (Schweber, 2013: 137). Many respondents 
explained these ‘genuine’ forms of sustainability as part of the design process. 
 
The concerns expressed by construction professionals within Schweber’s study are 
captured in a number of other studies. Cole’s study, for example, criticises BREEAM 
for enforcing standardised design solutions over innovative responses to a given context 
(Cole, 2005). Others have argued that ‘trade-offs’ similar to those identified in 
Schweber’s study can result in a poor representation of the building design as a whole, 
because higher scores in some areas of the design can be offset against lower scores in 
other areas (Sawyer et al, 2008).  
 
These concerns are not only presented in academic literature surrounding the Code for 
Sustainable Homes and BREEAM. In 2011 the UK government set out its proposals for 
a ‘Red tape Challenge’ in response to growing concerns across the construction industry 
that assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes and the regulations in which these 
assessments operate are not in-keeping with the demands of design and construction 
practice (UK Government, 2011; DCLG, 2012).  
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3.1. The distinction between two kinds of assessment. 
 
These experiences from practice captured in academic papers and governmental policy 
initiatives point to a distinction between two kinds of assessment: those made during / 
within the design and development process, and those made outside of the design and 
development process. From the perspective of design and development professionals, 
this distinction suggests that certain kinds of formal assessment i.e. highly structured, 
universally applicable assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes (i) ignore many 
of the issues deemed important to actors outside the regulatory framework and (ii) result 
in decisions that such actors deem to be counterproductive to the values directing the 
assessment (such as achieving a sustainable design).  
 
The question one might pose, therefore, is whether these concerns about formal 
assessments are limited to actors working within design and development roles (actors 
whose work is subject to assessment) or whether these concerns are equally felt by 
those working in regulatory / assessment roles (those responsible for forming and 
undertaking these assessments). To answer this question I turn now to some of the 
debates within the field of planning.  
 
It has long been argued that assessment is an intrinsic part of planning theory and 
practice. This stance is captured by Khakee who notes that ‘from both a theoretical and 
practical point of view ‘planning’ and ‘evaluation’ are inseparable concepts’ (Khakee, 
1998: 359). Whilst this assertion has gone mostly uncontested in planning literature, the 
nature, form and objectives of evaluation has been the subject of debate since the 
1950’s. The crux of this debate rests on the normative assumptions used to construct 
goal-centric, universally applicable assessment tools (similar to the Code for 
Sustainable Homes), and whether or not these assumptions continue to be relevant, or 
desirable in contemporary evaluative practice (Borri, 1998).   
 
Several attempts have been made to categorise different assessment methods in order to 
capture this debate. Khakee, for example, provides a historic review of planning 
assessments by drawing on and adapting Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) classification of 
assessment methods (Khakee, 2003; Alexander, 2006). This classification identifies 
four ‘generations’ of assessment design. The first three generations are presented as a 
sequence in which the focus of assessment changes from a unit of measurement (such as 
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cost), to pre-defined goals against which variations are judged (such as the goal for 
social equality or sustainable development) to a greater focus on objective ‘value free’ 
standards (Khakee, 2003; Alexander, 2006). Despite this shift in focus, Khakee notes 
that these three generations of assessment design are underpinned by the same 
normative assumption, namely that a single assessment model can be applied in a 
systematic manner to every project or policy used in all contexts. 
 
It is this idea of a universal model of assessment that is challenged in the most recent, 
‘fourth generation’ of assessment methods. Rather than an assessment based on a pre-
defined focus or set of criteria, such assessments, 
 
…take the form of a discourse between stakeholders who are directly or 
indirectly affected by a policy measure. It becomes a question of 
negotiations rather than of a search for a specific objective … (Khakee, 
2003: 343) 
 
A similar distinction can be seen in the assessment categories outlined by Söderbaum, 
(1998). Söderbaum identifies three groups of assessment: highly aggregated 
assessments, intermediary assessments and highly disaggregated assessments. 
According to Söderbaum, the first of these assessment types, highly aggregated 
assessments, are characterised by their attempts to sum up the impacts or success of a 
project / policy according to a single value. As Söderbaum notes, such assessments 
assume that a specific set of values is common across all actors and areas of society 
(Söderbaum, 1998: 53). Like highly aggregated assessments, intermediary forms of 
assessment focus on one objective, but aim to include the interests of different actors in 
the given project or policy.  
 
The third kind of assessment, highly disaggregated methods, provide a clear shift away 
the first two forms by rejecting the use of  pre-defined objectives or assessment models 
intended to capture this objective: 
 
Since the aim is not to capture a single collective value or to reduce effects 
to a simplified scheme, these methods are multi-dimensional and flexible. 
The design of the methods adapts to the changing context, and not only are 
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the results important but also the way of arriving at them (Khakee, 2003: 
345). 
 
Whilst expressed in different ways, these two attempts to categorise the ideas 
underpinning assessment methods reflect a distinction between two broad groups of 
assessment design: an assessment that focuses on a single objective and uses a pre-
defined, universally applicable method for assessing that design; and a flexible, 
contingent method that looks to identify the objective and approach of the assessment 
by engaging with the views of different actors in the project/planning process (Khakee, 
2003; Borri, 1998; Alexander, 2006). According to Borri, developments in planning 
assessment theory over the last few years have been marked by growing support for the 
latter. This is particularly evident in academic literature, which shows growing concern 
about formal evaluation exercises (Borri, 1998). Such literature has questioned the 
normative assumptions held by such assessments, calling, instead for a more ‘sensitive’ 
approach to evaluation ‘in which the positions of the less politically represented -both 
humans and non-humans can be fully acknowledged and respected’. Such arguments 
have also suggested that combinations of expertise and ‘commonsense’ have resulted in 
more creative outcomes and greater levels of resilience (Borri, 1998: 276). This shift 
towards flexible forms of assessment that better reflect the views of different actors is 
often characterised as part of a broader paradigm shift across planning theory, noted by 
many as a move from positivism to post-positivism (Henkel, 1991; Khakee et al, 2000; 
Khakee, 2003) or/and from modernism to post-modernism (Alexander, 1998; Lawrence, 
2000; Fischer, 2003). 
 
This argument, and the debate within the field of planning assessment design reflects 
the two observations I made above, namely that formal, universally applicable 
assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes (i) ignore many of the issues deemed 
important to actors outside the regulatory framework and (ii) result in decisions that 
some of these actors deem as counterproductive to the values directing the assessment. 
Rather than removing all formal assessments, therefore, the debates in planning theory 
suggest that these concerns might be resolved through the introduction of new, more 
context specific assessment tools.  
 
Yet, whilst this stance continues to grow in academic circles, it remains underdeveloped 
in practice. Alexander, for example, notes that, 
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In planning practice, if not so much in prescriptive theory, all the evaluation 
methods that have ever “evolved” are still in use today and those we think 
the most “primitive” are the ones enjoying the most widespread application. 
(Alexander, 2006: 14) 
 
Similar observations are noted by the evaluation theorist and practitioner Mary Henkel 
who observed that, despite theoretical shifts away from positivism, evaluative practice 
remains heavily reliant on positivist principles (Henkel, 1991).  
 
Many attempts have been made within planning theory to explain why these flexible 
forms of assessment remain underdeveloped in practice. For Borri it is owing to the 
influence of market-driven processes (Borri, 1998). For Lichfield and Prat, it is driven 
by governmental procedures that demand clear, demonstrable progress against policy 
objectives (Lichfield and Prat, 1998). Whilst for Baum, it is encouraged by the planners 
themselves, who demand ‘psychological reassurances’ of ‘good’ decision making 
(Baum, 1996; see also Alexander and Faludi, 1989). 
 
I believe that the most compelling explanation for the relative absence of flexible, 
context specific assessment tools in practice is captured in Fischer’s support for a 
structured, universally applicable, systematic process underpinning formal 
Environmental Assessments (Fischer, 2003). To appreciate Fischer’s arguments, and to 
help articulate the debate between advocates of both forms of assessment design, the 
following sub-section sets out the key points in Fischer’s argument, and follows this 
with a response from Richardson (Richardson, 2005).  
 
3.2. Arguments for and against flexible, context specific assessments  
 
Fischer’s stance against flexible assessments can be summarised according to four 
arguments. The first of these arguments centres on the existing structures and policy 
advances currently in place. Unlike post-modern assessments, the structure 
underpinning Environmental Assessments, he posits, is designed to accommodate 
existing hierarchies within the policy-making and planning process. Equally, the 
objectives used to direct this systematic assessment process is based on established 
definitions of the concept, ‘sustainable development’. This concept, he notes, has been 
debated and discussed in policy literature for many years and the resulting definition 
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represents a consensus between these different political interests.  The call for wide-
ranging, context and actor specific definitions, he argues, works counter to these efforts 
and achievements. With this in mind, Fischer argues that a flexible, context specific 
approach to assessment would not be able to serve what is formally recognised as 
‘Sustainable Development’. This point is not limited to the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ but could be equally applied to other broad, aspirational concepts (such as 
achieving social or territorial cohesion, a sense of community etc). 
 
Fischer’s second argument builds on this idea of a single, consensual definition by 
relating it to an underlying need for ‘common-ground’ in and across different parts of 
the development hierarchy. Re-iterating the post-modern image of a society formed 
from conflicting systems of value, Fischer questions whether one is able to capture such 
complexity and uncertainty methodologically. Rather than form a partial representation 
of this complexity, he argues, it is better to introduce a single set of values that can help 
to unite different points of view. For Fischer, a systematic, object-led and universal 
method, like the one used in Environmental Assessments (EA), 
 
…helps [to] reconcile differing goals and objectives through integration, 
thus uncovering inconsistencies and providing a platform for suggestions on 
how to achieve [a singularly defined objective for] sustainable development. 
(Fischer, 2003: 164) 
 
This unifying approach, he adds, introduces benefits that would otherwise be absent 
from a more flexible and context sensitive method. One such benefit includes the level 
of accountability offered by this approach to assessment design. By using the same 
method and principles at each stage in the policy, planning, and development process, 
one can map progress and identify blockages, deviations and improvements to this 
overarching agenda (Fischer, 2003).  
 
Fischer’s third argument rests on the idea that some degree of universality and 
systematic design are an inherent part of all assessments. Even the most flexible, post-
modern methods, he argues, still rely on ‘similar procedural stages as those present in 
‘traditional’ impact assessment’ (Fischer, 2003: 163).  
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The fourth line of argument in Fischer’s paper develops around his assertion that actors 
working in specific contexts are unable to pay due consideration to broader objectives. 
Drawing reference to the commonly used term, ‘NIMBY’ (Not In My Back Yard)  he 
suggest that many actors with a vested interest in a specific locality will place values 
specific to that locality, or their role in that locality above those that he regards as 
national or international in scope such as agendas for sustainable development. In this 
sense, Fischer suggests that systematic, object-led and universally applicable 
assessments like the EA are far more effective at capturing the broader ‘public interest’ 
than flexible, context specific assessments.  
 
Richardson’s response to Fischer’s paper is framed around these two final arguments. 
Whilst Fischer suggests that universal, systematic principles are an inevitable part of 
assessment design, Richardson argues that flexibility and differing values affect how 
such assessments are implemented.  Building on a number of experiences working with 
Environmental Assessments in practice, he concludes that, 
 
…most actors—planners, politicians, and stakeholders—see EA as an 
opportunity to persuade, to mediate, and to contest. This is necessary 
because that is how planning is. EA is being used by actors in the real world 
to mediate and contest value differences and conflicts, and EA practitioners 
are engaged in the daily business of mediating values, consciously and 
ethically or not, yet the EA community seems divided on whether this is 
happening, appropriate, or desirable. (Richardson, 2005: 359). 
 
This quotation shows that, for Richardson, efforts to construct scientifically sound 
procedures using fixed processes and definitions are not carried forward in practice. 
Whilst used to draw very different conclusions, this observation is equally 
acknowledged by Fischer who, in previous studies, talks about a slippage in the use and 
understanding of EA’s since its introduction in the 1980s (Fischer and Seaton, 2002).  
 
For Richardson, this practical reality of systematic, object-led assessments reflects a 
much broader issue in the principles used to construct them. In response to Fischer’s 
fourth argument, Richardson challenges the underlying belief that ‘bottom up 
expressions of (different) positions (will) interfere with broader, more strategic 
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environmental aims’ (Richardson, 2005: 347). Richardson’s challenge rests on several, 
connected points.  
 
Firstly, Richardson argues that Fischer’s comment suggests that local values act as the 
greatest barrier to creating a ‘good’ environment. Yet, he notes, one might equally point 
to a number to instances in which much broader, economic strategies have had a 
significant and negative effect on environmental conditions in the area. Secondly, it 
infers that one system of values (held by policy makers or/and expert planners) are more 
important than all other, contradictory systems of value (held by many different actors 
with different roles and interests in a given context). The problem here, he argues, is 
that,  
 
…we do not yet have an accepted basis in planning for asserting or deciding 
that certain environmental objectives should, in certain cases, override 
locally expressed objectives. (Richardson, 2005: 348). 
 
For Richardson, references to a political consensus on the definition of ‘sustainable 
development’ do not resolve this issue, because they still fail to explain why this goal 
should be prioritised other competing goals. Thirdly, Richardson asks whether it is 
ethical to ‘simply design these supposed opposing positions out of the process’ in order 
to create a method that better reflects a policy and development hierarchy rather than 
‘deal(ing) with the presence of multiple and often conflicting values, and ways of 
valuing’ (Richardson, 2005: 348). For Richardson, an inability to capture these different 
views should be seen as a failure in the assessment design rather than as proof that such 
views should not be accommodated. 
 
This brief overview of the debate between Fischer and Richardson reveal important 
lessons about the two kinds of assessment identified earlier in the chapter. Whilst 
Richardson provides a compelling argument against two of the key points in Fischer’s 
paper, he does not dismiss Fischer’s underlying point that structured, systematic forms 
of universal assessment perform functions that are not easily met by a more flexible, 
contextually sensitive method. These kinds of assessment, like the EA, provide actors 
higher up in the development hierarchy with an indication as to how a given scheme 
relates to broader policy objectives, however questionable these might be. As Fischer 
notes, this structure and policy framework is already in place and is unlikely to change 
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in any significant way over the short to medium term. Fischer’s paper also demonstrates 
that these kinds of assessments provide a means through which different projects and 
interventions can be understood as part of a ‘whole’, rather than as a collection of 
individual cases. This brief review of the debate suggests that both kinds of assessments 
(which, in the following Chapter I identify as ‘essentialist’ and non-essentialist 
assessments) perform different roles and respond to different concerns. This position is 
dealt with more fully in the findings from this study (Chapters 8 and 9). 
 
Given that these assessments perform different roles, it is questionable whether one set 
of assessments could completely replace another. In other words, developing a flexible, 
context sensitive assessment to fulfil the gap in practice noted above remains an 
important line of development but one should not necessary expect that such 
assessments will fully replace existing, object-led, universally applicable forms of 
assessment. This review of the debate also shows why proposals to integrate the two 
assessment types might prove problematic (see Lichfield, 2001 for example). As 
Richardson notes (2005), arguments for the former were introduced to challenge 
existing assessment practice and are based on very different principles.  
 
Perhaps the strongest direction for developing assessment methods in light of these two 
stances is made by Alexander who encourages efforts to develop new flexible methods, 
not to replace or merge with object-led, universally applicable assessments but to offer 
planners a broader set of assessment tools (Alexander, 2006). This, he adds, will 
facilitate assessment selection to best reflect the demands of a given project and the 
demands of different actors rather than reflecting normative practice. 
 
…it will be a rare case in planning or policy making when good practice will 
not call for a combination of some methods, in view of the limits of each 
particular evaluation method … understanding the whole kit of evaluation 
tools, and knowing which ones to select for a particular purpose, may be 
more important today than deeper familiarity with one family of methods or 
more sophisticated quantitative or statistical skills (Alexander, 2006: 50). 
 
Alexander’s stance is a reasonable one given the points and observations discussed in 
this chapter. The question as to whether or not such flexible, context sensitive 
assessments are possible, what they might look like and whether there is any validity in 
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this suggestion will be considered across the course of the following chapters and 
discussed specifically in Chapter 9.  
 
A number of key figures in planning literature suggest that advances in planning theory 
might provide the strongest starting point for developing this alternative kind of 
assessment. Lawrence, for example, suggests that the development of object-led, 
universally applicable assessment methods, such as the Environmental Assessments and 
the Code for Sustainable Homes discussed above, have, 
 
…largely failed to benefit from planning theory insights and lessons. 
Obstacles and dilemmas already encountered and addressed in planning 
theory are still hampering [assessment] theory building and practice 
(Lawrence, 2000: 607) 
 
Whilst Richardson supports Lawrence’s argument for a stronger link between 
developments in planning theory and assessment practice he questions Lawrence’s 
proposals, which he likens to ‘…‘downloading’ (complex theories) into a related area of 
practice, such as environmental assessment’. Instead, Richardson argues that one must, 
‘engage in more detailed exploration of the issues that are raised by particular 
theoretical approaches, so that the potential contributions can be handled sensitively’ 
(Richardson, 2005: 342). 
 
A similar argument is raised in much broader debates concerning the link between 
planning theory and planning practice. One of the key voices in this area comes from 
the planning theorist, Heather Campbell, who notes that,  
 
Few, if any … philosophers had planning in mind as the context in which 
they intended their ideas to be applied... Their horizons are therefore 
broader than a subsection of public policy making concerned with the 
creation of place and the mediation of space. This is not to dismiss this 
hugely significant body of work but to caution the appropriateness of direct 
translation (Campbell, 2006: 93) 
 
Campbell and Richardson, therefore, share in common the idea that abstract theory, 
especially theory with a strong link to philosophy, cannot be transferred directly into 
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planning practice. ‘Rather than seeking to import ‘lessons’ from planning theory,’ 
argues Richardson, ‘the aim is to try and ‘see’ [assessment practice] through the eyes of 
planning theory’ (Richardson, 2005: 342). In doing so, one must use theory in a 
different way: 
 
…instead of advocating solutions to procedural dilemmas, for example, the 
idea is to see if these dilemmas might be thought about differently if they 
were addressed in the ways that some planning theorists have thought about 
planning (Richardson, 2005: 342). 
 
These arguments suggest that, to develop an alternative form of assessment that reflects 
some of the observations and arguments made above, one must draw on philosophy and 
planning theory as a way to ‘see’ problems; to critique existing normative practices; and 
to re-think how these practices might play out differently.  
 
This line of enquiry forms the basis for the subsequent chapter (Chapter 2). Following 
the advice offered by both Richardson and Campbell, Chapter 2 starts by exploring the 
philosophical principles underpinning the object-led, universally applicable assessment 
used to introduce this thesis (the Code for Sustainable Homes). It will show how these 
principles are derived from essentialism and can be seen across many areas of design 
and planning practice, as well as attempts to critical engage with such methods.   
 
Building on these arguments I will show why I believe Deleuze’s non-essentialist 
concepts offer new opportunities for ‘seeing’ these concerns and for developing a new 
kind of assessment tool that better reflects the complex issues specific to context and the 
way professionals engage in that context. 
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Chapter 2: Essentialist and non-essentialist assessments 
 
1. An essentialist phenomenon in planning assessments. 
 
As noted in the closing paragraph of the last chapter, the first aim of this chapter is to 
appreciate formal assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes in broader, 
theoretical terms. To assist with this exercise, I start by re-presenting the table offered in 
the technical literature for the Code for Sustainable Homes in a spatial rather than a 
tabular format (Figure 3). 
 
 Figure 1: Diagram of the Code for Sustainable Homes. 
 
33 
 
The figure above shows how the concept of the ‘sustainable home’ branches out into 
nine other concepts, and each of these concepts, in turn, branch out into a number of 
different factors. Thinking back to the last chapter, ‘the sustainable home’ acts as a 
single goal broken-down into a number of factors deemed fundamental to achieving this 
objective. Using Khakee’s framework one might conclude that the Code for Sustainable 
Homes belongs to the ‘second generation’ of assessment methods because it is 
constructed around pre-defined goals against which variations are judged (Khakee, 
2003). The figure also shows that, by summing up the impacts or success of a project 
according to a single value (i.e. a Code for Sustainable Homes score) this assessment 
reflects Söderbaum’s description of a ‘highly aggregated’ form of assessment 
(Söderbaum, 1998).  
 
These two frameworks help position the Code for Sustainable Homes amongst other 
assessment types within a select area of planning and loosely explain the principles used 
in their construction. However, as Richardson notes, if one is to ‘see’ the problems 
underpinning these assessments, and to explore alternative directions for development, 
then one must draw on more abstract, philosophical ideas.  
 
With this in mind, I posit that the tree-like structure of the assessment is the result of a 
set of principle drawn from an area of thinking known as ‘essentialism’ (see Abrahams, 
2013). In simple terms, essentialism holds that any material or non-material entity has a 
number of traits that are deemed essential to its identity or/and its function (Cartwright, 
1968; Sayer, 1997; Barrett, 2001). In this instance, the figure above suggests that there 
are nine components that, together, form the total identity and function of a sustainable 
home
8
.  
 
Whilst these components and traits may all be considered as essential, the Code does 
not treat them as equal contributors to this identity and function. In the figure above, I 
have positioned each component or trait at heights relative to their weighting. So, for 
example, ‘energy and CO2 emissions’, ‘water’ and ‘materials’ are all essential to the 
concept of the sustainable home. Yet, ‘CO2  emissions’ forms 36.4% of the concept, 
‘water’ accounts for 9% and ‘materials’ account for 7.2%.  
 
                                                     
8
 Hence, why the sum of these eight categories form 100% of the assessment 
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The figure also illustrates how the same essentialist approach is used to define the 
identity and function of these eight components. There are, for example, nine 
components that, together, form the total identify and function of ‘CO2 emissions’. And 
again, these components are weighted differently to reflect the extent of their 
contribution (shown as different heights in the figure). The result of this essentialist 
approach is a universally applicable assessment ‘model’ for the otherwise vague 
concept of ‘the sustainable home’, which, for the purposes of this thesis, I would like 
capture using the shorthand term, ‘modelled concept’. 
 
1.1. Other essentialist modelled concept-based assessment tools.  
 
Whilst Khakee and Söderbaum’s frameworks were used to categorise a select area of 
assessments, the theoretical image of the ‘modelled concept’ helps to reveal a much 
broader, essentialist phenomenon affecting the construction of many kinds of planning 
or/and design tools.  
  
At the scale of European spatial policy one can identify the same, essentialist principles 
in the efforts made by the European Spatial Policy Observation Network to measure the 
concept of ‘territorial cohesion’ (European Territorial Cohesion Indicators) and to 
assess how spatial policies across the EU contribute to the concept of territorial 
cohesion (Territorial Impact Assessments) (Abrahams, 2013). In both instances, the 
concept of territorial cohesion is modelled according to its essential traits. 
 
At national scale the concept of ‘deprivation’ has been modelled many times in the UK 
over the last few years, each attempt resulting in a variant of the assessment tool, the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). This interest in deprivation has been mirrored 
with concern over national ‘wellbeing’ and ‘happiness’ (ONS, 2011a). The Office for 
National Statistics has undertaken a number of research projects to measure these 
concepts (ONS, 2011; 2011a). As with the ETCI and IMD, these multiple indicators are 
based on efforts to define a vague concept through, what are believed to be, its essential 
traits.  
 
At the level of urban development, Heritage Impact Assessments are often used to 
assess a proposal’s impact on a site of historic importance. The criteria for judging such 
impacts are determined by recognised standards for evaluating buildings or sites of 
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Outstanding Universal Value (UNESCO, 2013). This measure is formed from various 
criteria used to award UNESCO status for World Heritage sites (ICOMOS, 2010). 
Whilst less strict than other modelled concept-based tools, this criteria and the 
assessments used, follow a model drawn from the vague concept of ‘Outstanding 
Universal Value’. 
 
At an even finer scale, modelled concepts are also used to form sector-specific 
assessments such as the Housing Quality Indicators 2007 and the London Housing 
Design Guides 2010 (The National Affordable Housing Agency, 2007; Design for 
London, 2010). Both these guides define a number of traits deemed essential to a ‘well-
designed’ or ‘quality’ housing scheme. And both of these guides use these traits to 
identify material factors that serve as a definitive checklist for designers, developers and 
planners.  
 
These examples show that ‘modelled concepts’ have underpinned the construction of 
many different assessment tools used by a range of actors in development and 
regulatory processes. Whilst my use of the term ‘modelled concept’ is a new addition to 
the study of such assessments, as I will show in the following sub-section, I am not the 
first theorist to make the link between essentialism and object-led, universally 
applicable assessment tools. Similarly, I am not the first theorist to show that these 
essential principles result in tools that fail to reflect complex contextual factors, and the 
decisions made by actors working within those contexts. Some of the most compelling 
and detailed arguments against essentialist assessment tools are presented by planning 
theorists belonging to two traditions: pragmatism and discourse analysis.    
 
2. Debates in planning theory: considering alternatives to essentialist tools. 
 
In the following, I will review each of these bodies of literature in turn. I will address 
some of the main arguments presented by key figures in the respective fields and show 
how these arguments relate to the observations and comments raised in Chapter 1. I will 
also identify some of the limitations within these arguments and explain why I believe 
Deleuze’s philosophy might help resolve these limitations. 
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2.1. Pragmatism and communicative planning.  
 
My concerns over essentialism and the tools derived from essentialism, i.e. tools based 
on modelled concepts, are reflected in the work of several pragmatist planning theorists. 
According to Healey, pragmatists share a mutual rejection of simple, essentialist 
definitions used as ‘first principles’ in ‘designing practice’ (Healey, 2009). And, as in 
the example used to introduce this thesis, many of these positions draw on cases from 
specific milieu to highlight the problems associated with essentialist planning tools.  
 
For Jamal et al, some of the disagreements and divisions during the planning process 
can be traced to the use of essentialist labels (Jamal et al, 2002). Empirical studies 
suggest that such problems arise when the characteristics of a particular issue or 
stakeholder group do not translate into a pre-conceived definition (Jamal, et al, 2002).  
 
When these definitions are used as the basis for planning tools, it seems they introduce 
other problems. In their study of ‘sustainable planning’ in rural communities Markey et 
al found that these tools were incompatible with rural contexts and could not be adapted 
(Markey et al, 2010: 19). Successful projects undertaken in the study area, they note, 
were those in which simple solutions could be found to meet problems as and when they 
arose (Markey et al, 2010: 16, 19). 
 
For many, such findings are not limited to any one geographical area or setting. Stein 
and Harper draw on empirical studies to identify conclusions about the effects of 
essentialism in planning practice more broadly. They argue that essentialist planning 
tools impede creativity and innovation because they encourage designers and planners 
to apply rules rather than responding to specific issues (Stein and Harper, 2012). These 
problems occur because of a disjunction between a politically motivated concept and the 
pragmatic demands that arise during implementation (Batty, 2006: 38). Whilst the 
former seeks certainty and the reduction of risk, the latter must engage with the 
‘‘wickedness’ of complexity and uncertainty’ (Batty, 2006: 33).  
 
To resolve these problems, many pragmatists have argued that normative planning 
practice should re-think its engagement with complexity and uncertainty. One of the 
most important ways of doing this, they argue, is by keeping concepts like sustainability 
‘fluid’, ‘fuzzy’ and adaptable (Jamal et al, 2002; Harper and Stein, 2006; Stein and 
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Harper, 2012; Healey, 2009; de Roo and Porter, 2007). Many studies have shown that 
this fluidity is often unavoidable. Drawing on several planning studies in several 
countries, Healey notes that concepts constructed in one milieu change when they 
‘travel’ to other parts of the world and into other planning systems (Healey 2012; 
Healey and Upton, 2010; Tait and Jensen, 2007).  
 
In this pragmatic alternative, therefore, truth or meaning is held as something constantly 
reasserted through experiences within practice. For Healey, planners must constantly 
ask, ‘so what does this mean for us here?’ and now? (Healey, 2009). In this sense, 
meaning is considered temporal and immanent. Or, as Richard Rorty argued, the 
concepts we use are ‘temporary resting places constructed for specific utilitarian ends’ 
(Rorty, 1982: xli) rather than fixed and universally applicable.  
 
Stein and Harper argue that these temporal, immanent concepts should be created 
through dialogue. Their proposals for a ‘dialogical planning’ approach builds on 
developments in communicative planning and the techniques used to construct meaning 
within the specific conditions of an issue and context (Harper and Stein, 2006; Healey, 
1996; Innes and Booher, 1999; 1999a).  
 
2.2. Discourse analysis.  
 
Another line of argument against essentialism in planning can be seen in the work of 
discourse analysts such as Hajer who notes that discourse analysis is based on, 
 
…an anti-essentialist ontology; it assumes the existence of multiple, socially 
constructed realities instead of a single reality, governed by immutable 
natural laws… [it] takes a critical stance towards ‘truth’ and puts emphasis 
on communications through which knowledge is exchanged (Hajer, 2005) 
 
Whilst discourse analysts and pragmatists share a common ‘anti-essentialist’ stance they 
approach this argument in a very different way. Indeed, discourse analysts provide one 
of the most convincing and consistent challenges to pragmatist and communicative 
planning. 
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For discourse analysts, pragmatism and communicative planning does not take 
sufficient account of broader, political forces (Fainstein, 2000; 2005; Huxley, 2000; 
Flyvbjerg, 1998) or conflict (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002). According to Fainstein, 
it is ‘naïve’ for us to imagine that the meanings we construct through dialogue do not 
draw on wider political discourses and ideologies (Fainstein, 2000). 
 
For discourse analysts like Fainstein, concepts are understood through a range of 
meanings rather than according to one essentialist definition. But, unlike pragmatic-
collaborative planners, they hold that these meanings are not created from within 
practice alone. Rather, these constructions are conditioned by overarching discourses. 
Hajer’s study of acid rain in British politics (Hajer, 1993) Richardson and Jensen’s 
study of space in European politics (2001) and Waterhout’s study of territorial cohesion 
in European spatial planning (Waterhout, 2007) provide good examples of this 
argument. These studies each identify the dominant meanings of a concept and link 
them to a set of discourses each competing for a hegemonic position in the field. 
 
As analytical studies, these examples do not provide planners with an alternative, non-
essentialist approach to practice. However, they do help the planning community 
understand the consequences that arise when one essentialist definition dominates 
practice. Richardson and Jensen found that, in order to embed itself within planning 
practices, a discourse must marginalise other discourses and other meanings 
(Richardson and Jensen, 2001: 715; 2003: 19). By doing so, policy is directed towards 
one group of actors and away from another (Richardson and Jensen, 2001). 
 
The empirical studies undertaken by pragmatist/collaborative planners and discourse 
analysts highlight consequences arising from the use of modelled concepts not 
identified in my own experiences (Chapter 1). These include exacerbated conflicts in 
planning discussions, ‘implementation gaps’, suppressed creativity and marginalised 
interest groups. Bringing these studies together, pragmatism, collaborative planning and 
discourse analysis suggest that concepts should be considered as ‘fluid’ and adaptable. 
Their meaning should be created to meet the operational demands of practice (as argued 
by pragmatists). However, not all creations are possible. The possibilities for creating 
concepts are conditioned by broader forces, including those directed by politics and 
discourse (as argued by discourse analysts). 
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2.3. The problem with pragmatism/collaborative planning and discourse analysis.  
 
Whilst these arguments provide a useful stance against essentialism, and show a number 
of commonalities with the observations and concerns noted in Chapter 1, they are 
limited by their human-centric understanding of the complex world around us. The 
pragmatist/collaborative planner focuses on planning discussions, whilst the discourse 
analyst focuses on the conditions set by political discourse. Van Wazemael argues that 
this non-realist focus on language ‘…reinforce[s] a perspective where almost everything 
is related to hermeneutic, linguistic or sociological constructions.’ (Van Wazemael, 
2012: 97). And, in doing so, these stances suggest that the complexity seen in 
design/plan-making
9
 processes is ‘a property of humans interpreting reality’ rather than 
‘a property of reality’ itself (Van Wazemael, 2012: 97).  
 
For Van Wazemael, the human-centric, interpretative approaches underpinning 
pragmatism/collaborative planning and discourse analysis maintain ‘the essentialist 
perception of matter as inert, passive and docile’ (Van Wazemael, 2012: 98). Thus, 
whilst these areas of planning theory have been keen antagonists of essentialist 
definitions, for Van Wazemael, they form these anti-essentialist arguments whilst 
holding onto an essentialist understanding of the material world. If we are to avoid 
material as well as conceptual essences, he argues, we must see ‘complexity [as] a 
property of reality’ and the design/plan-making processes as a way of engaging within 
this complexity (Van Wazemael, 2012: 97).  
 
Van Wazemael’s broader critique of essentialism, and his support for complexity as a 
property of reality, points to a new direction for developing arguments against the 
essentialist phenomenon in planning. The direction that Van Wazemael and others have 
taken in order to better understand complexity and essentialism returns us to the 
philosophical terrain that directs this thesis, namely the realist philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze (see Van Wazemael, 2008; 2010; 2012; Hillier and Van Wazemael, 2012; 
Hillier, 2007; Trummer, 2012; Wood, 2009; DeLanda, 2006).  
 
 
 
                                                     
9I use the term ‘plan-making’ to highlight a broader set of processes including policy-
making, strategic plan making, local plan making, urban and building plan-making 
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3. Deleuze’s philosophy. 
 
The versatility and breadth of concepts used in Deleuze’s realist ontology offers some 
explanation for its growing popularity amongst the planning community. Deleuze 
constructs his philosophy by drawing on a number of different fields of knowledge. 
Such fields include art, cinema, literature, architecture, geography, psychoanalysis, 
politics and history. Each of these disciplines presents Deleuze with a different ‘milieu’ 
in which to construct and re-channel his ideas (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). Deleuze 
uses concepts from these different ‘milieux’ to serve very similar, explanatory roles in 
his ontology. In one such example, DeLanda argues that the ‘intensive processes’ drawn 
from his study of complexity science is used in a similar way to ‘territorialisation’ from 
his study of geography and geology, ‘coding’ from his study of linguistics and 
institutions, ‘desiring production’ from his study of psychoanalysis and the ‘plane of 
composition’ in his study of art and philosophy (DeLanda, 2002: 202-223).  
 
In doing so, Deleuze achieves two things. Firstly, he offers theorists from different 
fields of knowledge a number of gateways into his work. Secondly, he shows that the,  
 
…conclusions [he makes] do not depend on his particular choice of 
resources, or the particular lines of argument he uses, but that they are robust 
to changes in theoretical assumptions and strategies. Clearly if the same 
conclusions can be reached from entirely different points of departure and 
following entirely different paths, the validity of these conclusions is thereby 
strengthened (DeLanda, 2002: 4).  
 
For DeLanda, therefore, Deleuze’s philosophical project intends to demonstrate how the 
theoretical framework he creates can be identified in, and subsequently used by, all 
areas of knowledge. Massumi captures a similar point in his preface to the Chinese 
edition of A thousand plateaus when he states that Deleuze’s work provides a 
‘conceptual toolkit’ to help resolve problems in different fields (Massumi, 2010).  
 
4. So, what is Deleuze’s non-essentialist ontology? 
 
Before I discuss the ontological concepts Deleuze uses to oppose essentialism, I would 
like to explain how I have structured my reading of Deleuze’s concepts. After all, there 
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have been a number of attempts to reconstruct Deleuze’s ontological framework. Levi 
Bryant, for example, reconstructs Deleuze’s work and combines it with ideas from other 
theorists including Harman and Bhaskar to support his argument for an object-
orientated ontology, or ‘onticology’ (Bryant, 2011). In a seemingly opposing stance, 
Brian Massumi’s publications reconstruct Deleuze’s work and combine it with ideas 
from James and Whitehead to support his argument for an event-orientated ontology 
(Massumi, 2013). These object and event focused studies are important interpretations. 
But their connection to this thesis topic is less obvious than the one offered by Manuel 
DeLanda, who frames his reconstruction around a rejection of essentialism (DeLanda, 
2002) and our understanding of space (DeLanda, 2006). Given that these are 
fundamental issues in this thesis, I intend to call on DeLanda’s work in particular and to 
draw on other interpretations as broader frames of reference
10
.  
 
According to DeLanda, Deleuze’s philosophy provides us with three arguments against 
essentialism and five concepts serving as the basis for an alternative approach. These 
concepts are: the assemblage, becomings, multiplicity, blocks of becoming, and the 
virtual diagrams (plane of immanence)
11
. As I will show, these arguments and concepts 
provide a strong basis from which to understand the problems associated with modelled 
concept-based tools outlined in Chapter 1, and a useful direction for developing an 
assessment method not constructed around a modelled concept.  
 
4.1 Argument 1: A whole and its parts.  
 
The first of Deleuze’s arguments against essentialism concerns the relationship between 
a whole and its component parts. According to DeLanda, essentialism is characterised 
by an underlying belief in the,  
 
relations of interiority: [in which] the component parts are constituted by the 
very relations they have to other parts in the whole 
(DeLanda, 2006: 9).  
 
                                                     
10
 The strategic use of this essentialist/non-essentialist frame is discussed further in 
Chapter 9 
11
 A  working definition of these concepts is outlined below 
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Because of this relationship, essentialists assume that we can understand the whole by 
the cumulative properties of the components. And inversely, the properties of the whole 
can be used to explain the properties of the individual components (DeLanda, 2006).  
 
These relations of interiority can be seen in the modelled concept for ‘the sustainable 
home’. Figure 1 suggests that ‘the sustainable home’ as a whole, can be explained, and 
indeed is assessed, by the list of factors at the bottom of the figure. Equally, it suggests 
that the meaning of CO2 emissions is explained by its position within the assessment 
model as a whole.  
 
Assemblage.  
 
Deleuze argues that these relations between the whole and their components fail to 
account for instances when the whole has properties not present in the component parts. 
A building may contribute to the sustainability of local businesses, for example, yet, this 
property of the building as a whole might not be visible in the components that form the 
design. Equally, there are instances when individual components have properties that do 
not contribute to the building as a whole, but contribute to other buildings, other spaces 
or other social groups. A building façade might be designed to include false windows to 
reflect local vernacular or to improve the safety of a community, even though these 
windows contribute little to the building’s intended use. Thus, for Deleuze, not all 
properties are utilised by the totality in which we find them. And taking this further, 
entities should not be understood according to their properties, but by the way they 
operate in combination with other entities in different groups (DeLanda, 2006).  
 
This argument for the relations of exteriority is captured in Deleuze’s suggestion that all 
entities are formed as a collection of other entities, which he terms ‘the assemblage’. 
DeLanda argues that each and every assemblage can be understood both as an 
individual formed of component individuals and as a component in another assemblage.  
 
4.2 Argument 2: The referential model.  
 
This leads me onto the second argument Deleuze raises against essentialist thinking. 
According to DeLanda, this argument relates to the use of ‘essences [that] … act as 
models, eternally maintaining their identity’ and used to understand the individuals we 
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come across in the future (DeLanda, 2002: 6). For Deleuze, this approach starts from 
the wrong position. Rather than studying the real world to justify a set of definitions 
defined in advanced, he argues that we should start from within the real and the 
differences we find there (DeLanda, 2002).  
 
This argument against the referential model is at the heart of Deleuze’s seminal 
monograph, Difference and repetition (Deleuze, 2004). For Deleuze, the concepts of 
difference and repetition are some of the most underdeveloped in philosophy. In both 
instance, he argues, they are only understood in reference to a stable, identified case or 
model and judged according to the extent of their similarity. Difference, for example, is 
only ever understood as difference to, and seen as a negation of something already 
agreed upon (Deleuze, 2004).  
 
The concept of repetition, suffers from a similar problem. Repetition is always 
considered as the repetition of an original, identified case. This, he argues, is ‘a static 
repetition…[one that] refers back to a single concept, which leaves only an external 
difference between the ordinary instances of a figure.’ (Deleuze, 2004: 23). For 
Deleuze, therefore, these repetitions recognise objects according to their similarities 
rather than their ‘internal differences, which it incorporates in each of its moments’ 
(Deleuze, 2004: 23).  
 
This critique of repetition and difference can be seen in the example used to introduce 
this thesis. For the Code for Sustainable Homes assessor, the decision to change from a 
steel frame to a concrete frame took the design further away from the pre-conceived 
referential model of a ‘sustainable home’. In other words, this difference was judged as 
something different to the referential model of the ‘sustainable home’, not a difference 
generated from within the design itself.  
 
Deleuze’s concept of the assemblage helps us overcome this focus on sameness and 
similarity. For Deleuze, each assemblage we see around us in the actual world is unique, 
which is why he asks that we think of them as individuals (DeLanda, 2006). When we 
bring entities together, we are creating something new that responds to the different 
demands of each entity. The assemblage, therefore, avoids the risks of ‘applying 
[universal] rules’ identified by Stein and Harper (2012) and the risks of marginalising 
44 
 
particular sets of entities such as interest groups discussed by Richardson and Jensen 
(2001; 2003). 
 
4.3 Argument 3: Properties.  
 
Deleuze’s third argument against essentialism concerns what we should study. 
Essentialism assumes that we should study individuals as if they were fully formed 
entities defined by their properties. However, in doing so, Deleuze argues that we ignore 
the ways in which these individuals (or assemblages) come into being (DeLanda, 2002: 
10). As a consequence, essentialism is unable to consider how assemblages might 
behave in the future, and how they might change when confronted with other 
individuals in a changing environment.  
 
For Deleuze, understanding how an assemblage comes into being demands a shift in the 
way we think about them ontologically. Rather than asking what an assemblage is (its 
being) Deleuze argues that we should think about the potentials that determine what it 
might become (its becomings). DeLanda captures this idea when he notes that, 
 
…becoming without being… [is one in which] …individual beings do not exist 
but only as the outcome of becomings, that is, of an irreversible processes of 
individuation [or actualisation] (DeLanda, 2002: 106).  
 
This quotation suggests that, for Deleuze, reality is much more than the actual world we 
see around us. These ‘pre-actual’ parts of reality are fundamental to Deleuze’s 
philosophy and contain some of his most complex ideas. Before I discuss becomings in 
further detail, therefore, I would like to provide a brief outline of this ontological 
structure drawing on the explanation used by DeLanda (2002). 
 
Deleuze’s ontological structure.  
 
One of the best ways to understand this ontological structure is to envisage a line 
between two extremes: an actual realm and a virtual realm (Figure 2). As DeLanda 
notes above, the first of these extremes, the actual realm, is problematic because it 
suggests that the entities we see around us can be studied as roughly fixed beings with 
discernible traits. A similar argument could be made against Deleuze’s reference to an 
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opposing, virtual realm. A collection of ‘pure potentials’ is, after all, no less abstract 
and reductionist.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of Deleuze’s ontological structure. 
 
 
Rather than afford these extremes with an ontological status, as is the case in 
essentialism, Deleuze sees these two realms as functional devices. They help him 
envisage the theoretical line connecting these two points, or, what DeLanda has termed, 
the ‘processes of actualisation’ (Figure 2).  
 
This conceptual technique is not unique to Deleuze’s ontological framework. Similar 
examples can be found in many of the concepts he uses to develop this framework. 
Notable examples include the concepts of the tree and the rhizome, territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation, the state machine and the war machine, striated space and smooth 
space and so forth. In each instance, these extremes are not intended as ontological 
truths. There is, for example, no such thing as an entirely rhizomatic or tree structure, 
neither is there such thing as a true state or war machine.  
 
In each instance, these conceptual devices serve a similar role. They each provide 
Deleuze with a middle ground in which to explore processes of actualisation. And, more 
broadly, they emphasise, what DeLanda termed, ‘a common conclusion’ in Deleuze’s 
work (DeLanda, 2002: 4): that all assemblages formed from human and non-human, 
material and non-material entities should be understood according to a combination of 
actualised and dormant becomings, rather than as beings in their own right.  
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Becomings.  
 
So what are these becomings and what do they do? According to DeLanda, Deleuze’s 
concept of becoming is drawn from advances in mathematics and physics. In such 
fields, becomings are referred to as ‘singularities’, which,  
 
…are said to represent the inherent or intrinsic long-term tendencies of a 
system, the states which the system spontaneously tend to adopt in the long 
run as long as it is not constrained by other forces (DeLanda, 2002: 14). 
 
Building on these scientific findings, DeLanda shows how the same singularity might 
not necessarily result in the same form (DeLanda, 2002: 15; 2006: 29). DeLanda 
illustrates this by referring to the formation of soap bubbles and salt crystals. In this 
simple example, he notes that these two forms are the result of a common ‘long-term 
tendency’ towards the minimisation of energy use. The soap bubble adopts a spherical 
form to minimise surface tension and a salt crystal adopts a cubic form to minimise 
bonding energy (DeLanda, 2002: 15).  
 
In such examples, we can see why Deleuze contests the essentialist focus on properties 
instead of becomings. As DeLanda notes, an essentialist might look at the soap bubble 
and the salt crystal and conclude that these two entities belong to two completely 
different essentialist groupings. In doing so, this basic assessment would fail to 
acknowledge the same becoming that allowed these two forms to come into being 
(DeLanda, 2002: 15). This emphasises the problem raised in Chapter 1, namely that 
essentialist, formal assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes are unable to take 
account of the design process, and the assessments made during this process because 
they focus on the building as a complete being. 
 
Multiplicities.  
 
There are, of course, significant differences between the formation of a soap bubble and 
the development of a building or urban design. However, for Deleuze, these types of 
differences are scalar rather than ontological.  Unlike the soap bubble, a building 
assemblage is formed from many singularities, each pushing the design process towards 
different forms. Deleuze refers to this combination as the assemblage’s ‘virtual 
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diagram’ or, in scientific terms, as an assemblage’s ‘multiplicity’ (DeLanda, 2002). We 
can see this multiplicity in the example outlined in Chapter 1. The two extracts discuss 
the design of the building’s foundations and the building’s structural frame. In each 
extract, I outline a number of different becomings, or long term tendencies all 
contributing to the building assemblage:  a long term tendency towards corrosion, low 
maintenance, durability, reduced energy consumption, ease of construction, cost 
efficiency and so forth. Taken together, these long term tendencies are part of the 
building’s multiplicity, or ‘virtual diagram’. 
 
Blocks of becoming.  
 
So how might these becomings within the multiplicity be conceived as directing the 
design process? According to DeLanda, singularities (becomings) affect the process of 
actualisation at different stages (DeLanda, 2002: 26). In each stage, development is 
directed towards a dominant or universal singularity, until it meets a threshold, which 
moves the process into a new block directed towards a different universal singularity.  
 
In A thousand plateaus Deleuze refers to these stages as ‘blocks of becoming’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004a: 324). Whilst it is possible to identify the universal singularity 
directing these stages, Deleuze argues, it is not possible to know how this will play out, 
or at what point one block will shift to another. This is because ‘there is no preformed 
logical order to becomings and multiplicities’ but ‘alogical consistencies or 
compatibilities’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 276/7). Contextual factors may introduce 
new thresholds, or may steer a development towards an otherwise dormant singularity. 
In such instances, a new block of becoming begins, which may lead the developing 
assemblage toward a different form (DeLanda, 2002). 
 
The concepts of becomings, thresholds and blocks of becomings appear abstract when 
discussed in such philosophical and scientific terms. To illustrate their usefulness in the 
field of design/planning, the following figure (Figure 3) provides a marked-up extract 
from Chapter 1.  
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Figure 3: Extract of a design sequence marked-up using Deleuze’s ontological concepts. 
 
 
The figure above illustrates how one might use Deleuze’s concepts to explain the 
sequence of design experiments and assessments made during the design process 
discussed in Chapter 1. The body of the text is formed from extracts from one of the 
design sequences: ‘designing the structural frame’. The notes in the right-hand-side 
column translate aspects of this design process into Deleuzian terms.  
 
This extract shows how design sequences were directed by blocks of becoming, which 
changed once they met a threshold resulting in a new direction (a new block of 
becoming). This extract also shows how the development of one block of becoming can 
introduce otherwise dormant becomings, such as a ‘becoming thermally efficient of the 
structural frame’ or a ‘becoming simple of the construction process’.  
 
This figure also reveals a broader becoming: ‘becoming sustainable’ that was developed 
as a result of these experiments. As I noted in Chapter 1, ‘becoming low maintenance of 
the building’ implies greater durability and less building work across its life. A 
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‘becoming simple of the design’ implies less bespoke materials manufactured 
individually, and less specialist trades travelling greater distances. ‘Becoming simple of 
the construction process/programme’ implies less time on site, less transportation and 
reduction in road closures and so forth. All of these implications can be understood as 
different ways of thinking about sustainability: different contributions to a broader 
‘becoming sustainable’ of the building. 
 
This short analysis is not intended as a way of ‘proving’ that Deleuze’s philosophy is 
‘right’ or that it is better than any other theoretical framework. Rather, it is intended to 
reveal two things: firstly that Deleuze’s concepts can be understood using ‘real-life’ 
examples and secondly, that it offers opportunities for responding to the issues 
presented in Chapter 1 and 2.  
 
In terms of the latter, the analytical exercise above shows how Deleuze’s concepts help 
to explain the different understanding of sustainability that arise from the design process 
(understandings currently ignored in formal, essentialist assessment methods). It also 
shows how Deleuze’s concepts capture some of the points highlighted in non-
essentialist planning literature. These include Fainstein’s suggestion that planning 
should not ignore the broader forces (broader blocks of becoming) acting on the 
development process (2000; 2005); and Stein and Harper’s suggestion that meaning, 
and the way one assesses meaning should respond to the unique developments 
undertaken during the design or planning process, in this case, during the design 
process (Harper and Stein, 2006; Stein and Harper, 2012). Likewise, it reflects many of 
the so-called ‘post-modern’ calls for a more flexible and context sensitive assessments 
designed to reflect ‘real’ decision making (Borri, 1998; Alexander, 1998; Fischer, 
2003).  
 
This chapter makes a case for using Deleuze’s concepts to develop an assessment tool 
that responds to concerns raised by actors working in the design and development 
process, academics working in the field of assessment methodology and planning 
theorists. In the next chapter I will consider what is needed to make this transition: i.e. 
how one operationalises these concepts to make them useful to concerns and issues 
raised in the spatial disciplines.   
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Part 2: 
How to make Deleuze useful? 
Whilst Part 1 makes the case for using Deleuze’s concepts to form an alternative to 
essentialist assessment tools, Part 2 looks to ascertain some directions for making these 
concepts useful. It does this by reviewing existing literature, focusing on the attempts 
made by spatial theorists working in the field. 
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Chapter 3: Attempts to make Deleuze useful  
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In the last chapter I introduced a set of problems associated with essentialism and the 
kind of modelled concept-based tools derived from essentialism. To provide a new 
direction for planning, I discussed a number of philosophical concepts from Deleuze’s 
philosophy and explained how these concepts can be used to explain the design process 
and how they might also be used to set out a new, non-essentialist method for assessing 
these designs.  
 
2. Aim and structure of the chapter. 
 
The aims of this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, it is intended to provide further clarity on 
the Deleuzian concepts discussed in the last chapter by showing how they are used in 
different fields. Secondly, it aims to identify a number of lessons from other Deleuze-
inspired spatial theorists about how one might translate these concepts into a theoretical 
framework that can usefully contribute to a specific line of enquiry. These aims reflect 
the principle objectives of this study namely, to translate Deleuze’s concepts into a 
practicable planning tool (see Chapter 1).  
 
To achieve these aims, the following text reviews and critically discusses a selection of 
Deleuze-inspired studies in detail. Such detail is important if one is to form meaningful 
conclusions about translating and adapting a Deleuzian concept from philosophy into 
planning theory and planning practice. With this in mind, I have centred my review on 
three important studies. These studies act as an organising device to bring in other 
cognate debates and points. 
 
3. Selecting the three Deleuze-inspired voices. 
 
Over the last few years there has been a growing community of spatial theorists whose 
work makes direct or indirect references to Deleuze’s concepts. To choose three studies 
from this growing body of knowledge I have applied three selection criteria that reflect 
the aims of the thesis. 
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3.1. Criterion 1: Analysis and engagement.  
 
As noted above, the broad aim of this thesis is to consider whether Deleuze’s 
philosophy can be translated into a non-essentialist assessment that can be 
operationalised in planning and development practice. This aim suggests using Deleuze 
in a way that is not based on analysing existing forms of assessment and planning 
practice alone, but also offers new tools for engaging in such practices. This is what the 
planning theorist John Forester termed, ‘reconstructive’ as well as ‘deconstructive’ 
planning theory (Forester, 2007). With this in mind, my first selection criterion will 
include one Deleuze-inspired study from each of the following three groups. These 
groups are: (i) using Deleuze’s philosophy as a form of analysis, (ii) using Deleuze’s 
philosophy as a form of analysis and as a method of engagement in space / spatial issues 
and (iii) using Deleuze’s philosophy predominantly as a method of engagement. In 
doing so, I hope to gain some insight into the way Deleuze has and has not been useful 
to inform different research objectives. 
 
3.2. Criterion 2: Ontological concepts. 
 
As I note previously, the concepts I have selected from Deleuze’s philosophy capture 
his broader ontological understanding of ‘the real’ (see Chapter 2): formed from the 
actual, the processes of actualisation and the virtual (Figure 2). Whilst spatial theorists 
and practitioners have been keen to draw on Deleuze’s concepts, there have been fewer 
attempts to consider these concepts as part of a broader ontological framework 
(DeLanda, 2002). With this in mind, the second selection criterion demanded that the 
chosen studies draw on more than one Deleuzian concept and are supported by attempts 
to understand the ontological setting in which these concepts were created.  
 
3.3. Criterion 3: Representativeness.  
 
It is important to ensure that these interpretations and their subsequent application 
reflect current thinking within the spatial field of study. With this in mind, I have 
included studies whose contribution to the field of knowledge is supported by other 
Deleuzian-inspired spatial scholars and non-Deleuzian scholars alike.  
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The following studies effectively met all three selection criteria as detailed in the 
introductory section of my review for each study: 
 
1. Mark Bonta’s study of changing land use in Olancho, Honduras (Bonta, 2001; 
Bonta and Protevi, 2004) 
2. Mark Halsey’s study of, and proposals in response to, textual violence in the 
Goolengook forest in Australia (Halsey, 2006) 
3. Jean Hillier’s proposals for a multiplanar theory and method in spatial planning 
(Hillier, 2007) 
 
As part of this selection process, a number of other studies were considered and 
dismissed. These include Nigel Thrift’s proposals for a ‘Non-representational theory’ in 
geography (Thrift, 2007) and DeLanda’s proposals for ‘A new philosophy of society’ 
based on his study of spatial assemblages (2006). These two studies were not selected 
for different reasons. Thrift’s study demonstrates a strong understanding of Deleuze’s 
concepts, but does not explore Deleuze’s ontological framework to the same extent as 
the geographical study included in the selection: Bonta and Protevi’s study of 
‘geophilosophy’ (2004). As demonstrated in Chapter 2, DeLanda’s study is part of a 
larger framing of Deleuze’s ontology.  However, as a philosophical study undertaken 
within the spatial disciplines I feared that DeLanda’s proposals might not fully represent 
the issues and concerns specific to the spatial disciplines, particularly when compared to 
the three spatial studies selected. 
 
The three studies that were selected (Bonta and Protevi; Halsey, Hillier) each focused 
on a problem within their respective field, and develops Deleuze’s concepts to respond 
to that problem. To help me identify useful lessons from these studies I have broken 
each detailed review into four sub-sections: 
 
1. Brief introduction to the study  
2. The problem directing the study 
3. The core concepts drawn from Deleuze’s philosophy  
4. The resulting theoretical framework and its gaps 
 
Bringing these three studies together, section 7 of this chapter will consider what 
lessons can be learned from all three studies, their individual benefits, failings and how 
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they might help direct my own use of Deleuze’s philosophical concepts introduced in 
Chapter 2 and developed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
4. Bonta: analysing ‘complex spaces’. 
 
The first voice in my review belongs to the geographer, Mark Bonta as first captured in 
his analytical study of changing land-use in the Olancho region of Honduras, South 
America (2001) and developed in his subsequent text with John Protevi (Bonta and 
Protevi, 2004).  
 
4.1. A brief introduction to Bonta’s study.  
 
Mark Bonta’s study and his subsequent work with the philosopher, John Protevi situates 
him as ‘…among the first to bring Deleuze and Guattari together with complexity 
theory …[to respond to some of the] questions facing geography’ (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004: 7). These efforts provide us with one of the most thorough and detailed readings 
of Deleuze’s philosophy and one of the only attempts to translate these philosophical 
concepts into a glossary intended for spatial theorists. Bonta and Protevi refer to this as 
a ‘geophilosophy’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004; DeLanda et al, 2003). 
 
Bonta uses this geophilosophy to make sense of his ethnographic observations of land 
use in the Olancho region of Honduras, South America. Deleuze’s philosophy, and his 
concept of the assemblage in particular, help Bonta analyse and explain complex 
combinations of people, objects and ideas.  
 
This geophilosophy has been used as support in a number of subsequent Deleuze-
inspired studies.  Such studies include proposals for a Deleuzian ‘understanding [of] the 
entangled relationships between globalization, climate change, capitalism and 
indigenous peoples’ (Cupples, 2011:10), proposals for new ways to understand 
geographic scale (Marston et al, 2005), the development of households in Quintana 
Roo, Mexico (Normark, 2009), and developments in ‘relational’ geography through 
advances in complexity science (Jones 2010). It has also influenced proposals for new 
ways of engaging in spatial planning (Hillier, 2007) and politics (Palmas, 2008).  
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Despite its influence, there have been few attempts to understand how Bonta expands 
and (re)creates Deleuze’s concepts to make them useful to his particular field of 
enquiry, how these concepts contribute to Bonta’s theoretical framework and what 
limitations and problems result from these concepts. This part of the study helps fill 
these gaps in the literature. 
 
4.2 The problem directing Bonta’s study. 
 
Bonta is attracted to Deleuze’s philosophy after rejecting many of the methods used by 
geographers to understand and analyse the complex world around us. In his 
collaboration with the philosopher, John Protevi, Bonta discusses and rejects three 
existing approaches to spatial analysis. Each of these approaches, they note, share a 
common focus on ‘the ideal of description and explanation’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 
200). Bonta and Protevi’s critique is poorly supported with examples from comparative 
studies undertaken in the Honduras. To rectify this shortcoming I will discuss and, 
where possible, illustrate these three approaches by identifying and using land-use 
studies undertaken in and around Bonta’s study area.  
 
‘Molar’ analysis’.  
 
In the first analytical approach, an area is studied in reference to one or several broad 
categories. There have been a number of studies undertaken over the last twenty years 
that might reflect this ‘molar’ approach to analysis. Such examples might include 
attempts to relate deforestation to factors such as foreign debt (Gullison and Losos, 
1993), tenure security and the leisure preferences of local residents (Godoy et al, 1998); 
time spent in early, formal education (Godoy et al, 1998a); population and the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (Jha and Bawa, 1999); population density (Pfeffer et al, 
2005); and the interaction between different types of land use (Ruf and Schroth, 2004). 
These examples from land-use literature help us appreciate Bonta and Protevi’s 
argument that,  
 
…far too many researchers … have burdened us with the ‘molar’ rain 
forest, biome, life zone, frontier, town, city, campesino. These are indeed 
molarising – normalising – processes at work that ensure we will 
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encounter similarity and linkages wherever we go… (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004: 42). 
 
This quotation captures two criticisms against this approach to analysis. Firstly, it 
questions the validity of findings drawn from studies that relate one type of land use to 
one or several influential factors. Secondly, it suggests that these kinds of studies have 
negative effects on the way these spaces operate. It does this, Bonta and Protevi suggest, 
by fixing our understanding of entities found in these spaces and the relationships 
between them.   
 
Analytical modelling.  
 
In many ways, these problems are overcome in attempts to model a range of different 
factors. Rather than focus on one or several factors, these attempts consider the joint 
contribution of social, economic and environmental factors in changing land-use.  
 
This modelling approach has gained a great deal of attention over the last 15 years. 
Many of the models related to Honduras have focused on deforestation. National Forest 
Monitoring and Assessment (NFMA) and the Global Forest Resources Assessment 
(FRA), for example, both map forest types and model their changes over time (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation, 2010). Other integrated models, like the LUCC models 
have taken a broader view. These integrated models look at a combination of influential 
factors affecting different kinds of land use change in different parts of the world 
(Pauleit et al, 2005). 
 
Despite their growing popularity, Bonta and Protevi argue that this second area of 
analysis is problematic for two reasons. The first concerns the impossibility of 
modelling the complexity seen in complex social systems,  
 
…we are still far away from being able to model social systems 
successfully. The biggest problem… is (that such models are not) very 
useful for those committed to a realist attempt to capture features of the 
world rather than merely modelling phenomena. (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 
33) 
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Modelling, they suggest, typically identifies phenomenon but fails to explain how this 
phenomenon comes into being. This argument is supported by others working in the 
field of land-use planning (Nagendra et al, 2004; Monroe and Muller, 2007). 
 
For Bonta and Protevi, the second problem with these models relates to their use in 
practice. For Bonta and Protevi,  
 
The problem comes when people write about (neoliberal) economics as if 
they were only a matter of assumptions and models rather than prods for 
concerted efforts to produce a social reality conforming to the model’s 
assumptions (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 199). 
 
As with their critique of ‘molar analysis’, Bonta and Protevi believe that the models 
used to explain complexity fail to capture many of the subtle changes and relationships 
within practice. These models, they argue, become blueprints for our understanding and 
subsequent efforts to engage with the complex world around us.  
 
This argument against modelling draws links to my own research agenda. In Chapter 2, 
I outlined attempts to model abstract concepts like the ‘sustainable home’. And like 
Bonta and Protevi, I questioned the idea that such ‘modelled concepts’ should be used 
to change the way urban and building designers understand and engage in complex 
spatial problems.  
 
Thick description.  
 
Geertz’s ‘thick descriptive’ methods have had a strong influence in ethnographic 
research over the last forty years (Geertz, 1973). In the region of Honduras in particular, 
Dean offers us a thick descriptive account of family life in Northern Honduras (Dean, 
1988). More recently, Pine offers a highly descriptive account of one Honduras citizen 
and his movements across different spaces (Pine, 2008). For Bonta and Protevi ‘thick 
descriptions’ do not account for the, 
 
…irreducibility of distributed spatiotemporal networks of embodied 
artisans in ‘resolving’ complex problems by real life operations…  
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 25) 
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For Bonta and Protevi, therefore, these three forms of analysis fail to understand and 
explain the complex factors operating in these spaces. Taking this further, they also fail 
to explain how the things we see around us came into being through ‘real life 
operations’ (Bonta, 2001; Bonta and Protevi, 2004).  
 
Of course, these three approaches criticised by Bonta and Protevi are not unique to 
geography. Planning literature includes numerous studies that Bonta and Protevi might 
term ‘molar explanations’ such as the attempts made to explain changes in the economic 
growth of a region or country through developing ICT infrastructure (Roller and 
Waverman, 2001; Sridhar and Sridhar, 2007, Czernich et al, 2011). Planning literature 
also outlines numerous attempts to model a range of complex, inter-related factors 
(Batty, 1996; Batty, 2011; 2011a; 2011b) as well as efforts to understand complexity 
through thick description (Flyvjberg, 2001; Maginn, 2007). This suggests that Bonta 
and Protevi’s arguments might be used to challenge studies undertaken in other spatial 
disciplines. In terms of this thesis, Bonta’s critique of these methods and of molar 
analysis in particular, shares some of my concerns with the limited approach to 
assessment seen in formal, essentialist assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes 
(Chapter 1).  
 
4.3. The core concepts drawn from Deleuze’s philosophy. 
 
To resolve these problems, and to outline an alternative method of analysis, Bonta 
draws on several concepts from Deleuze’s philosophy.  
 
The assemblage and complex spaces.  
 
One of the most important Deleuzian concepts in Bonta’s study is that of the 
assemblage and his subject expansion of this concept to form the concept of ‘complex 
space’. For Bonta, these concepts capture his observations from the field. Drawing from 
his fieldnotes, Bonta describes the way that,  
 
Coffee farms were being taken over by cattle; beans were taking over forests; 
forests were taking over ranches; Hurricane Mitch had stripped away cattle 
pastures, beanfields, coffee, and forests alike. 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 172). 
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This example shows that a piece of land being used as a ‘coffee farm space’ was also 
becoming a ‘cattle farm space’, which was, itself, becoming a ‘forest space’ and so 
forth. The result is a complex combination of different uses all operating on the same 
piece of land and all in a state of transition. Bonta describes these combinations as 
‘complex spaces’. Rather than trying to model or capture these ‘complex spaces’, Bonta 
argues that we must understand them as a combination, or an ‘entanglement’ of 
different spaces. And thus, when we analyse them, Bonta suggests we must study the 
way a coffee farm space becomes entangled with a cattle ranch space and a forest space 
etc (Bonta, 2001; Bonta and Protevi, 2004).  
 
Bonta observed that,  
 
If one were ‘plugged into’12 the cattle-ranch (space), one was to a large 
extent predetermined and at the very least codetermined by a complex 
system quite different to that of one’s neighbour, who was plugged into the 
complex system of coffee farming… 
(Bonta, 2001: Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 172) 
 
This example shows how a coffee farmer would be part of a set of processes particular 
to planting, growing, harvesting and preparing coffee beans. These would be very 
different to the processes required of his neighbour, a cattle farmer. Likewise, these two 
sets of processes would require similar material and non-material entities but adapted in 
different ways, such as varying degrees of education, population density and machinery. 
They would also demand differing quantities of land at differing times (Bonta, 2001; 
Bonta and Protevi, 2004).  
 
To add to the complexity, Bonta observed that entities operated in more than one space. 
Bonta noted that, as a coffee space was becoming
13
 a cattle space, the coffee farmer was 
also becoming a cattle farmer. 
 
…Because individual human bodies are the nexus for myriad forces that 
traverse them, they are easily put to work for different complex systems at 
                                                     
12
 Bonta uses the phrase, ‘plugged into’ to describe instances where a person or an 
object engages with, or operates within a set of relations and ways of doing things.  
13
 For the purposes of this text, ‘becoming’ should be taken as ‘in transition to’ 
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the same time…(resulting in) rancher-conservationist-teachers, peasant 
farmer-ranchers and rancher-logger-coffee growers… 
(Bonta 2001; Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 172) 
 
This short description highlights the range of roles undertaken by different members of 
the community and why traditional categories fail to capture this complexity.  
 
If we extend this to non-human entities as Bonta and Protevi suggest, we might consider 
water on the land as simultaneously cleaning the coffee, cooling the coffee machines, 
cleaning and hydrating cattle, feeding the grass that feed the cattle, transporting and 
nourishing plant seeds from the forest, directing the flow of tree roots and so forth. In 
the same way that Bonta asks us to think of a ‘complex space’ as a combination of other 
spaces, Bonta asks that we think of these spaces as a combination, or ‘assemblage’, of 
human and non-human entities. This illustration of complex space as an assemblage 
formed from other assemblages captures Deleuze’s argument for ‘the relations of 
exteriority’ in that it suggests that each assemblage can be understood as an individual 
in its own right as well as an entity operating as part of a broader assemblage i.e. the 
complex space. Bonta’s approach to assemblages, therefore, shows parallels with the 
illustration I present in Chapter 2. 
 
Like DeLanda, Bonta argues that human and non-human entities within an assemblage 
should be understood according to their capacities to affect other entities (DeLanda, 
2006). Thus, in the above example, water has the capacity to cleanse, cool, hydrate, 
transport and attract other things in a range of assemblages. These capacities allow 
water, for example, to ‘plug into’ different processes in the same assemblage, or ‘plug 
into’ processes across other assemblages (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). For Bonta, this 
conception of the assemblage and its relation with other assemblages reveal the 
entanglements that characterise ‘complex spaces’ (Bonta, 2001; Bonta and Protevi, 
2004). Mapping these assemblages over time, he argues, should help us understand the 
dynamism of land-use (Bonta and Protevi, 2004)
14
. 
 
This last idea suggests that we can understand complexity by mapping the assemblages 
we identify. This idea is not new to geography or planning. Similar attempts at mapping 
                                                     
14
 Examples of such mapping can be seen in Bonta’s study explored in more detail 
below 
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assemblages are often associated with Actor Network Theory (ANT) and the work of 
Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law in particular and its methodological 
nostrum that one should follow the actors, be they human or non-human, and map the 
networks that they construct. ANT has a long history in the social sciences, making 
these methods accessible to geographers and planners alike (Murdoch, 1995; 1997; 
1998; 2001; Farias and Bender, 2010). 
 
This growing popularity in ANT and the idea of mapping assemblages has led to a 
number of criticisms. For Allen, these maps help us to appreciate how heterogeneous 
elements can work as a collective without resorting to one universal explanation. 
However, whilst this may prove beneficial to some urban geographers, he suggests that 
it may result in ‘endless description’ and ‘weak conceptualisation’ (Allen, 2011). 
Robbins and Marks also draw attention to these two risks. For Robbins and Marks, 
many efforts to map assemblages to date have done so by describing rather than 
conceptualising relations. When these assemblages have extended beyond description, 
they have tended to critique existing concepts rather than offer us new ones (Robbins 
and Marks, 2010). We can identify similar criticisms in other areas of geography. In 
their review of efforts to map institutional assemblages, Whittle and Spicer conclude 
that most studies did not offer a useful, workable theory (Whittle and Spicer, 2008).  
 
Rather than reject Bonta’s use of these concepts, these criticisms demonstrate an 
important distinction between Latourian (ANT) and Deleuzian assemblages. For Latour, 
the assemblage concept provides a means to map ‘networks’ of material and non-
material entities. Deleuze, however, places greater emphasis on the assemblage as an 
ontological concept relating to other ontological concepts in his theoretical framework. 
Mapping assemblages helps the researcher understand what drives their creation, or 
what Deleuze terms, ‘becomings’. It also helps the researcher understand the potentials 
for re-creating them differently in the future, or what Deleuze termed, an assemblage’s 
‘virtual diagram’, or ‘multiplicity’ (see Chapter 2). We might argue, as Allen does, that 
compared to Deleuze’s approach, ANT places too much emphasis on capture and 
description. Indeed, thinking back to Bonta’s critique of other analytical approaches, 
Bonta might also reject an ANT understanding of assemblages on similar grounds.  
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Smooth and striated space.  
 
Above I have shown how Bonta’s observations helped him identify some of the 
components that form a coffee farm assemblage and a cattle farm assemblage. But to 
explain how these components organise space, one must decide what spatiality can be 
attributed to these assemblages. 
 
Traditional ways of understanding space and the organisation of space is characterised 
by three dimensions: things in the real world, representations of this world and the 
subject who forms the representation (Buchanan and Lambert, 2005; see also DeLanda, 
2006). These distinctions are inappropriate for studying assemblages because many 
different entities contribute to the way assemblages are formed and the way they operate 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004; DeLanda, 2006). Nigel Thrift, has similarly argued against 
the use of representations in geography. For Thrift, these representations limit our 
ability to engage or understand the way different elements and forces ‘perform together’ 
(Thrift, 2007).  
 
To avoid these traditional classifications and the problems associated with them, Bonta 
calls on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of ‘striating’ and ‘smoothing’. In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari note that,  
 
…there is a significant difference between the spaces: sedentary space is 
striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures, while nomad 
space is smooth, marked only by “traits” that are effaced and displaced 
within the trajectory. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a :420) 
 
When Deleuze talks about smooth space, therefore, he talks about spaces that are 
understood as part of movement. As we move through smooth space, we remove the 
characteristics identified by others. In contrast, striated space is structured, enclosed and 
defined. These structures determine how we interact with things and, to some extent, 
how we move through space. From this passage, it is evident that Deleuze does not 
intend the concepts of ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ to be properties of a space. Rather, he 
uses them to explain ways of making or adapting space.  
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As I noted in Chapter 2, whilst these concepts are oppositional, acts of smoothing and 
striating are not separate and exclusive. Smoothing and striating space occurs together 
and as part of the same set of processes (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 427). In the 
following I will show how Bonta draws on these concepts to explain how different 
assemblages simultaneously organise (striate) and disorganise (smooth) space to meet 
their unique demands. Whilst considered in terms of land use rather than design and 
regulation, the insight offered by Bonta provides some important clues about the role 
played by different assessments and how they relate to the way assemblages (such as 
the designer assemblage or the regulator assemblage) organise and disorganise space. 
 
Drawing on Deleuze’s concept of the assemblage, Bonta provides us with a four 
hundred year history of assemblages operating within the region’s ‘complex spaces’. 
These assemblages are not limited to definable land-uses like the coffee farm 
assemblage, but also include more abstract assemblages like ‘the state assemblage’, ’the 
church assemblage’ and ‘the environmental assemblage’. By mapping this history, 
Bonta reveals how assemblages are formed, re-formed, taken-over and adapted by 
striating and smoothing space. A review of this history reveals a number of key points. 
In the following I will discuss these points in the context of Bonta’s study before 
reflecting on their relevance to my own line of enquiry concerning the use of modelled 
concepts in assessment design. 
 
The first point I would like to discuss concerns acts of ‘smoothing’. Bonta’s history 
highlights the fact that spaces are never empty. When an assemblage seeks to striate 
land to meet its needs, it must engage with the striations instated by other assemblages. 
Bonta identifies instances when individuals within an assemblage have removed 
existing striations through ‘smoothing’. In the 1500s, Bonta explains how colonial 
settlers introduced cattle to the existing agricultural assemblages used to feed the 
existing Indian populations. These cattle spread over the plains eating and trampling the 
vegetation. In doing so, they ‘smoothed’ striated planting fields (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004: 176). Such attempts at smoothing the striations set out by existing assemblages 
have not always resulted in an effective ‘take-over’. Bonta identifies instances when,   
 
Ranchers deploy[ed] cattle to effect takeovers of other territories, for 
example the deterritorialisation [smoothing] of coffee space [and]…so coffee 
space had to be fenced and gated (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 177). 
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In this example, the smoothing effects of cattle were resisted. The result was a more 
heavily striated space made possible by expanding the assemblage to include new 
entities (fences). This example shows how an assemblage might expand and re-form 
through its interaction with (or resistance to) other assemblages operating in the same 
space.  
 
The effects of this expansion are relatively limited. The introduction of fences into the 
coffee farm assemblage only affected the assemblages already operating in the same 
space. Yet, this is not always the case. In a different example, Bonta explains how the 
conservation assemblage was expanded in the wake of an event: Hurricane Mitch. This 
event triggered attempts to striate space according to the demands of a new addition in 
the assemblage - buffer zone concepts:  
 
[These] buffer zone concepts [were used to] … promote a zone of contact 
between land-using humans and Nature…while making the forest space 
itself off-limits to all localised land-uses, but useful as a pure reserve of 
water and biodiversity, and accessible only to ecotourists and scientists 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 184). 
 
By creating and including buffer zone concepts, this example shows how the 
conservation assemblage divided human and non-human uses. The effects of which 
were to promote the interaction of select assemblages and prevent the interaction of 
others.  
 
These examples highlight two important points. Firstly, they show that each entity, 
human and non-human, within an assemblage is motivated to striate and smooth space 
to meet their unique operational demands. This is equally applicable to the actors in the 
design and regulatory process who organise space to meet the demand of actors in their 
assemblage. This also illustrates the distinction discussed above between a Deleuzian 
and an Actor Network Theory approach to assemblages and mapping.  In his review of 
Callon’s ANT study (Callon, 1986), Murdoch notes that,  
 
Although we might legitimately wish to ask, for instance, what motivates 
entities such as the scallop scientists to become actors, ANT theorists are 
unwilling to enter into a discussion of motivations, intentions, and the like, 
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as these smack too much of some internal, already solidified notion of 
social agency…. Motivations are thereby discussed in only the most 
general and abstract terms. 
(Murdoch, 1998: 746) 
 
This same criticism could not be applied to Bonta’s discussion on ‘complex spaces’ and 
the relationship between coffee farm and cattle farm assemblages in particular.  
 
Secondly these two examples show a distinction between two kinds of entity. This 
distinction relates to the way these entities are introduced into a complex space and how 
they affect assemblages within a complex space. This distinction is captured in the way 
Bonta negotiates two Deleuzian concepts: the multiplicity and the referential model. As 
I will show below, this distinction in Bonta’s study offers parallels with the distinction 
between essentialist and non-essentialist assessments discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. 
 
Multiplicities and referential models.  
 
Whilst roaming cattle had a material effect on the coffee farm assemblage, they were 
not responsible for deciding how the coffee farm coped with this effect ie by adding 
fences into the assemblage. The decision to expand the coffee farm assemblage to 
include the fence came from within the coffee farm assemblage itself: by the operational 
and spatial demands of coffee plants, harvesting and sowing machines etc. Likewise, the 
introduction of the fencing would have material affects on the cattle farm. But again, the 
coffee farm assemblage would not decide how the cattle farm assemblage responded to 
the effects of the fence. Any entities added to or omitted from the cattle farm 
assemblage to respond to this fence would have been determined from within the cattle 
farm assemblage.  
 
Unlike the fence, the buffer zone concept did not originate from the unique demands of 
entities operating within the assemblage. Bonta informs us that this concept was ‘based 
on the US model … the ‘perfect’ park out of the US textbook’ (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004: 183-184). It was, we might argue, a model created within a different context, in a 
different country at a different time and with a very different purpose.  
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Additionally, the buffer zone (or model) was more intrusive than the fence. This model 
sought to change the way these assemblages operated, by ‘persuading land-users to 
adopt, ‘land-friendly practices’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 184). And in doing so, they 
sought to determine how other assemblages organised themselves by the entities they 
selected or omitted from the assemblage.  
 
Bonta’s study provides two different kinds of entity/ies, and thus, two ways of 
creating/re-creating an assemblage. The first kind of entity (like the fence) is introduced 
into an assemblage to meet the operational demands of other entities within that 
assemblage, and to respond to the effects of ‘entanglement’. Thinking back to the 
example I give in Chapter 1 and expanded in Chapter 2, one might argue that this 
reflects the assessments made during the design process: drawing from what Deleuze 
termed, an assemblage’s ‘multiplicity’ (or ‘virtual diagram’).  
 
The second kind of entity, like the buffer zone concept in Bonta’s study or formal 
assessments such as the Code for Sustainable Homes in this study, is developed in a 
different context and serves a different purpose. Such entities are introduced into a 
complex space to change the way other assemblages operate. An assemblage is not re-
created by drawing on the assemblage’s multiplicity, but by reference to a pre-defined 
model created in and for a different assemblage. In doing so, Bonta provides us with a 
working example of Deleuze’s multiplicity and its distinction from the referential 
model.  
 
This distinction is an important one, not least because it helps explain the kind of spatial 
problems that Bonta believes are best suited to a Deleuze-inspired approach. For Bonta, 
the spaces he observed in Olancho are complex. They are formed from different 
assemblages all operating together resulting in their ‘entanglement’. Whilst these 
assemblages have material effects on each other, this does not change the way they 
operate. For Bonta, each assemblage operates in its own way adding or removing 
entities to reflect these operational demands. As they do so, assemblages must smooth 
the striations set out by others and striate the land to meet their own requirements. This 
kind of space, he argues, lends itself to a Deleuze-inspired approach. Deleuze, he 
argues, presents us with concepts that can be usefully incorporated into a theoretical 
framework used to make sense of, and explain, the way different assemblages come into 
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being in the absence of a dominant, causal agent i.e. emergence. Such a framework is 
captured in Bonta’s study as per Table 2. 
 
4.4. The resulting theoretical framework and its gaps. 
 
Table 2: Mark Bonta’s theoretical framework (Bonta, 2001; Bonta and Protevi, 2004). 
Deleuzian concepts Bonta’s concepts 
Assemblage: 
A combination of human and 
non-human entities operating in 
their own way as part of the 
assemblage. 
Complex space: 
A complex space is formed by a 
combination of assemblages. 
Smooth and striated: 
Each entity striates and smooths 
a given space to meet its unique 
operational demands.  
Complex space:  
A complex space can only exist 
when a given space is not 
dominated by any one set of 
striations defined by one or 
several assemblages. 
Becomings: 
Becomings are the potentials 
for an entity to operate in 
certain ways.  
Multiplicity 
A multiplicity is the 
combination of all potentials in 
all the entities in an 
assemblage. It provides the 
conditions for developing an 
assemblage. 
Referential model: 
The referential model is used to 
determine which potentials will 
and will not be operationalised. 
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The left-hand-side column lists five of Deleuze’s key, ontological concepts and the way 
Bonta interprets these concepts to make them useful to his study. Running from top to 
bottom of the column, these concepts are used to explain the combination of entities 
operating in Bonta’s field of study (assemblages), how they organise space (striations 
and smoothness), how they are able to operate in this way (becomings), where these 
potentials come from (multiplicity) and one way in which this process is directed in 
policy assemblages (referential models). This left-hand column presents a very similar 
picture to the one outlined in Chapter 2, and my own attempt to explain these 
ontological concepts using examples from the design process. 
 
The second column to the right-hand-side identifies the concept that Bonta creates to 
meet the specific demands of his project. As the table suggests, Bonta’s develops the 
concepts of the ‘assemblage’ and ‘striated and smooth space’ to form the concept of 
‘complex space’.  
 
This concept of ‘complex space’ is a strong addition to the concepts offered in 
Deleuze’s seminal texts. However, it also leads me onto, what I believe to be, the 
principle gap in Bonta’s theoretical framework. According to Bonta, not all spaces can 
be considered as complex spaces. For Bonta, spaces cannot be considered complex if 
one or several assemblages dominate land-use. These dominant assemblages, he argues, 
have direct, material effects on other assemblages. They determine how other 
assemblages operate, how they add or remove entities and how they organise space. 
Rather than explaining these relations, Bonta holds that Deleuze’s theoretical 
framework provides us with the tools we need to problematise the dominant position 
held by such assemblages (Bonta and Protevi, 2004).  
 
This begs the question, how does this relate to other studies outside of Olancho? For 
Bonta and Protevi complex spaces can be found in developing rather than developed 
countries where the State assemblage has not assumed a dominant role over other 
assemblages (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). However, for me, this final distinction is too 
simple. Do complex spaces not exist in Western, developed countries? If we sit at any 
urban square in the UK, can we not see a number of entangled assemblages operating in 
the area? After all, the entities operating in these areas are not all part of a State 
assemblage. Drug sellers, homeless people, stray cats, pigeons, children playing with 
bottle tops etc also operate within other assemblages not defined by a State assemblage. 
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And each of these assemblages smooth and striate space to meet their own, unique 
demands.  
 
Additionally, I question whether ‘the State’ can be understood as a single, monolithic 
assemblage. Like any other large assemblage, it too is formed from other assemblages 
that operate in different ways and seek to striate and smooth physical, as well as non-
physical (such as policy), space to meet these unique demands. Thinking back to 
Chapter 2, there is no reason to assume that the State assemblage should be governed by 
‘relations of interiority’, whilst all other assemblages are governed by ‘relations of 
exteriority’. It also assumes that the State assemblage implements their goals with clear 
and effective force, and no discretion on the part of their subjects. With this in mind, it 
seems inappropriate to talk about a State assemblage as a unified body operating and 
striating space in a coherent way (Hillier and Abrahams, 2013).  
 
I would like to suggest, therefore, that complex spaces are found in many different areas 
in many countries around the world. The design process I discussed in Chapter 2, could 
thus be described as a developing assemblage (the building assemblage) operating 
within a complex space. If we start with the assumption that all spaces are complex, 
then we are able to make fuller use of the ideas presented in Bonta’s study and his later 
work with Protevi .We might then ask: What assemblages operate in the area? How do 
they entangle and affect each other through this entanglement? Which entities are 
introduced by other entities operating in an assemblage in complex space, and which are 
introduced as ‘referential models’ from other contexts? Thinking back to Chapter 1 and 
2, modelled concepts would be a good example of this second type of entity. Do these 
models seek to change the way other assemblages are created and how they operate? 
And if so, what are the effects on these assemblages operating in a complex space? 
 
By adapting the concept of ‘complex spaces’ we can start to see how these kinds of 
questions might guide analytical methods in related disciplines such as spatial planning. 
This Deleuze-inspired understanding of complex space and its use alongside other 
Deleuzian concepts could be used to critique and draw lessons from studies of ‘complex 
spaces’ in ANT (Callon and Law, 2004). This could include an engagement with Law’s 
proposals for ‘baroque’ and ‘romantic’ forms of complex space (Law, 2004) or/and 
Thrift’s discussion on ‘encountering’ (Thrift, 2004) 
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Similar opportunities might exist in spatial planning literature more specifically. The 
concept of ‘relational space’, for example, has been developed by a number of 
influential planning theorists (Graham and Healey, 1999; Healey, 2006), as has its link 
to Deleuze’s conception of space (Massey, 1999; Murdoch, 2006; Malpas, 2012; Hillier, 
2007; Monno, 2012). Thus, it seems that an expanded understanding of Bonta’s 
‘complex space’ could help inform, revise and direct these theoretical developments in 
geography and planning. This expanded understanding of ‘complex space’ will be 
included in my own theoretical framework developed in Chapter 7.  
 
5. Halsey: analysing and engaging in ‘violence’.  
 
In my review of Bonta’s ‘complex spaces’ above, I discussed the distinction he makes 
between two ways of creating an assemblage: by the assemblage’s own ‘multiplicity’ 
(like the fence) or by reference to a model introduced into a different assemblage (like 
the buffer zone). Whilst Bonta presents a position against the latter, his study is mostly 
analytical. It explains the effects of the buffer zone as a reference model but does not 
consider how we might engage with the consequences it causes. This is an important 
line of enquiry in this thesis because it informs the way we might respond to the 
modelled concepts used as the basis for formal assessments such as the Code for 
Sustainable Homes (see Chapter 2). 
 
With this in mind, I turn now to the work of the ecologist and criminologist, Mark 
Halsey. Like Bonta, Halsey draws on Deleuze’s philosophy to consider the way 
assemblages develop as part of a ‘complex space’. And like Bonta, Halsey focuses on 
one rather than many complex spaces. However, by framing his work in the field of 
criminology, Halsey has a different reason for studying the way a complex space is 
developed over time. Halsey is interested in identifying and engaging with the 
consequences caused by ‘acts of naming’ and categorising (Halsey, 2006). These names 
are not too dissimilar to the buffer zone concept drawn from Bonta’s study, or the 
modelled concept of ‘the sustainable home’ discussed in Chapter 2. For Halsey the 
consequences caused by these names should be conceptualised as a kind of ‘violence’ 
that affects the way assemblages develop over time (Halsey, 2006). By studying these 
effects (or ‘violence’), he argues, criminologists can make judgements about the 
damages that might be incurred.  
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5.1. A brief introduction to Halsey’s study.  
 
Since its publication, Halsey’s call for an alternative approach to environmental 
criminology has been met with broad support (Brisman, 2008). For Gibbs et al, 
Halsey’s work should be seen as part of a ‘framework [that] will ultimately advance 
knowledge and practice regarding environmental crimes and risks’ (Gibbs et al, 2010: 
17). For Gough, this framework should be directed towards efforts to correct the 
violence of ‘naming nature’, (Gough, 2008). Gough describes these corrective measures 
as ways of ‘unnaming nature’ pursued by exploring a new becoming: ‘becoming 
pedagogical’ (Gough, 2008).  
 
Whilst Gough uses Halsey’s Deleuze-inspired proposals as a starting point for further 
development, others have drawn on Halsey’s study to reveal a broader shift in 
ecological thinking. Fancy argues that Halsey’s study demonstrates the benefits offered 
by a Deleuzian understanding of ecology (Fancy, 2011). This approach, he notes, draws 
on a line of thinking running through Deleuze’s work, related to geology and 
performance, which Fancy articulates as ‘geoperformance’ (Fancy, 2011). Halsey’s 
interpretation of and use of Deleuze’s concepts, therefore, have gained a great deal of 
support within his field of interest, and have offered new opportunities for others to 
develop different lines of enquiry. But, like Bonta’s study, there have been few attempts 
to understand how Halsey translates Deleuze’s concepts to help him respond to this 
field. 
 
5.2. The problem directing Halsey’s study. 
 
Halsey’s interest in Deleuze stems from the problems he identifies in five of the most 
popular theoretical perspectives used in the field of ecology: liberal ecology, 
ecomarxism, ecofeminism, deep ecology and social ecology. Taken as a whole, Halsey 
argues that these ‘modernist’ approaches are unable to take account of environmental 
damage (Halsey, 2006: 34). This failing, he notes, arises from two problems. 
 
The first problem relates to the idea that environmental damage has an identifiable 
‘cause’. This idea is fundamental to the five perspectives. For liberal ecologists, this 
cause can be traced to middle-class consumption patterns and the market’s inability to 
meet these demands through more efficient products. For ecomarxists, it is caused by 
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the market itself and the class-system more broadly. Whilst for ecofeminists and social 
ecologists, it is caused by the dominance of one group of society over another: women 
over men or, more broadly, the powerful over the less powerful. And finally, deep 
ecologists argue that these problems are caused by a false distinction between humans 
and Nature (Halsey, 2006:15-34). Whilst these arguments differ, they share a common 
‘tendency to write the ‘causes’ of environmental problems in monolithic fashion’ 
(Halsey, 2006: 35). 
 
One might criticise Halsey’s summary of these perspectives as overly simplistic. 
Looking across the literature from these five perspectives one can identify work that 
bridges these distinctions. Mikulak, for example, shows how a Marxist analysis of 
labour captures the idea that humans cannot be understood in isolation of their 
environment, and, likewise, how deep ecology is underpinned by a critique of 
capitalism (Mikulak, 2007).  
 
It is not entirely accurate, therefore, to consider this body of knowledge as a collection 
of distinct, ‘monolithic’ causes. Mikulak’s combination, for example, would suggest 
that environmental damage is caused by a capitalist economy, social class system and a 
human/Nature distinction. This observation helps to re-qualify rather than dismiss 
Halsey’s broader point, which is that these ecological theories all believe that 
environmental damage can be attributed to one or several universal causes. And by 
extension, they believe that tackling these causes will resolve the problem of 
environmental damage as a whole (Halsey, 2006). This argument has a link with the 
problems I identified with formal assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes. The 
regulation directing such assessments also assumes that unsustainable designs can be 
identified, that they result from identifiable causes located in the design process and that 
these causes can be tackled by applying an appropriate combination of assessment and 
regulation. 
 
The idea of a universal cause and corresponding solution leads me on to Halsey’s 
second point. Halsey notes that, by fixing their perspective around one or several 
causes, these five ecological theories are unable to ‘explain the mobility and meaning(s) 
of environmental issues’ (Halsey, 2006: 37). Halsey illustrates this point by drawing on 
the environmental issue surrounding the wood-chipping industry in Australia.  
 
73 
 
Halsey notes that 85% of wood-chippings are sourced from Australia’s forests. This 
activity is supported by Government policy but heavily contested by public opinion. 
Each of the five ecological theories, he argues, fails to appreciate the complexity that 
surrounds wood-chipping practice, policy, public opinion and their relationship with the 
material reality of the forest.  
 
Liberal ecologists, he notes, might frame this relationship as a distinction between an 
expert-led proposal for meeting economic demand in a sustainable way, and the views 
of an uninformed public. However, as Halsey notes, many ‘experts’ admit that this 
industry is unsustainable, and economic reports have shown falling demand for these 
products. An ecomarxist might frame this as a way of putting jobs and profit before 
environmental sustainability. Yet, evidence suggests that these industries have revealed 
continued economic and employment losses. Halsey illustrates similar contradictions 
for ecofeminism, social ecology and deep ecology (Halsey, 2006: 36-37). 
 
For Halsey, these ways of falsely explaining environmental damage are not the only 
area of concern. Similar problems can be seen in the way judgements are formed about 
environmental damage.  
 
Halsey’s first concern relates to the distinction made between human crimes and a non-
human environment. At present, most environmental crimes are defined as damage 
perpetrated by ‘individuals and corporations’ (Halsey, 2006: 43). But, as Halsey notes, 
individuals and corporations are not the only, or indeed, the greatest contributors to 
environmental harm. The State has a much greater impact but is judged in a very 
different way because it is classified as an institutional body rather than a human body 
(Halsey, 2006: 44). Like Bonta, Halsey’s argument reflects a challenge to the distinction 
between human and the non-human bodies
15
.  
 
However, for Halsey, the benefits offered by current realist criminology literature are 
undermined by two ideas. The first results from their connections to ecological theory 
and the idea of a universal cause and solution. The second concerns the idea that 
judgement should be made in reference to one or several ideals.  
 
                                                     
15
 Indeed this challenge can be seen in many so-called ‘realist’ positions including those 
inspired by Deleuze’s philosophy and those inspired by Actor Network Theory 
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To illustrate this second idea Halsey reviews three key studies in ‘biocentrism’ and 
‘ecocentrism’. In each of their proposals, judgements are made in reference to an 
essentially defined ideal. For Barnett, environmental crime should be judged against a 
timeless understanding of ‘beauty and integrity’ (Halsey, 2006: 46-47; Barnett, 1999). 
For Benton, judgements should be made against a universal definition for ‘human and 
non-human rights’ (Halsey, 2006: 49; Benton, 1998) whilst Lynch and Stretsky refer to 
a universal understanding of ‘environmental justice’ (Halsey, 2006: 53; Lynch and 
Stretsky, 2003).  
 
Halsey’s argument against the idea of a universal cause and a universal reference for 
making judgements is that they prevent us developing a nuanced understanding and 
engagement in human/environmental interactions (Halsey, 2006: 53). This argument is 
important to this thesis, because it reflects the point I raised in Chapters 1 and 2 
concerning the use of formal assessments as universal references for making 
judgements about sustainable design.  
 
Given Halsey’s critique of current literature from ecology and criminology, we might 
ask,  
 
 How else should we conceptualise the effects one assemblage (discussed below) 
has on another (environmental damage) without referring to overarching, causal 
explanations? and 
 How do we determine and judge these effects without a fixed, ideal such as 
‘beauty and integrity’, ‘human nature’ or ‘environmental justice’? 
 
Halsey answers these questions by developing two interconnected concepts from 
Deleuze’s philosophy: the assemblage and the machine.  
 
5.3 The core concepts drawn from Deleuze’s philosophy.  
 
Assemblages, machines and violence.  
 
Halsey considers the Goolengook forest as a collection of assemblages operating in, 
what Bonta had termed, ‘a complex space’. The difference between Halsey’s study and 
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Bonta’s study becomes visible when one considers how they each discuss the creation 
and re-creation of assemblages.  
 
Above I showed that Bonta offers us two instances in which an assemblage is created. 
These can be understood according to the potentials available to them. In the first, an 
assemblage adds or omits an entity to meet the operational demands of other entities 
within the assemblage (its multiplicity). Whilst in the second, an assemblage adds or 
omits an entity to meet the demands set out by an entity in a different assemblage (a 
referential model). This distinction, I noted, reflects the distinction discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2 between assessments within the design process (drawn from 
multiplicities) and formal, essentialist assessments (referential models). 
 
Halsey’s work, however, seems to suggest that assemblages are all created in a similar 
way: 
 
..the formation of bodies [or assemblages] (a mineral body, a forest body, a 
recreational body) cannot be divorced from the enunciations (or process of 
naming) that brings them into being (Halsey, 2006: 97).  
 
This quote illustrates Halsey’s belief that the ‘process of naming’ sets out the conditions 
through which assemblages are created. Similar arguments can be seen in the work of 
other spatial theorists (see Robbins and Marks, 2010 for example). Throughout his 
study, Halsey describes these conditions as a kind of ‘violence’ because they determine 
how an assemblage selects what will and will not be made ‘visible’ or operational 
(Halsey, 2006). This position is similar to Bonta’s description of buffer zone concepts. 
Like Bonta, Halsey argues that some concepts introduced into ‘complex space’ change 
the way other assemblages are created and re-created.  
 
However, in his review of Halsey’s work, Bonta questions Halsey’s argument that 
assemblages are created through the violence of naming machines because it ‘gives the 
false impression that, in the Deleuzian world, nothing is beyond or prior to the text’ 
(Bonta, 2008: 576). This stance taken by Bonta is supported in Deleuze’s work. 
Deleuze’s study of geology with Felix Guattari, for example, presents a complex space 
formed from assemblages created in the absence of human language (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a: 44-82).  
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It seems, therefore, that Halsey’s suggestion that assemblages are created through the 
‘processes of naming’ should be re-qualified. Rather, we might argue that the process of 
naming and the ‘violence’ it causes helps us understand the role humans play in forming 
a complex space. Rather than showing us the complex interaction between two different 
ways of creating an assemblage as Bonta’s study did, Halsey’s study puts these human 
engagements with complex spaces into critical relief. It is in this sense that I would like 
to review his work  
 
Halsey uses these two concepts, assemblage and machine, to explain how and why this 
environment changes over time. This can be seen in an example from his longitudinal 
study. 
 
An important change in Halsey’s study area begins with a letter written by the Division 
of Forest Management in 1972. This letter declares the subdivision of the Orbost Forest 
District into a series of ‘Forest management blocks’. For Halsey, this letter initiates a 
number of ‘naming machines’ such as ‘forest block 21’ and ‘forest block 22’.  
 
By dividing the land into numbered blocks, Halsey demonstrates how these newly 
created machines ignored or removed topological features, the presence and interaction 
of different biological assemblages and the ‘multiple histories’ that has helped mould 
the land in different ways (Halsey, 2006: 159). Halsey also describes the way these 
blocks created the conditions for a new structure to emerge based on the activities and 
demands of the logging industry. By doing so, the land within any given forest block 
could be understood in reference to the operational demands of one, dominant 
assemblage. Not only did these forest block machines limit which assemblages could 
operate in these spaces, they also created and affected other assemblages operating at 
different scales and in different environments. Looking across the history of the 
Goolengook, one can identify a number of such examples.  
 
In 1986, the forest block machine, conceived at the scale of the district, was re-produced 
at a much larger scale. The Victorian Timber Industry Strategy divided the State of 
Victoria into 15 Forest Management Areas (FMA), each containing a number of Forest 
Management Blocks. These FMA’s are discussed according to their ability to supply 
annual volumes of graded saw logs (Halsey, 2006: 172). Four years later, the 1990 
Forests (Timber Harvesting) Act extended this further by charting the total, sustainable 
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volume of logs that could be supplied over a 15-year period. It also introduced a 
requirement for the relevant Minister to undertake a five-year review of sustainable 
yield calculations (Halsey, 2006: 181-182).  
 
This example reveals a number of machines operating within a complex space. It shows 
how these machines led to the creation of other, complementary or conflicting machines 
and how they each affect the way different assemblages develop over time. For the most 
part, this analytical aspect of Halsey’s study is successful. The problems with this 
framework arise when Halsey moves from analysis to engagement: an important move 
in the context of this thesis given that both analysis and engagement are integral to 
planning. 
 
Tolerable and intolerable violence.  
 
Halsey’s proposals for engaging in complex spaces centre on the way one judges these 
‘naming machines’. He believes that we should not think of the violence caused by 
these machines as inherently good or bad (Halsey, 2006: 92). Rather, he argues that we 
should judge machines by asking ‘what becomings are either facilitated or cast aside in 
such scenarios?’ (Halsey, 2006: 63). Machines that allow an assemblage to explore and 
develop a wide range of potentials would thus be judged positively, whilst machines 
that significantly limit these potentials would be judged negatively. This alternative way 
of judging environmental harm, or ‘violence’, avoids the use of essential ideals such as 
‘integrity and beauty’, ‘human nature’ or ‘environmental justice’. 
 
To form these judgements, Halsey argues we must ‘decide upon the thresholds at which 
a certain type of [lexical] violence will be permitted [or tolerated], rather than upon how 
to eradicate the violence of naming per se’ (Halsey, 2006: 234). For Halsey, tolerable 
violence occurs when a machine creates conditions that allow assemblages to change in 
their own way and to pursue new relations with other entities and assemblages (active). 
Intolerable violence occurs when a machine creates a set of conditions that determine 
how assemblages will develop (reactive). (Halsey, 2006: 247). It is in this distinction 
between tolerable and intolerable violence that we can start to see the distinction 
discussed by Bonta and myself concerning the creation of an assemblage according to a 
multiplicity or according to a referential model. 
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To illustrate how this distinction might form a basis for judgement, Halsey returns to the 
machine outlined above: the naming of the forest into forest blocks. For Halsey, this 
machine illustrates an instance of extreme or ‘monumental’ violence because it ‘strictly 
limits the velocities (directions) [the Googengook assemblage] can chart’ (Halsey, 
2006: 234).  
 
However, whilst this example is useful, it represents an extreme case. Halsey does not 
discuss other, less significant acts of violence. Yet, such cases are necessary if one is to 
understand where and how to locate the threshold between tolerable and intolerable 
violence in this or any other complex space. 
 
5.4 The resulting theoretical framework and its gaps. 
 
Whilst Halsey’s concept of violence and his proposals for assessing violence are useful 
additions to the concepts drawn from Deleuze’s seminal texts, they also lead me onto, 
what I believe to be, the principle gap in Halsey’s theoretical framework. As noted 
above, Halsey argues that a naming machine cannot be judged as inherently good or 
bad, but must be judged according to the becomings (potentials) it encourages or blocks. 
However, this principle is not developed further and we are left with two other 
problems. 
 
The first of these concerns the identification of becomings. After all, Halsey suggests 
that we form judgements based on becomings (potentials) that have been actualised, 
those that still might be actualised, and those that were blocked or removed. Whilst we 
might be able to trace the former in the assemblages we see around us (in the actual), 
the same cannot be said for the others. Halsey offers little indication as to how we 
should identify these ‘pre-actual’ becomings. 
 
The second problem concerns assessment. Once identified, Halsey provides us with 
little indication as to whether we should assess becomings on quantitative or qualitative 
grounds. If we pursue the former, then a machine would be judged as positive if it 
encourages more becomings than it blocks. However, this may lead us to questionable 
conclusions. One can imagine a scenario in which a machine that encourages many 
racist, sexist and socially repressive becomings is judged in the same way as a machine 
that encourage many sustainable, egalitarian and socially cohesive becomings.  
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If one was to resolve this dilemma by pursing a qualitative assessment, then it would 
suggest judging a machine according to the desirability of the becomings it encourages 
or blocks. However, the problem here is that we must then decide what is or is not 
deemed to be desirable, thus returning us to the problem of judgement.  
 
I believe that this problem is owing to the way Halsey (re)creates Deleuze’s concepts to 
form his own theoretical framework. To illustrate my argument, I would like to start by 
capturing Halsey’s framework in tabular form below (Table 3). 
 
  
80 
 
Table 3: Mark Halsey’s theoretical framework (Halsey, 2006).  
Deleuzian concepts Halsey’s concepts 
Assemblage: 
A combination of human and 
non-human entities. 
Machine: 
A machine is a collection of 
forces acting on a number of 
assemblages. This leads them to 
structure and re-structure 
themselves in very particular 
ways 
Naming machine: 
A naming machine determines 
how assemblages operate, 
whether it will develop into the 
future, and whether other 
assemblages will be created. 
Violence: 
Violence is the effect that 
naming machines have on 
assemblages. 
Becomings: 
Becomings are the potentials 
for an assemblage to develop in 
different ways. 
  
In/tolerable violence: 
Tolerable violence occurs when 
a machine allows the 
assemblage to pursue a wide 
range of becomings from its 
multiplicity. Intolerable 
violence occurs when a 
machine significantly reduces 
those becomings to those set 
out by a referential model. 
Becoming (blocks): 
The Goolengook assemblage 
can be understood according to 
a series of developments broken 
into blocks of becoming.  
 
The left-hand-side column lists four of Deleuze’s key, ontological concepts and the way 
Halsey interprets these concepts to make them useful to his study. Running from top to 
bottom of the column, these concepts are positioned across the three ontological realms 
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that form Deleuze’s understanding of the real: the assemblages and the machine as part 
of the actual, and becomings / blocks of becomings as part of the virtual (or, more 
precisely, part of the processes of actualisation) (DeLanda, 2002).  
 
The second column to the right-hand-side, identifies the concepts that Halsey creates to 
meet the specific demands of his project. As the table suggests, Halsey develops the 
concepts of the machine to form the concept of naming machines and uses this as the 
basis for developing the concepts of violence and in/tolerable violence.  
 
Deleuze’s concept of becoming is an important part of Halsey’s approach to judgement. 
However, as the table shows Halsey does not (re)create this concept to meet the specific 
demands of his field. For me, this provides us with some explanation as to why Halsey’s 
study is unable to identify and measure becomings, and thus establish a practical basis 
for judgement.  
 
The problem is that Halsey’s proposals are limited to the way Deleuze’s uses this 
concept in his seminal texts.  Such texts offer very few clues as to how we should 
identify or measure becomings. One of the most developed examples can be seen in 
Deleuze’s review of Freud’s diagnosis for Little Hans (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004; 
Deleuze, 2007). Deleuze argues that Freud psychological judgements focus too heavily 
on a pre-conceived set of ideas and explanations. In doing so, his analysis of Little Hans 
does not account for his becomings: becoming-animal, becoming horse (Deleuze, 2007: 
98). Neither does he allow for the assemblages that Hans has created from these 
becomings (Deleuze, 2007: 98). However, Deleuze does not expand on this in detail 
leaving us with a partial image of Hans’ potentials ‘to become’ and no way to assess 
these potentials. Given that Deleuze intends this as a philosophical critique, it is not 
surprising that Deleuze does not develop this concept to meet these demands. However, 
the same cannot be said of Halsey’s study of the Goolengook.  
 
If Halsey is to offer a new, practical tool that can be used to engage in complex spaces, I 
believe that this gap must be resolved because, to be useful to criminology or to 
planning, there is a need to move beyond critical analysis and towards engagement. 
 
Rather than using Deleuze’s concept of becoming as it appears in his seminal texts, I 
believe we must (re)create this concept in a way that allows practitioners to identify and 
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assess the becomings that are encouraged or blocked by naming machines. Doing so 
would make Halsey’s concepts of ‘tolerable and intolerable violence’ of practical use to 
assessment practice. Given that this is the core focus of my study, such concepts will be 
taken forward in my subsequent proposals developed in Chapter 7.  
 
6. Hillier: a multiplanar theory for engagement.  
 
I started my review of Bonta and Halsey’s studies by outlining a number of empirical 
observations taken from very specific places. I showed how these empirical 
observations introduced problems that both theorists believed would benefit from a 
Deleuzian insight. In both cases we are left with an unstated question: how might this 
study of a specific case change the way we engage in a range of spatial problem or/and 
‘complex spaces’? 
 
This question is fundamental to Jean Hillier’s work as a planning theorist. In the 
introduction to her 2007 monograph, Hillier suggests that her study aims ‘to take 
Deleuzoguattarian geophilosophy beyond the abstract to a useful, practical basis for 
spatial management’ (Hillier, 2007: 13). Hillier’s study, therefore, captures the macro-
objectives of this research i.e. to consider whether Deleuze’s ontological concepts can 
be translated into planning theory and planning practice.  
 
This problem at the heart of Hillier’s study is much broader and more abstract in focus 
than the problems underpinning the last two studies. To understand and resolve these 
problems, Hillier draws on the most abstract parts of Deleuze’s philosophy. The use of 
abstract, philosophical concepts to resolve abstract, spatial problems can make Hillier’s 
work difficult to follow. In order to make this Deleuze-inspired voice accessible and to 
show its relevance to this thesis, I will try to unravel some of Hillier’s thinking. 
 
6.1 A brief introduction to Hillier’s study.  
 
Like Bonta and Halsey, Hillier forms her proposals from a detailed review of Deleuze’s 
ontological concepts (Hillier, 2007). Such interpretations have attracted the attention of 
the broader Deleuzian community. These interpretations have also had notable influence 
in planning theory. Hillier’s Deleuze-inspired approach has been used to discuss 
broader shifts in planning. For Porter and Davoudi, Hillier’s proposals are part of a 
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small academic community looking outside traditional planning theory to ‘develop 
more relational, ﬂuid, and interpretive approaches to planning’ (Porter and Davoudi, 
2012: 331). Whilst for Searle and Bunker, Hillier’s multiplanar theory is an important 
contribution to a developing ‘Australian paradigm’. This paradigm is thought to bring 
together new theories and practices of strategic planning in metropolitan cities such as 
Sydney and Melbourne (Searle and Bunker, 2010). These approaches, they argue, share 
the idea that strategic plans must be created to allow for, but not predict, future changes 
and adaptations. 
 
Hillier’s unique contribution to the idea of adaptability has been discussed by a number 
of other planning theorists. For many, Hillier’s study is seen as an experimental and 
performance-centric approach to planning (Healey, 2009a; Ploger, 2010). For 
Wilkinson, this idea of experimentation is best captured in Hillier’s interpretation and 
use of the Deleuzian concept, becomings. By thinking in terms of becomings, she notes, 
planners are able to ‘navigate towards desired trajectories’ and consider endless 
adaptations to a changing, and complex world (Wilkinson, 2012: 162). This, she goes 
on, might provide planners with a framework for developing resilient forms of planning 
practice (Wilkinson, 2012). Wilkinson’s comments in particular show how Hillier’s 
Deleuze-inspired study has since been used to develop other lines of enquiry in response 
to current debates in planning.  
 
Since Hillier published her proposals for a ‘multiplanar’ theory in 2007, several 
attempts have been made to develop and ‘test’ these ideas in strategic planning practice. 
Nyseth et al’s study of Tromsø in Norway provides us with the most developed attempt 
to date (Nyseth et al, 2009). In this study, the research team compared the approaches to 
strategic planning in practice with those offered in Hillier’s proposals. Their findings 
suggest that some of the Deleuze-inspired concepts used by Hillier, particularly those 
associated with becomings, could be identified in existing planning methods (Nyseth et 
al, 2009).  
 
6.2 The problem directing Hillier’s study. 
 
Hillier’s proposals for a multiplanar theory are constructed around a problem she 
identifies in many areas of planning theory and practice. This problem concerns the use 
of transcendental principles and models rather than methods and theories based on an 
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immanent and changing world. Whilst Hillier does not offer a detailed review of 
assessment methods used in the milieu of planning/design, one can see how closely this 
argument relates to my own line of enquiry presented in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
Hillier identifies two areas in planning theory and practice where efforts to embrace 
immanent practices and theories of planning are overshadowed by subsequent attempts 
to relate these proposals to a transcendental theory. To appreciate this argument, I 
would like to outline and discuss these two areas in turn.   
 
Consensus building.  
 
The first area of planning discussed by Hillier is captured by Judith Innes and David 
Booher’s study of ‘consensus building’ and the references they make to network science 
(Innes and Booher, 1999; 1999a; 2010; Booher and Innes, 2002). As the name suggests, 
‘building consensus’ includes both a process (building), and a product of this process 
(consensus). Innes and Booher explain the process of building consensus through the 
concept, ‘bricolage’. As in many disciplines across the social sciences16, bricolage is 
considered as a process of assembling heterogeneous components whose origins lie 
outside of the specific issue under consideration. In this instance, such components are 
the fragments of concepts, ideas and strategies used or seen in other projects (see Innes 
and Booher, 1999a).  
 
Innes and Booher’s observations from consensus-building practice suggest that the 
direction this bricolage process takes, and the products of this process (consensus) are 
constructed during the creative act itself (Innes and Booher, 1999a; 2010). There are no 
pre-defined models or archetypes that decide how this should be done or what the 
outcomes should be (Innes and Booher, 1999; 1999a). In fact, they insist that effective 
consensus building can only occur when a group of stakeholders are able to devise and 
adapt their own rules for specific parts of the process and decide what the final product 
should look like (Innes and Booher, 1999). The way they describe the immanent process 
of bricolage, therefore, seems to support the Deleuze-inspired arguments made by Bonta 
and Halsey as well as the points drawn from my own experiences of design practice in 
Chapter 1. 
                                                     
16
 see Lincoln and Denzin, 2003 for example 
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However, unlike Bonta and Halsey, Innes and Booher assume that this immanent 
process of bricolage will lead the group to a mostly harmonious end-state, consensus. 
For Hillier, this is problematic because there is little reason for us to assume that 
consensus would develop out of difference (Hillier, 2003).  Different viewpoints, she 
notes, contain conflicts, antagonisms and tensions as much as areas of agreement 
(Hillier, 2003). For Hillier, this shows how the immanent process of bricolage is stifled 
by an overarching trust in the transcendental concept, consensus (Hillier, 2003).  
 
One can see parallels between Hillier’s argument and Bonta’s observations. Thinking 
back to Bonta’s study of the Olancho region, there is no reason to believe that the 
interactions between different assemblages like the coffee farm and the cattle farm 
would lead to a harmonious end-state. Indeed, for Bonta, the complex space that results 
from these interactions is formed out of disharmony
17
. Similarly, there is no reason to 
assume that the sequence of design experiments discussed in Chapter 1 should fit 
together to form a perfectly functional building (hence the resulting problems associated 
with furniture layouts, corridor design etc). 
 
For Hillier, another important area of contention concerns Innes and Booher’s attempts 
to explain and support this idea of consensus. Innes and Booher draw on advances in 
network theory and structuration theory to explain why consensus is achieved from the 
immanent process of bricolage.  
The use of network theory as an explanatory framework can be seen in most of Innes 
and Booher’s work. Not only are network dynamics used to explain how consensus is 
achieved between different viewpoints (Innes and Booher, 1999a), it is also used as a 
model for new ways to collaborate in planning and for institutional change more 
broadly (Innes and Booher, 2010; Booher and Innes, 2002).  
 
To add further support to this overarching system of order, they argue that the 
distribution and production of power in the network model corresponds to broader 
theories of structural dynamics. In this case, they relate power in a network to Giddens’ 
three typologies of power: the power of action; the power of ideas, modes and methods, 
and the power of deep structures (Booher and Innes, 2002: 225; Giddens, 1984).   
                                                     
17 Which Bonta and Protevi term, ‘far from equilibrium states’ 
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For Hillier, Innes and Booher’s work captures an inconsistent position. They reject 
models and archetypes in favour of bricolage: an immanent process of creation (drawn 
from multiplicities). Yet they introduce pre-defined end points within this process and 
justify the results using explanatory models and universal theories (referential models).  
 
Relational complexity.  
 
The second area of planning identified by Hillier, brings together Patsy Healey’s 
arguments for relational complexity and new-institutionalist theory (Healey, 1999; 
2003; 2004; 2004a; 2006; 2007).  
 
Healey argues that planners must embrace the idea that they too are embedded in the 
fabric of society (Healey, 1999). As such, they must see planning practice as a way to 
work within rather than outside of a complex world. Such practices, she goes on, must 
be undertaken as experiments in an uncertain, dynamic and fluid set of relations 
(Healey, 2003; 2004; 2007). 
 
Like Innes and Booher’s idea of bricolage, Healey’s proposals for experimentation 
seems to suggest that the process and products of planning practice should be created 
immanently ie from within the complexity that surrounds us. Yet, like Innes and 
Booher, this engagement with complexity is set against a theoretical framework 
developed around networks and structuration theory.  
 
For Healey, geography is ‘relational’. Healey describes this geography as a complex 
collection of overlapping, ‘loosely-coupled webs’ formed from ‘nodes, links and loose 
threads’ (Healey, 2007: 222). Whilst Healey’s description seems to embrace greater 
degrees of complexity, it is based on the same assumption that the network model can 
be used to understand the actual world around us. Like Innes and Booher, Healey also 
assumes that this referential model of the network can be transposed between different 
uses. Indeed, this is critical to Healey’s position.  
 
This has ontological implications. It suggests that all entities and the relationships 
between entities share a common structure. We might argue that such an idea lends 
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itself to an essentialist stance, positioned at the level of the actual world as a whole 
rather than at the level of the entities themselves.  
 
For Hillier, Healey’s relational space introduces immanent processes of experimentation 
(drawing on multiplicities). But, like Innes and Booher, she goes on to explain this 
experimentation by referring to network models and universal theories (reference 
models). 
 
Hillier uses these two examples from planning theory to highlight a broader problem in 
the discipline. In philosophical terms, she questions why many planning theorists and 
practitioners advocate immanent practices but explain these by referring to 
transcendental models and theories.  
 
For Hillier, this problem cannot be resolved by simply discarding transcendental 
structures. After all, these structures do more than simply explain the way plans are 
made. They have functional roles in planning practice. Planning professionals would be 
unable to form or enforce their plans without a set of statutory regulations for example.  
 
The solution, she argues, is to distinguish between these two kinds of transcendental 
structure: those that try to explain complexity, and those that function within 
complexity. For Hillier, spatial planning theory and practice needs a theoretical 
framework that takes account of solutions that are created immanently. Such a 
framework, she argues, must avoid any reference to simple models or/and structural 
dynamics. For Hillier, it is in the construction of such a framework that Deleuze’s 
philosophy can be of greatest benefit to spatial planners.  
 
6.3 The core concepts drawn from Deleuze’s philosophy.  
 
As in Bonta and Halsey’s studies, Hillier’s proposals for planning are based on the way 
she interprets, expands and (re)creates some of Deleuze’s key ontological concepts. 
Whilst most of the concepts in Bonta and Halsey’s studies focus on the actual, Hillier 
develops her multiplanar theory around a number of concepts within Deleuze’s virtual, 
or ‘pre-actual’ realm (DeLanda, 2002). This is not entirely unsurprising given that the 
role of planning is to create plans based on ‘what might be’, rather than what has 
already become.  
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Plan(e)s.  
 
Hillier develops her theory around Deleuze’s concept of the plane, and its usefulness to 
spatial planning. To do this, Hillier looks to the explanations offered by the Deleuzian 
scholar, Brian Massumi. In his translation notes for A Thousand Plateaus, Massumi 
explains that the French term ‘le plan’ designates both a “plane” in the geometrical 
sense and a “plan”’ (Massumi, 2004: xvii-xviii). Whilst Deleuze and Guattari primarily 
use le plan to mean “plane”, there are times when both meanings are intended, such as 
during their discussion on the plane of transcendence
18
. In such instances Massumi 
makes this distinction by using the term, ‘plan(e)’.  
 
Rather than using the dual meaning for only one kind of plane, Hillier extends this to 
include both planes. Thus, for Hillier the plan(e) of immanence and the plan(e) of 
transcendence can be seen as geometric planes in a theoretical framework, and as plans 
more specifically (Hillier, 2007: 242). 
 
Plan(e) of immanence: a figure of the plane / strategic plan.  
 
By drawing on this dual meaning, Hillier begins to forge links between philosophical 
planes and spatial plans. To do this, Hillier must interpret and adapt some of Deleuze’s 
explanations.  
 
Hillier introduces Deleuze’s concept of the plane of immanence as a ‘virtual realm of 
potentials’ (Hillier, 2007: 244). Because it is virtual, Hillier argues, it will always 
remain ‘inaccessible to actants such as spatial planners’ (Hillier, 2007: 246). However, 
this should ‘…not stop us ‘figuring it, or constructing images of it’’ (Hillier, 2007: 246). 
Rather than focusing on the virtual plane, Hillier focuses her attention on this ‘figure’. 
In doing so, Hillier reflects the point I made in Chapter 2 concerning Deleuze’s use of 
extremes like ‘the virtual realm’ to encourage theorists to think about processes of 
actualisation.   
 
This position is equally supported in Bonta and Protevi’s proposals for a 
‘geophilosophy’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). Like Hillier, Bonta and Protevi form a 
                                                     
18
 Or ‘plane of organisation’, which is taken to be approximately synonymous  (Hillier, 
2007: 242; DeLanda, 2002) 
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distinction between two planes of immanence. They describe the first as a ‘(relative) 
plane’ and the second as ‘THE virtual plane’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). Like Hillier, 
they distinguish these according to our ability to construct and understand them: 
 
…in general humans have the capacity to transform and re-smooth their 
landscapes by transmuting their spaces, drawing new ‘planes of 
consistency’ [immanence] for them… (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 173).  
 
Whilst they are set in very different contexts and use different terms, this comment 
seems to offer some support to the links Hillier draws between a figure of the plane of 
immanence and a strategic plan (Hillier, 2007: 249).  
 
Becomings and speculative potentials.  
 
Hillier develops this figure of the plane of immanence (strategic plan) by focusing her 
attention on the becomings that form it. A plan(e) of immanence, she notes, is formed as 
a, ‘transvaluative, collective speculation about what might be’ (Hillier, 2007: 243). In 
this, Hillier confirms Deleuze and Guattari’s point that the plane of immanence is made 
up of potentials. In other words, it is formed from potentials to become something/s 
rather than a collection of things that have already been actualised into something 
(entities).  
 
This description is made all the more interesting by the two terms she adds to this 
definition: ‘collective speculation’ and the ‘transvaluative’. For Hillier, a figure of the 
plane is formed from a set of potentials imagined by a group of ‘actants’ working 
together (Hillier, 2007). These actants may include local residents, planning consultants, 
master-planners, architects, builders and policymakers.  
 
Hillier’s phrase also suggests how these people might construct this figure. By referring 
to ‘transvaluative’ potentials, Hillier distinguishes this figuring from other forms of 
brainstorming or collaborative work. This term implies that the group of actants must 
imagine potentials without relating them to existing or assumed principles. Instead, they 
should make their judgements according to ‘the forces that intersect it and the things it 
can do’ (Hillier, 2007: 243; Kaufman, 1998; Hillier, 2011). Building on Kaufman’s 
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description, Hillier, describes these forces as the relationships between potentials and 
the way these potentials might transform established relationships (Hillier, 2011: 508). 
 
Thinking back to Hillier’s critique of consensus building, one can see why this is 
important. In Innes and Booher’s practice of consensus building, a facilitator 
encourages a group of stakeholders to consider potentials that might help them to 
achieve consensus (Innes and Booher, 1999; 1999a). In such instances, consensus is 
taken as an end-state, and potentials are valued according to the way they might 
contribute to achieving this. 
 
In Hillier’s proposal, potentials are considered according to their capacity to affect the 
relationship between entities. In doing so, she broadens the likely directions such 
collaboration might take.  
 
Empty signifiers.  
 
However, this raises an important point concerning how one should speculate, or what 
one should speculate about. In her final description for the figure of the plane of 
immanence, Hillier discusses, 
 
Several (or perhaps one collectively preferred) trajectories or ‘visions’ of the 
long-term future, including concepts towards which actants desire to move 
such as sustainability (plan(e)s of consistency or immanence) 
(Hillier, 2007: 249). 
 
For Hillier, these empty signifier concepts provide a focal point for ‘speculating 
becomings’. Thus, actants would observe the entities that surround them and consider 
what potential these entities have to become ‘sustainable’, or ‘more socially cohesive’ 
and so forth.   
 
Hillier’s proposal to include concepts like ‘sustainability’ into her theory is drawn from 
her work with Michael Gunder and their Lacanian / Zizekian analysis of spatial 
planning (Gunder and Hillier, 2004; 2007; 2009). In their most recent publication they 
identify ten concepts seen across planning theories and practices that have,  
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…given up explicit, concise, significance to secure multifarious points of 
view, chains of significations constituting conflicting narratives, or unique 
interpretations pertaining to particular situations, all under one common 
label (Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 17). 
 
Such open-ended concepts are described using the Lacanian term, ‘master [or empty] 
signifier’. As in Lacan’s analysis of the individual, Gunder and Hillier argue that 
planning theories and practices are formed from a combination of terms used to 
construct an identity. Thus, a spatial policy document, for example, may draw on 
concepts like ‘sustainability’, ‘certainty’, ‘growth’ and ‘globalisation’ to help identify 
what the policy is and how it relates to other policies and debates in the field. Yet, the 
meaning of these concepts and the relationships between concepts are never explicit. 
They are always open to different interpretations, or points of view. Drawing on Laclau, 
Gunder and Hillier refer to these concepts as ‘empty’ or ‘floating’ concepts (Laclau, 
1996; 2003; 2005).  
 
Whilst Hillier does not make the connection, this role played by ‘empty signifiers’ is not 
unlike the role played by singularities within Deleuze’s seminal texts and outlined in 
Chapter 2 (DeLanda, 2002). Like empty signifiers, singularities provide a direction, for 
becomings as they develop from the virtual towards the actual, or, in Hillier’s 
framework, as they move from the figure of the plane of immanence towards the actual 
world we see around us (DeLanda, 2002: 14). This idea is developed further in Chapter 
6. 
 
Emergence: the un-speculated potentials.  
 
Deleuze describes the plane of immanence as a ‘transcendental field’ (Deleuze, 2001: 
25): a virtual realm inaccessible to our sensory observations (hence ‘transcendental 
empiricism’ Bryant, 2008)19. Thus, whilst we may be able to overcome some of these 
limitations by speculating potentials for the future, Hillier reminds us that the resulting 
figure is inevitably partial: 
 
                                                     
19
 See Chapter 7 for a detailed review of transcendental empiricism, how it differs from 
other epistemological stances, and how it influenced my research design. 
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(A plane of immanence) is a plane of foresight; of trajectory, of creative 
transformation, of what might be. Chance is important, however. We should 
not forget the potential for unforeseen lines of flight to emerge… (Hillier, 
2007: 245) 
 
Hillier develops this idea of emergence through un-speculated potentials when she notes 
that ‘there is thus much scope for things to not turn out as planned; for something to 
emerge in the gap between plan and built form, between virtual and actual.’ (Hillier and 
Abrahams, 2013: 33). In doing so, Hillier warns us that we must see strategic plans as 
temporal; open to revision both at different periods in time and at different scales of 
plan-making (Hillier, 2011). 
 
Plan(e) of transcendence.  
 
Hillier does not offer speculated and un-speculated becomings as the only factors 
influencing the actualisation of assemblages. As a counterpoint to the plan(e) of 
immanence, Hillier suggests that these assemblages are also created in reference to the 
plan(e) of transcendence. As with the plan(e) of immanence, Hillier describes the 
plan(e) of transcendence as both a geometrical plane in an ontological framework and as 
a plan from the field of spatial planning. If a strategic plan is an example of the former, 
she argues, ‘local plans, design briefs (and) detailed plans are typical planes of 
(transcendence)’ (Hillier, 2007: 247). Unlike strategic plans, these plans relate 
specifically to the way we organise, define and construct space.  
 
For Hillier such plans, act as ‘masterplans’ or ‘blueprints… with certain goals for 
development’ and they set the standards through which subsequent decisions are judged 
(Hillier, 2007: 247; Hillier and Abrahams, 2013). Thus, a local plan will set goals for 
how many homes will be constructed in a given part of a town. It will also set the 
standards on how these houses will be built in terms of heights, use of materials, 
relationships to context, number of car parking spaces per house and so on. And it will 
use these to influence the design and location specific plans, such as a masterplan or a 
building plan.  
 
Thinking back to Chapters 1 and 2, we might argue that my description of the 
essentialist, modelled concept is similar to Hillier’s description of a transcendental 
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plan(e). It sets out a series of goals based on carbon neutrality, it defines ‘blueprints’ for 
achieving this through a universal assessment method and it sets standards by which 
subsequent decisions will be judged. Hillier’s study suggests that these modelled 
concepts are an inevitable part of the regulatory and planning / design process. She does 
not suggest that these modelled concepts should be removed in all instances, because 
her study infers that they serve a useful purpose
20
. However, for Hillier, it seems that 
modelled concepts become problematic when they are used as a fixed goal against 
which all subsequent decisions are judged or organised.  
 
6.4 The resulting theoretical framework and its gaps. 
 
As with Bonta’s and Halsey’s theoretical framework I have captured Hillier’s 
theoretical framework in tabular form (Table 4). The left-hand-side column identifies 
the ontological concepts drawn from and interpreted by Hillier in her proposed 
framework. Looking down the column I have shown how many of Hillier’s concepts are 
created within the virtual or ‘pre-actual’ area of Deleuze’s ontology, the extent of which 
reflects Hillier’s underlying message to ‘stretch beyond the horizon’ or, in other words, 
stretch beyond the actual world we see around us. We can also see that, whilst they are 
used as part of a very different project, these ontological concepts are used and 
described in similar ways to those set out by Bonta, Halsey and myself in Chapter 2. 
 
  
                                                     
20
 Although she does not offer a detailed review or explanation as to what this purpose 
is, when and how it is beneficial  
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Table 4: Jean Hillier’s theoretical framework (Hillier, 2007). 
Deleuzian concepts Hillier’s concepts 
Assemblage:  
An assemblage is an actualised 
group of potentials.  
Plane of transcendence: 
A plane of transcendence is a 
collection of blueprints used to 
explain complex relations 
Plan(e) of transcendence: 
The plan(e) of transcendence is 
a blueprint for a given area or 
an area of design.  
Becomings: 
A becoming is the potential for 
an entity to develop in the 
future 
Un/speculated potentials: 
Speculated potentials are 
potentials that can be imagined.  
Un-speculated potentials are 
potentials that cannot be 
imagined.  
Becoming (blocks): 
Blocks of becoming are a 
collection of potentials directed 
towards the development of an 
assemblage/s. 
Empty signifiers: 
Empty signifiers have no 
inherent meaning. They provide 
direction to our speculations 
about what ‘might be’. 
Plane of immanence: 
A plane of immanence is a 
chain of multiplicities (virtual 
diagrams). 
Plan(e) of immanence: 
The plan(e) of immanence is 
the combination of all 
speculated potentials directed 
towards a series of empty 
signifiers already given within 
the field. 
The strategic plan: 
A strategic plan is an example 
of a figure of the plane of 
immanence. 
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The right-hand-side column shows concepts created by Hillier. As in Bonta and 
Halsey’s theoretical framework this table demonstrates how Hillier interprets, expands 
and (re)creates Deleuze’s concepts to meet the unique demands of her field.  
 
This table also highlights what Hillier suggests as three influences leading to the 
creation of a planned or designed assemblage: 
 
1. The first group is offered the greatest attention and centres around the strategic 
plan (plan(e) of immanence), formed from speculated potentials directed 
towards empty signifiers (or singularities).  
2. The second group is the un-speculated potentials that emerge over time, and as 
the design process moves across different kinds of plan and stages in the 
actualisation of a city or building, from strategic plans to masterplans, building 
plans and the built environment.  
3. The third group is defined by the plan(e) of transcendence that determines how 
space should be structured (striated) through blueprints for a specific 
geographical location or for a specific area of design (such as established layouts 
for WC’s, houses or cul-de-sacs). 
 
Thus, Hillier suggests that, as we move from the strategic plan to the masterplan, the 
building plan, the window jamb detail, a sketch in a wet site hut and the built 
assemblages we see in the world around us, we must work with these three groups of 
influences: speculated potentials, un-speculated potentials and blueprints. However, this 
leaves us with a series of difficult and mostly unresolved questions important to this 
thesis: 
 
1. How does the masterplanner or architect sat at their desk and drawing board take 
Hillier’s strategic plan (formed from speculated potentials) and use it as a 
practical basis for their proposed designs: to direct the processes of 
actualisation?  
2. How should they combine these speculated potentials with the un-speculated 
potentials that arise during the process of plan-making? Such as the potential for 
poor ground stability identified in the example used to introduce this thesis. 
3. How should they negotiate these influences with the influence of regulations and 
blueprints and, what I term, ‘modelled concept-based tools’? 
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Hillier’s multiplanar theory is mostly focused on the creation of a strategic plan, rather 
than questions of assessment, design and actualisation. Of course, this is not 
unsurprising given that Hillier’s work is situated within the field of strategic planning 
rather than the field of planning/design. However, if we are to make Deleuze’s ontology 
useful to plan-making practices more broadly, then I believe we must ‘stretch’ Hillier’s 
multiplanar theory in both directions: ‘beyond and towards the horizon’. Or, in other 
words, we must direct our speculations towards the virtual, but we must equally 
consider how these speculations might be actualised and assessed through the many 
decisions we make in different areas of plan-making practice. This, I believe, highlights 
a gap in Hillier’s framework. 
 
Hillier has started to offer some initial and tentative responses to these questions. The 
first of these can be seen in her attempts to identify ‘approximations of multiplanar 
planning in practice’ (Hillier, 2007: 275). These examples from practice include 
reference to the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), municipal planning 
in Norway, and proposals for Melbourne Docklands (Hillier, 2007: 276-291).  
 
Hillier selects these cases in particular because they share a mixture of strategic 
planning and local planning proposals. Each example includes instances when strategic 
planners have experimented with new methods and have left parts of their strategy open 
to subsequent interpretation and development by actors operating at the local level. In 
her review of the ESDP, Hillier notes that it is a,  
 
…plane of immanence upon which more detailed and different existential 
sphere and place-specific plans and policies emerge, where the voices of 
local communities may be heard and political power-games played out. 
(Hillier, 2007: 280) 
 
This quote suggests that Deleuze’s concepts can be identified in existing forms of 
strategic planning practice. We might argue that such links between Deleuzian theory 
and practice are important if we are to develop a viable and practicable set of Deleuze-
inspired planning tools. However, the problem is that once Hillier has established these 
links, she does not consider how the ESDP, the Norwegian municipal plan or Australian 
docklands can usefully contribute to a Deleuzian alternative to planning, or an 
alternative set of tools used by planners. As a result, Hillier proposal acts as an 
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analytical frame for existing practice rather than something that might change existing 
planning practice.  
  
Hillier’s subsequent work makes some attempt to resolve this problem. In her 2011 
paper, Hillier establishes conceptual links between her multiplanar theory and Richard 
Hames’ methods of strategic navigation.  Such links are supported by planning theorists 
using this method in practice (Wilkinson, 2011: 598). Like Hillier, Hames also focuses 
on potentials for the future, experimentation and adaptability. But these principles are 
not strictly Deleuzian and can be found in a range of literature in many disciplines. As 
with her review of the ESDP, Hillier identifies links with existing forms of practice, but 
does not critically discuss this link, or consider how it might advance her own proposals 
for a new set of practicable planning tools.  
 
Hillier’s study suggests, therefore, that Deleuze’s philosophy can be used to help 
planners re-think key parts of their practice. Yet her proposals for a new, Deleuzian set 
of planning tools intended for engagement rather than analysis remain incomplete. 
Whilst Hillier does not develop her concepts fully, they provide us with useful additions 
to the concepts offered in Deleuze’s seminal text. These concepts are particularly 
important to professionals engaged in the field of planning/design, as well as those 
engaged in the assessment of building and urban designs. Given that this is the core 
focus of my study, such concepts will be taken forward in my subsequent proposals 
developed in Chapter 7.  
 
 7. Discussion. 
These three studies provide some directions for answering my two research questions 
and a number of broader lessons about making Deleuze useful. These will be discussed 
below according to the following, three themes: 
 
1. Directions for responding to the essentialist, ‘modelled concept’ 
2. Is Deleuze useful as a method of analysis or/and engagement? 
3. Lessons about making Deleuze’s concepts useful  
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7.1. Directions for responding to the essentialist, ‘modelled concept’. 
 
In this first theme I explore how these three studies respond to the idea that a concept 
can be modelled according to its essential traits. Whilst these three Deleuze-inspired 
studies do not address ‘modelled concepts’ directly, they do make references to 
comparable concepts and associated problems. Taking these into consideration, I 
consider what can be learned from these and what directions they offer for developing a 
suitable response to the modelled concepts introduced and discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2. 
 
Bonta’s study illustrates two kinds of entity operating in a ‘complex space’. The first is 
illustrated in his description of roaming cattle and the subsequent introduction of 
fencing. In my review, I showed that, whilst the cattle affected the coffee farm 
assemblage, it was not responsible for deciding how the assemblage coped with these 
affects (ie the introduction of the fence). This fence was introduced into an assemblage 
to meet the operational demands of other entities within that assemblage, and to respond 
to the effects of ‘entanglement’.  
 
The second kind of entity is illustrated in his description of ‘buffer zone concepts’ as 
promoted by the conservation assemblage. As I noted above, Bonta informs us that this 
concept was ‘based on the US model … the ‘perfect’ park out of the US textbook’ 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 183-184). It was, we might argue, a model created within a 
different context, country, time and purpose. This second kind of entity was aimed at 
changing the way other assemblages operated. They did this, he notes, by determining 
how other assemblages organised themselves and the entities they selected or omitted 
from the assemblage. 
 
This ‘buffer zone concept’ as described by Bonta, is comparable, to what I termed, 
‘modelled concepts’. As in my reference to the ‘sustainable home’, they too capture the 
idea that a concept, in this case ‘the perfect park’, can be modelled to form a set of 
principles transferable to many different spaces. As in modelled concepts, these 
principles are also used to determine how a space (or design / plan) will evolve in the 
future. 
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Interestingly, Bonta’s analysis suggests that, once introduced, these modelled concepts 
become part of a complex space. Bonta’s principle concern, it seems, is that these 
modelled concepts should not be allowed to provide the only means through which 
other entities are introduced into a complex space. The different assemblages that form 
a complex space, he suggests, should be free to introduce entities that meet their unique 
operational demands also. As in the case of the roaming cattle and coffee farm 
assemblage, Bonta seems to suggest that these entities are important to the way 
assemblages adapt to a changing environment. Thus, rather than removing essentialist, 
modelled concepts, like those used in the Code for Sustainable Homes form of 
assessment, Bonta suggests we must prevent them from dominating a complex space 
(and the design process) and thus limiting the development of other potentials in the 
future.  
 
Similar links to ‘modelled concept’ can be identified in Halsey’s study of the 
Goolengook. In his timeline for this complex space, Halsey discusses the introduction 
and development of the forest block. Halsey shows how this ideal and rather abstract 
concept was operationalised through a series of other, more tangible concepts. As in 
Bonta’s study, these concepts were used to sub-divide land in Goolengook according to 
pre-defined categories, defining which assemblages would operate in different parts of 
the forest and which entities would need to be added or omitted from those 
assemblages.  
 
Like Bonta, Halsey is critical of these concepts and suggests that some form of action is 
needed to prevent them from dominating complex spaces. Unfortunately, Halsey does 
not discuss which kind of actions would be deemed suitable. However, he does argue 
that any such actions should be underpinned by a process of judgement. 
 
Rather than judging a concept as inherently good or bad, he argues, every concept 
should be assessed according to whether they encourage or block an assemblage’s 
potentials to develop differently in the future. This argument suggests that, whilst 
Halsey judges the forest block concept as ‘intolerable’, other modelled concepts with a 
lesser effect might be judged more favourably. It also suggests that the ‘forest block’ 
could have a positive effect if introduced and developed in different ways (as part of a 
different machine).  
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The idea that we should assess modelled concepts on an individual basis is not fully 
supported by Hillier’s study. In my review of her study, I suggested that ‘modelled 
concepts’ are captured, at least in part, by Hillier’s argument against transcendental 
concepts / ideas. Such concepts, she notes, arise when a concept like sustainability, is 
defined as a ‘desired societal goal’ and used to ‘coalesce … a field of diverse issues’ 
(Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 144). Hillier argues that these transcendental concepts 
should be removed from the early, strategic planning process. Such concepts, she notes, 
should be replaced with ‘empty signifiers’ whose meaning is not determined in advance.  
 
Whilst Hillier dismisses such concepts as part of the strategic planning process, she 
acknowledges that the codes and assessments used in more detailed stages of planning 
are part of a ‘transcendental plane’ that cannot be removed from the planning process 
entirely. And, whilst she does not explain what useful contribution these codes and 
assessments make, her proposal does infer that they have some tangible benefits to 
regulatory planning and design. 
 
This leaves us with a mixed proposal for responding to modelled concepts, and 
modelled concept-based tools in Hillier’s framework. It suggests that essentialist, 
modelled concepts should not be used as part of early planning (strategic planning) 
processes but cannot be avoided in subsequent stages of planning (and design). As yet, 
Hillier has not provided planners, masterplanners and architects with any clear 
indication as to how they should work with or respond to this latter group of modelled 
concepts. 
 
All three studies present us with the idea that an alternative to the modelled concept 
either exists or could exist. These three studies discuss this alternative as something that 
encourages and reveals an assemblage’s potentials (becomings), so that new 
assemblages or adaptations will emerge from an assemblage’s multiplicity in a 
constantly changing environment.  
 
Whilst these three studies share a common description, they offer different directions 
for developing an alternative to the modelled concept. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
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1) Balancing: Bonta suggests that modelled concepts are part of complex spaces. 
Rather than removing these modelled concepts, and the assessments built from 
them, we should look for ways to balance them against alternative ways of 
assessing an assemblage. 
2) A judgement-led response: Halsey suggests that each modelled concept, and thus 
each formal assessment, should be assessed on an individual basis. This 
assessment should be focused on the potentials this assessment encourages or 
blocks. Any subsequent action should be determined in response to these 
assessments.  
3) Removing modelled concepts in early plan-making processes: Hillier suggests 
that modelled concept should be removed from early strategic stages of planning 
/ design, and assessment. They should be replaced with an immanent approach 
based on speculating potentials for the future. 
 
7.2. Is Deleuze useful as a method of analysis or/and engagement? 
 
Unsurprisingly, these three directions relate to the objectives underpinning each study. 
Bonta’s suggestions favour analysis, Halsey’s favour analysis-led engagement and 
Hillier’s suggestions are focused almost exclusively on ways to engage in complex 
spaces during the early, strategic stages of planning and assessment.  
 
Understanding the success or failure of these three objectives is important to this thesis. 
As I noted in the introductory chapter, this study considers whether Deleuze’s 
philosophy can be used to develop a new, non-essentialist tool for planning. This 
alternative is not intended to analyse existing ways of assessing a building or urban 
plan. Rather, it is intended as a practical tool that can assist planning-related processes 
in practice.  
 
In the following I bring together the criticisms raised in my review of each study, and 
use these to ask whether Deleuze has been most successful when used to analyse and 
engage in complex spaces. 
 
My review of Bonta’s study identified one principle area of concern. Bonta’s concept of 
‘complex space’ I argued, failed to include spaces in countries with highly developed 
State assemblages. This is drawn from his description of the State as a coherent 
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assemblage. Yet this view has little support in planning and political literature 
(Degeling, 1995; Cowell and Owens, 2002; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006; Cowell and 
Martin, 2002). 
 
My critique of Bonta’s ‘complex space’ concept provides scope for broadening his 
analytical approach rather than challenging its use in his study of the Honduras. With 
this in mind, it is fair to conclude that Bonta’s use of Deleuze’s (geo)philosophy 
successfully meets his study objectives, which are to help him analyse and understand 
land use in this complex space. 
 
A similar statement could be applied to the analytical part of Halsey’s study. My 
principle critique of Halsey’s analysis of the Goolengook forest is drawn from a 
comment made in Bonta’s review of this study. As I noted above, Bonta argues that 
Halsey’s concept of ‘the naming machine’ fails to acknowledge the role played by 
other, non-textual machines. As in Bonta’s study, this critique provides scope for 
broadening Halsey’s study rather than pointing to a fundamental problem in his 
analytical approach.  
 
Whilst Halsey’s theoretical framework is largely successful in the analysis of 
environmental damage (violence) it fails in its second objective, which is to offer an 
effective way to engage in the world through new forms of judgement. Halsey’s study 
offers only a vague principle for his alternative to current, essentialist approaches to 
judgement. As discussed in the last theme, Halsey argues that a machine cannot be 
judged as inherently good or bad, but must be judged according to the becomings 
(potentials) it encourages or blocks. However, this principle is not developed further 
and we are left with two other problems: identifying becomings and assessing these 
becomings. Thus, it seems that Halsey’s attempt to engage in complex spatial problems 
remains vague and under-worked.  
 
I raise similar concerns over Hillier’s proposals for engagement. Hillier’s ‘multi-planar 
theory’ is largely successful in translating Deleuze’s ideas from philosophy to planning 
theory. Hillier’s theoretical framework, for example, relates Deleuze’s plane of 
immanence and plane of transcendence to different kinds of plan, and the concepts of 
becomings and blocks of becomings to the process of plan-making. The latter roughly 
reflects the outline I presented for the design process in Chapter 2.   
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However, the limitations of this philosophy/planning transition are made clear in 
Hillier’s subsequent efforts to translate this framework from planning theory to planning 
practice. She argues that her theoretical framework, and particularly the relationship 
between the plan(e) of immanence and the plan(e) of transcendence, can already be 
identified in existing planning practice. However she makes no subsequent effort to 
develop these links as part of a new Deleuze-inspired set of tools for practice. Rather 
than using Deleuze’s philosophy to engage in planning, this suggests it be used to 
analyse and justify the way we already engage in practice.  
 
These three studies suggest, therefore, that Deleuze’s philosophy has been more 
successful when used to analyse spatial problems than it has to engage in spatial 
problems. This reaffirms John Forester’s concerns that planning theory often draws on 
philosophical concepts to analyse and critique existing forms of practice, but offers very 
few suggestions for replacing these practices with new tools of engagement (Forester, 
2007)
21
. 
 
7.3 Lessons about making Deleuze’s concepts useful.  
 
In my review of the three studies I have shown how important Deleuzian concepts like 
the assemblage, becomings / blocks of becoming and the plane of immanence have been 
in the development of each theoretical framework. The tables used to conclude each 
review shows how these concepts are interpreted to meet the unique demands of the 
field and the problems each theorist identifies in that field. These tables also show how 
these concepts, and other related concepts are expanded and (re)created in each study. 
As my review shows, it is here where most of the unanswered questions and gaps lie.  
 
The problems I identify in Bonta’s study centre around his concept of ‘complex spaces’. 
The problems I indentify in Halsey’s study result from his failure to (re)create the 
concept of becoming to correspond with his concept of tolerable and intolerable 
violence. Likewise, Hillier’s failure to develop her proposals into a practicable tool is 
owing to her failure to (re)create these concepts to suit the demands of planning 
practice.  
 
                                                     
21
 This is discussed in Chapter 9 
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With this in mind, I suggest that, if Deleuzian theorists are to make the transition from 
philosophy to planning theory and practice, they must be prepared to (re)create 
Deleuze’s concepts many times and in many ways to suit the unique demands of their 
field (Abrahams, 2013a). This argument will be used to direct my own proposals, as 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
8. Conclusions.  
 
The aims of this chapter were to identify what opportunities these three studies offered 
for developing an alternative to essentialist, modelled concepts like ‘the sustainable 
home’ and to consider the viability of using Deleuze’s philosophy to analyse and 
engage in spatial problems. Bringing these observations together, I hoped to identify a 
starting point for developing a Deleuze-inspired theoretical framework that might be 
used to challenge and re-think the use of modelled concepts in the way we assess 
building and urban designs in practice. In this conclusion I would like to briefly 
consider how these aims have been met. 
 
In this literature review I have focused on three Deleuze-inspired studies undertaken by 
prominent spatial theorists. I selected these studies because they each occupy a different 
position between analysis and engagement, because they all draw on a range of concepts 
from Deleuze’s ontology and because they are representative of developments in their 
respective field. 
 
In this review I found that each of these three theorists created a unique Deleuze-
inspired theoretical framework that responded to the problems they identified. These 
three frameworks offered more or less importance to different concepts in Deleuze’s 
ontology (see Tables 2-4). These four theoretical frameworks provide clarity and 
direction for an alternative to the modelled concept, as well as providing some insight 
into usefulness. These are summarised as follows: 
 
Clarity.  
 
This review identified areas in all three studies where concepts or entities resembling 
‘modelled concepts’ had been discussed alongside possible alternatives. These three 
alternatives shared a number of similar traits, namely something that encourages and 
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reveals an assemblage’s potentials, so that new assemblages or adaptations will emerge 
in a constantly changing environment.  
 
Direction.  
 
Despite these similarities, each study presented different directions for pursuing and 
introducing / developing this alternative.  
 
Usefulness.  
 
These directions are underpinned by different study objectives. After reviewing the 
success and failure of these objectives I identified a gap in knowledge surrounding 
attempts to make Deleuze useful for engaging in complex spaces.  This gap, I argued, is 
owing to failures to sufficiently (re)create Deleuze’s concepts to meet the unique 
demands of their field / line of enquiry. 
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Part 3: 
A case study of BRE assessments 
The last two parts of the thesis have looked to define the outlines of a problem, to 
review the debates surrounding this problem, to identify directions for resolving the 
problem and to understand whether Deleuze’s concepts can be made useful to 
engagement as well as analysis. In this third part of the study I use these lessons and 
insights to explore a case study aimed at exploring the possibilities of making Deleuze 
useful to a specific area of planning practice. As with most case studies this part of the 
thesis is broken up into three broad sections: selection of a case, methodology and 
results / analysis. However, unlike more ‘traditional’ studies in the social sciences, this 
case study is not weighted in favour of empirical enquiry. Rather, it is formed from two 
roughly equal and connected lines of enquiry: a theoretical study into a new, Deleuze-
inspired assessment tool; and testing the practical viability of the tool through empirical 
enquiry.  
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Chapter 4: Research strategy  
 
1.  Aim and structure of the chapter. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the research strategy and research design for this 
third part of the thesis. To achieve these aims, this chapter starts by explaining which 
case of the modelled concept has been selected to develop and test a Deleuze-inspired, 
non-essentialist form of assessment. Building on this broad strategy, the second part of 
the chapter outlines key stages of the research used to answer the two research questions 
indentified in the introduction, namely: 
 
1) Can Deleuze’s philosophical concepts be translated into a new theoretical 
framework for constructing formal assessments? 
 
2) If so, can this be translated into a practical tool useful to actors in the planning 
and development process?  
 
The third part of this chapter draws on Deleuze’s epistemological stance and the 
methods used by other Deleuze-inspired researchers to translate this strategy into the 
two research stages, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
2. Selecting a case study of the modelled concept. 
 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, essentialist, modelled-concept-based tools can be seen in 
specific planning/design milieu as well as in the broader field of planning. These 
observations suggest that the case selected for study must offer specific conclusions 
useful to the selected area of assessment, as well as generalisable conclusions about 
essentialism in planning and about the usefulness of philosophical concepts to spatial 
disciplines. 
 
These concerns have been used to formulate two selection criteria: 
 
108 
 
1. Criterion 1: A good example of the modelled concept in planning practice. The 
assessment tool selected should be one of the most developed and consistent 
uses of the modelled concept in planning.  
2. Criterion 2: A critical example of the modelled concept in planning practice. 
The tool selected should be a critical example of a modelled concept. In the case 
of this thesis, a critical case is taken to be: an assessment that significantly 
affects the way design decisions are made in a specific milieu; an assessment 
that dominates an area of regulatory practice. 
  
As part of the selection process, a number of assessments were considered and 
dismissed, the most notable of which are the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) and Territorial Impact Assessment (TIA). The first of these, SEA, was discussed 
in Chapter 1. As Fischer notes, this assessment is structured around a pre-conceived 
idea of ‘sustainable development’, which is used as the basis for systematic evaluation 
(Fischer, 2003). Fischer’s comments suggest that SEA’s are design around a modelled 
concept (a modelled concept of ‘sustainable development’) and, thus, broadly meet the 
first selection criterion. However, Fischer also argues that, since its inception in the 
1980s, a range of in-use variations of SEA have developed (Fischer and Seaton, 2002; 
Fischer, 2010; Fischer and Gazzola, 2006; Silva et al, 2014). Whilst some diversity 
might be considered an inevitable part of the assessment process, Fischer argues that 
these differences are significant enough to limit the systematic, cross comparative 
principles that underpin the assessment’s design (Fischer and Seaton, 2002; Fischer, 
2010; Fischer and Gazzola, 2006). Fischer’s comments point to important 
inconsistencies in the role played by modelled concepts, thus excluding them as ‘good’ 
examples of the modelled concept used in practice (Criterion 2). 
 
My reasons for dismissing TIA as a candidate for the case study lies in its 
incompatibility to the second criterion. Whilst modelled concepts have been intrinsic to 
the design of TIA to date (Abrahams, 2013), these assessments have still to be finalised 
and used across the European Union’s member states (ESPON, 2012). It is fair to 
conclude therefore that, in their present state of development, these assessments do not 
dominate a specific area of regulatory practice (Criterion 2).  
 
After reviewing a number of such candidates for case study selection, I found that a 
family of assessments developed by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) 
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provided a strong ‘fit’ to the selection criteria above. This family includes, The Code for 
Sustainable Homes used to introduce this thesis as well as, BREEAM New Construction, 
BREEAM In-Use, BREEAM Refurbishment and BREEAM Communities. The following 
text demonstrates how this group of assessments meet the selection criteria.  
 
Criterion 1: A good example of the modelled concept in planning practice. This broad 
group of BRE sustainable assessment tools are some of the most developed and 
consistent uses of the essentialist, modelled concept to date. In Chapter 2 I provided a 
diagram that showed how the modelled concept underpins the Code for Sustainable 
Homes form of assessment. A similar schematic can be seen in all assessments in this 
family. BREEAM New Construction, for example, is used to assess newly constructed 
buildings across all sectors. Like the Code for Sustainable Homes, it is developed 
around a series of components deemed essential to the core concept, the ‘sustainable 
building’ (Figure 4). As a broader concept, this model is intended to capture the 
‘sustainable school’, the ‘sustainable prison’ and the ‘sustainable supermarket’ for 
example. Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of these components and their 
contribution to the concept. 
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Figure 4: Components and factors to be considered in a ‘sustainable building’. 
 
Source: Abrahams 2013 adapted from BRE, 2011  
 
As with the Code for Sustainable Homes, these essential components are broken down 
into their material factors for consideration by the design team.  
 
In Chapter 2 I outlined a number of other assessment tools constructed around 
essentialist modelled concepts. These included, European Territorial Cohesion 
Indicators (ETCI), the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), Heritage Impact 
Assessments (HIA) and Housing Quality Indicators (HQI). Whilst these tools are good 
examples of this phenomenon, none of them have used the essentialist, modelled 
concept as consistently as the BRE suite. This BRE suite of assessments, therefore, acts 
as a good case of modelled concept-based tools used in planning and, thus an ideal 
opportunity to consider and test an alternative. 
 
Criterion 2: A critical example of the modelled concept-based tool. The use of critical 
cases to test a theory or proposal is an established method within case study literature 
(Yin, 2009: 47-48). Not only are the BRE assessments some of the most developed 
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examples of modelled concept-based tools in planning, taken together, they are also 
some of the most critical examples used in practice.  
 
Whilst these assessments are not mandatory, many local authorities and public sector 
clients across the UK specify this form of assessment as a condition of planning 
approval and funding (BRE Global, 2011). According to a survey undertaken by BRE 
Global, over ‘40% of local authorities in the UK are specifying sustainable building 
policies in their plans…’ (BRE Global, 2011). Drawing from this data, BRE Global 
argues that such assessments will continue to ‘shape the nature of planning policy in the 
UK’ (BRE Global, 2011).  
 
This scenario is not unrealistic. Since its inception, the Code for Sustainable Homes has 
been a key component in the UK government’s strategy to reduce carbon emissions and 
has been established as a condition of funding in all new affordable housing schemes 
built in the UK. The latest addition to the BREEAM family, BREEAM Communities, 
was published early in 2011. In June 2011, Bristol City Council published a Core 
Strategy as part of their Local Development Framework. This strategy makes it 
mandatory for all large urban design schemes in the local authority to be assessed using 
the latest, BREEAM Communities form of assessment (Bristol City Council, 2011; 
BRE, 2012). If such efforts are judged successful, it is possible that other local 
authorities will follow a similar path.  
 
Yet, this support for BRE forms of assessment is not shared across all departments and 
scales of government. In July 2010, the Department for Education launched a 
comprehensive review of all capital investments. This review questioned whether it 
should be mandatory for each new school over £2m to achieve a ‘very good’ rating 
using the BREEAM New Construction form of assessment (DfE, 2011). Removing this 
condition, it was suggested, could streamline procurement and reduce additional costs. 
However, following the passionate and immediate defence offered by representatives of 
the Chartered Institute of Building, the UK Green Building Council and the Aldersgate 
group (The Guardian, 2012), these proposals were withdrawn.  
 
Similarly, in 2012 the Department for Local Government and Communities began a 
much broader and extensive review of regulation and assessment policy through the 
Housing Standards Review, launched in October 2012 and released in August, 2013. 
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The working group suggested a number of changes for subsequent consultation. One of 
the most significant of these changes was the proposed ‘wind down’ of the Code for 
Sustainable Homes and measures taken to integrate these standards into the UK 
building regulations (DCLG, 2013; DCLG, 2014). Whilst this change has affected 
domestic assessments it has not impacted on non-domestic assessments. Thus, despite 
these changes to the Code for Sustainable Homes, the BREEAM forms of assessment 
remain central to the UK government’s agenda on sustainability.  
 
This literature shows fierce support for the modelled concept-based assessments used by 
the BRE assessments as well as wider motivations to challenge and re-think their use in 
practice. Given the intensity of debate surrounding these assessments, I believe they 
offer a critical case in which to question the normative use of modelled concepts, and to 
consider whether an alternative is both possible and practicable. If Deleuze can 
contribute to this alternative, then it may help us re-think the expanding influence of the 
modelled concept and associated tools.  
 
Researcher’s experience using this modelled concept-based tool: Whilst not used as 
part of my selection criteria, I have also taken into consideration the advantages offered 
by tools in which I, as the researcher, have already developed a strong working 
knowledge. In Chapter 1, I set out one of many examples taken from my experience and 
showed how my concerns align with other professionals (see Schweber, 2013). This 
suggests that my experiences and views do reflect the experiences and views of other 
experts in the field.  
 
3. Two Research Stages and three possible outcomes. 
 
The resulting case study of BRE assessments was structured into two research stages 
corresponding with the two research questions identified at the beginning of this thesis. 
The contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is based on these two stages. The 
first considers the meaning of Deleuze’s concepts in ‘real’, practice-based contexts and 
the second considers the usefulness of these concepts to actors working in practice. 
Possible outcomes for these research stages were identified and captured in the 
following table (see Table 5): 
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Table 5: Two Research Stages for the thesis and three possible outcomes. 
 Research Stage A: 
Can Deleuze’s concepts be 
developed into a proposal for a 
non-essentialist assessment 
tool? 
Research Stage B: 
Is there any empirical evidence 
to suggest that such a tool could 
be made practicable? 
Conclusions 
1
st
 Outcome Yes: Concepts do translate into a 
proposed tool 
Yes: Concepts underpinning the 
proposal are considered as a 
practical direction for 
assessment practice  
Deleuze’s philosophy can be used to develop an alternative to 
the essentialist, modelled concepts used in formal assessments. 
Additionally, there is empirical evidence to suggest that this 
alternative can be translated into a practicable tool, albeit this 
conclusion would be subject to further development. 
2
nd
 Outcome Yes: Concepts do translate into a 
proposed tool  
Not in current form: 
Practitioners agree with concepts 
underpinning the proposal but 
feel they are impractical or 
problematic in practice 
Deleuze’s philosophy can be used as a starting point for an 
alternative to essentialist, modelled concepts used in formal 
assessments. But, to translate and develop this for practice, 
empirical evidence suggests that changes must be made. Some 
of these changes may clash with Deleuze’s philosophy. 
3
rd
 Outcome No: Concepts do not translate 
into a proposed tool. 
No: There is little evidence to 
suggest that a Deleuze-inspired 
tool would be practicable or 
useful to practitioners.  
Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be used to inform an analytical 
alternative to the essentialist, modelled concept. Or, it can be 
used as an analytical alternative, but empirical evidence suggests 
that it is unable to offer a practicable alternative. 
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The table above presents each of the two research stages and three possible outcomes. 
This research strategy was used to guide the theoretical and empirical stages of my 
research as presented in detail over the following chapters.   
 
4. An epistemological and methodological approach. 
 
So what methods are most appropriate to these two research stages?  
For Deleuze and Guattari, a line of enquiry should inevitably lead to an appropriate 
method. They capture this point in A Thousand Plateaus, where they note that, ‘there is 
no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a). Whilst expressed differently, contributions to research methods 
literature draw similar conclusions. Key figures in this field have argued that a 
researcher’s method for exploring a field cannot be separated from their research aims, 
and ontological stance (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln et al, 2011). Building on this 
argument, the social scientists Guba and Lincoln categorise different areas of social 
research according to their ontological, epistemological and methodological positions 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The combination of these three elements, they argue, forms a 
paradigm traceable across many different forms of enquiry.  
 
In their earliest attempts to categorise these paradigms, Guba and Lincoln describe and 
discuss four such groups: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism. 
This has recently been revised to include a fifth paradigm, participatory inquiry 
(Lincoln et al, 2011: 100). Each of these paradigms is discussed according to its unique 
approach to realism or relativism / constructivism
22
, and a list of methods typical to 
these approaches (Lincoln et al, 2011: 100).  
 
These generalities are intended as guidance rather than a definitive reflection of social 
science research.  However, these categories offer very little direction for researchers 
drawing on Deleuze’s philosophy and looking for an appropriate methodology. This is 
because Deleuze’s ontology, epistemology and method do not ‘fit’ into the five 
paradigm categories. His actual/virtual ontology and the processes of actualisation that 
                                                     
22
 Positivism as ‘naïve realism’, postpositivism as ‘critical realism’, critical theory as 
‘historical realism’, constructivism as relativism and participation as participatory 
reality (ie reality constructed through the participatory project) 
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connect these realms (see Chapter 2) cannot be described as ‘naïve’, ‘critical’23 or 
‘historical’ forms of realism. And whilst Deleuze rejects the idea that we, as researchers, 
can obtain a true knowledge of reality, his philosophy also argues against relativist, 
socially constructed understandings of the world around us (DeLanda, 2006).  
 
Whilst social science research methods literature does not provide a clear and well-
trodden path between Deleuze’s ontology, epistemology, methodology and method 
selection, a number of Deleuzian scholars offer some guidance for making this 
connection. Bell suggests that Deleuze’s ontology can be structured according to two 
components: ‘pragmatics’ and ‘transcendental empiricism’ (Bell, 2006). The first of 
these components, concerns Deleuze’s approach to creating concepts and developing a 
line of enquiry. Deleuze draws on concepts from a range of different disciplines and re-
creates these concepts by focusing on what they do, and what they might do if they were 
adapted to different settings and problems (Hillier and Abrahams, 2013). The second of 
these components, transcendental empiricism, sets out Deleuze’s stance on the relation 
between these concepts and lived experience (the empirical). Deleuze uses this stance to 
develop and ‘test’ the pragmatic usefulness of the concepts he creates.   
 
These two components in Deleuze’s epistemology correspond with the two stages of my 
research design: Research Stage A as the construction of a new tool by adapting 
concepts to a new context (Deleuzian pragmatism) and Research Stage B as the testing 
of this new tool and the concepts used to create this tool through empirical enquiry 
(transcendental empiricism). As the following chapters demonstrate, this connection 
was fundamental to the creation and application of a research design suited to the two 
research stages. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23
 Note that the ontological and epistemological links between critical realism and a 
Deleuzian form of realism is discussed in Chapter 6 
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Chapter 5: Methodology for Research Stage A 
 
1. A pragmatic method for developing a non-essentialist assessment tool. 
 
In Chapter 2 I showed how Deleuze’s pragmatic approach to concept development 
relies on the fundamental questions, ‘what do these concepts do?’ and ‘what might these 
concepts do in this specific context?’ In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how this pragmatic 
approach to concepts played out in three Deleuze-inspired studies. In my review of 
these studies I highlighted several gaps in their respective frameworks and suggested 
that such gaps were owing to the researcher’s failure to re-create Deleuze’s concepts to 
suit the specific demands of the field. The research design for Stage A was informed by 
these lessons. The transition from an abstract set of concepts to a practice-based 
proposal was directed by four sub-stages (Table 6).  
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Table 6: Breakdown of Research Stage A into four sub-stages. 
Research Stage A:  
Can Deleuze’s concepts be developed into a proposal for a non-essentialist assessment tool? 
Research Stage A1: 
How might we review and (re)think 
BRE forms of assessment? 
Research Stage A2: 
Can these ideas be developed into a 
theoretical proposal? 
Research Stage A3: 
Can this proposal be developed by 
drawing on other forms of 
assessment used in this milieu? 
Research Stage A4: 
How does this translate into a 
practical proposal? 
The first sub-stage reviewed BRE 
assessments in order to: 
 Identify the role currently played 
by essentialist, modelled concepts   
 Identify and develop initiatives 
within the BRE’s history that 
might usefully contribute to an 
alternative. 
 Consider how Deleuze’s concepts 
might re-work these initiatives in 
the absence of a modelled concept 
structure. 
The second sub-stage used the ideas 
developed in the last sub-stage (A1), 
and adapted some of the ideas 
identified and developed in Chapter 
2 and 3 to set out a new method 
which I have termed. ‘the 
Speculative and Immanent 
Assessment Method’ (SIAM). 
The third sub-stage responded to 
some of the practical questions left 
open in the theoretical proposals for 
SIAM. It did this by drawing on the 
established form of assessment used 
as part of the Construction and 
Design Management (CDM) 
regulations, 2007. In Chapter 7, I 
show why the CDM provides useful 
insight into the gaps left unresolved 
in the developing SIAM method. 
The fourth and final sub-stage 
‘translated’ the theoretical 
proposals for SIAM into a 
practical proposal that could be 
understood and operationalised 
by practitioners whose 
knowledge of Deleuze’s 
philosophy might be very 
limited.  
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Table 6 presents the process I used to develop and adapt Deleuze’s concepts to meet the 
specific demands of a field of knowledge. The first of these stages acted as a ‘scoping’ 
exercise intended to understand different forms of BRE assessment, and to identify 
opportunities to introduce Deleuze’s ideas into the field. This stage was conducted as a 
documentary review and analysis. Documents were selected from key stages in the 
developing BRE’s suite of assessments, and their so-called, ‘universal method’ (BRE, 
2011). Key stages in this history were identified from previous BRE studies and 
documents sourced from within the BRE’s archive. Whilst every effort was made to 
capture the key stages and documents in this history, one of the respondents in the 
second empirical stage (Respondent R9) pointed to an important development in BRE’s 
history that had been overlooked in my review.  
 
In 2002, the BRE introduced a form of assessment that was much closer to my 
subsequent proposal (SIAM). This assessment was termed, ‘the BRE Sustainability 
Checklist’ and was introduced alongside the BREEAM method. Whilst these two 
methods ran parallel for a short period, the Checklist was not developed further, and 
was soon superseded in practice. This Checklist is omitted from most of the literature 
focused on BREEAM, hence its omission from my review, and, thus, why it was not 
discussed in Research Stage A. Whilst I do not believe that this Checklist would have 
changed the way Deleuze’s concepts were adapted and translated into my proposals for 
SIAM, it could have provided greater support for the proposal, especially in the final 
sub-stages. This, I believe, highlights the benefits of this two stage approach to the 
research: theoretical development and empirical testing. It also provides a direction for 
further study (see Chapter 10).  
 
The second and third sub-stages shown in Table 6, expanded some of the ideas 
generated from the historical study, and explored other opportunities for introducing 
Deleuze’s concepts into the field of assessment. Much of sub-stage A3 focused on links 
between the developing proposals for SIAM and the CDM assessments. This 
assessment was selected following a brief review of formal building and urban design 
assessments and supported by my own experiences working within this field. This 
connection between SIAM and the CDM assessment method proved useful, both in 
terms of the theoretical development of my proposal and the subsequent testing of 
SIAM through the second empirical stage (Research Stage B). In terms of the latter, it 
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helped direct sample selection and helped explain some of the most difficult Deleuze-
inspired ideas (speculation and immanence) into terms that were already understood by 
designers and regulators alike.  
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Chapter 6: Methodology for Research Stage B 
 
1. Outline of the chapter. 
 
In the last chapter I set out the method used to develop Deleuze’s concepts into a 
theoretical assessment tool for practice. In this chapter I return to Deleuze’s 
epistemological stance to outline a research method suited to empirical enquiry. 
 
Of the two Research Stages, this second stage was the most demanding. This difficulty 
was owing to the uncertainty surrounding Deleuze’s stance on ‘transcendental 
empiricism’ and how this stance might best inform a methodological approach and 
research design. This chapter explains how this transition was made, the decisions taken 
and why I felt these decisions to be compatible with Deleuze’s philosophy and the aims 
of the study.  
 
2. Epistemology, methodology and research strategy for Research Stage B. 
 
Deleuze’s epistemological stance, termed ‘transcendental empiricism’, is built around a 
critique of established empirical methods. This is captured by the Deleuzian scholar, 
Levi Bryant, who notes that most forms of empirical enquiry, including those conducted 
by most pragmatists, share a common interest in the role, relationship and status of 
objects and subjects. This focus is often defined by questions such as, “How can we, as 
subjects know objects or / and subjects?”. “How are subjects produced by objects?” or 
“How are objects produced by subjects? (Bryant, 2008: 265). This reflects, what Bryant 
terms, the ‘primacy [often given to] the subject and object’ (Bryant, 2008: 265).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Deleuze holds that subjects and objects are both products of 
becomings drawn from processes of actualisation. As such, empirical enquiry cannot 
and should not take these products as the starting points for generating a theory (Bryant, 
2008). For Deleuze, if we are to engage in empirical enquiry, we must do so without 
ignoring or underplaying the importance of the becomings that form the entities we see 
in the world around us (processes of actualisation) (Bryant, 2008: 265; DeLanda, 2002). 
Importantly, whilst Deleuze holds that empirical enquiry cannot ignore these processes, 
he also holds that we cannot observe them either (Bryant, 2008). According to 
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Deleuze’s stance, we, as researchers, are actualised subjects whose sensory experiences 
can only identify other actualised entities. In other words, for Deleuze, the pre-actual 
realm cannot be accessed through empirical enquiry, yet must still be accounted for and 
used to explain our empirical observations. It is in this sense, therefore, that Deleuze’s 
approach to empiricism is considered ‘transcendental’ (Bryant, 2008) or ‘higher’ 
(Williams, 2008).  
 
This argument opens up a difficult question that I deemed important to the second stage 
of my study (testing through empirical enquiry): how does one design empirical 
research to account for a pre-actual area of reality that cannot be accessed by the 
researcher’s sensory observations? The academic community has yet to provide a clear 
answer to this question. So, to progress this empirical stage of my study, I evaluated 
three areas of realist literature; each selected because of the efforts they make to tackle 
similar issues. I then used this evaluation to direct, what I felt to be, a reasonable 
approach to Deleuze’s epistemological stance. These three areas of realist literature are 
as follows: 
 
1. Deleuzian research methods for the social sciences: I explored some of the most 
recent studies found in Deleuzian social science research methods literature. My 
evaluation of this literature found many of these proposals to be inappropriate.  
2. Critical realist research methods: Looking outside of Deleuzian literature to 
critical realism, I identified similar questions to those noted in transcendental 
empiricism. My evaluation of this literature suggested that the critical realist 
argument for abstraction is compatible with Deleuze’s stance, but their proposals 
for achieving this abstraction are not.  
3. Speculative methods: Building on my evaluation of the critical realist method, I 
reviewed a speculative method outlined by one of the Deleuze-inspired voices 
discussed in Chapter 3. My evaluation suggested that this method could be used 
to abstract empirical observations in a way that I deem compatible with 
Deleuze’s philosophy and the aims of this thesis. 
 
2.1. Deleuzian research methods for the social sciences. 
 
Deleuzian scholars, Bryant (Bryant, 2008) and Williams (Williams, 2008) hold that, 
whilst we cannot identify potentials in a stable environment, we are more likely to 
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identify them following a significant change or ‘shock’. This is because such shocks 
force entities (or assemblages) to adapt and evolve by pursuing different potentials 
(becomings). This argument underpins their proposals for a research strategy 
underpinned by a ‘shock’ or encounter. 
 
In his discussion on transcendental empiricism Levi Bryant argues that we should, 
 
…seek out those gaps, events, traumas or shocks, and encounters which 
upset the smooth continuity of the subject… (Bryant, 2008: 266).  
 
Bryant’s arguments are developed at a strategic level, offering researchers very few 
working examples to illustrate how this ‘shock’ strategy might be developed into an 
empirical research design. However, ‘naturally occurring’ shocks provide the basis for a 
number of other empirical studies. In Chapter 3 I reviewed two such studies. Bonta’s 
study of changing land-use in the Honduras and Halsey’s study of the changing 
Goolengook forest are both examples of studies focusing on naturally occurring ‘events, 
traumas or shocks and encounters’. 
 
This research strategy has been particularly influential in the social sciences.  Coleman 
and Ringrose’s edited volume of Deleuzian empirical research methods demonstrates a  
growing interest in Deleuzian concepts amongst social scientists (Coleman and 
Ringrose, 2013). This collection of essays is one of the most thorough efforts to capture 
the latest and most advanced studies of this kind (Coleman and Ringrose, 2013). 
However, like Bonta and Halsey, the studies in this collection are aimed at analysing 
and critiquing a changing environment rather than developing tools to engage in that 
environment. Many of them also point to a growing trend for using established 
ethnographic practices to generate data as part of a broader Deleuzian method (Bonta, 
2009).  Commenting on this link, Bonta notes that: 
 
…doing ethnography is a way of letting the world wash over us, taking note 
of what’s going on and making sense of it …. [Deleuze provides us with] 
hints at ways to figure out how the full corporeality of the world works 
while we’re in the world, not just providing us with endless new ways to 
interpret the meanings of signs from a safe distance. (Bonta, 2009: 142 
emphasis added). 
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This quotation suggests that existing ethnographic methods, particularly those based on 
participant observation, provide researchers with rich, descriptive data that can then be 
understood using Deleuzian analytical methods. A similar point is raised by Renold and 
Mellor in their ethnographic study of nursery environments. Like Bonta, they suggest 
that ethnography’s role in a Deleuzian method is to generate the richest data possible to 
capture the greatest range of potentials. If these Deleuzian insights are to be successful, 
they add, ethnographers must seek the richest data possible. This, they note, is best 
achieved by drawing on multiple sources of data, especially data generated from a 
combination of different bodily senses (Renold and Mellor, 2013).  
 
Other social scientists have sought this richness by drawing on differing combinations 
of longer established data generation methods such as interviews, focus groups, 
participant observation and image making. (Ringrose and Coleman, 2013; Blaise, 2013; 
Dyke, 2013; Grinberg, 2013).  
 
This link between existing methods of data generation and new Deleuzian methods of 
data analysis is not limited to ethnographic research designs. Cole’s study, for example, 
is designed around an encounter between members of the Muslim community and 
established forms of Australian culture. The data generated in this study follows 
conventional practice for undertaking semi-structured interviews. Most importantly, 
these interviews were not undertaken exclusively for Cole’s Deleuzian study, but rather, 
for a very different research project funded by the Australian government (Cole, 2013).  
 
These studies raise three important methodological assumptions. Firstly, they suggest 
that these existing, empirical, qualitative methods of data generation are already suited 
to a Deleuzian method. Yet, for many social scientists and Deleuze alike, the methods 
used in a research design should be drawn from the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological stance (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln et al, 2011; Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004a). Given that Deleuze’s ontology and arguments for transcendental empiricism are 
constructed as a counter position to many existing forms of empirical enquiry, it is 
questionable why one would assume that the methods used in such enquiries could also 
be used in a Deleuzian method. In other words, if social scientists are to construct a 
Deleuzian methodology, then the methods used to generate and analyse data should be 
compatible with Deleuze’s philosophy.   
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Secondly, they suggest that this suitability lies in the richness of the sensory data they 
generate. Whilst the use of data rich methods have proven successful in a range of social 
science studies, many of these studies have started with a very different epistemological 
stance to the one set out in Deleuze’s philosophy (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  
 
Above I noted that, for Deleuze, we should not seek to understand the actual world 
around us, but to understand how this world comes into being (becomings). Deleuze’s 
approach to empiricism is termed, ‘transcendental’ because he argues that these 
becomings lie beyond our sensory observations
24
. With this in mind, it is equally 
questionable why one would assume that, of all the existing methods available to 
researchers, those based on sensory observations would be suited to this objective. 
Contrary to the suggestions made by Deleuzian ethnographers like Bonta (2001; 2009) 
and Renold and Mellor (2013), I do not believe that adding to the richness of this 
sensory data can help researchers resolve this issue. Whilst much of the data presented 
in Coleman and Ringrose’s edited volume offers a good description of the actual world 
identified by the researcher, it is not clear how this data would be used to identify and 
explore the processes of actualisation. This exploration of becomings is reserved almost 
exclusively for data analysis.   
 
This brings me onto the third assumption. These studies suggest that sensory data 
contains potentials that can only be identified and explored through subsequent methods 
of analysis. A similar assumption can be seen in a range of empirical studies in the 
social sciences, particular those applying grounded theory methods (see Charmaz, 
2006).Yet, as noted earlier in this thesis, Deleuze holds that potentials are often hidden 
or lost within sensory data.  
 
With this in mind, I believe these recent attempts to form a ‘Deleuzian’ method for the 
social sciences fail to capture some of the most fundamental aspects of Deleuze’s 
epistemological position. This failure results from a focus on data analysis rather than 
data generation. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that all existing data 
generation methods are ill-suited, or that ‘Deleuzian methods’ are straightforward. 
However, it suggests that, one must select methods compatible with Deleuze’s position.    
2.2. Critical realist research methods. 
                                                     
24
 It should be noted that the use of the term ‘beyond’ here does not refer to something 
outside of, but something inaccessible.  
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Deleuze-inspired researchers are not the only ones to struggle with the difficult task of 
generating data based on pre-actual processes. Many social scientists working within 
‘critical realism’, or, what is termed, ‘transcendental realism’ in the natural sciences, 
have tried to address this problem (Yeung, 1997). Like Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism, such stances posit that the study of observable entities does not, alone, 
provide us with insight into the processes that formed them. And like Deleuze, they 
locate these processes in an area of reality that transcends empirical observation, what 
Deleuze termed, a ‘transcendental field’. As with Deleuze’s realist ontology, critical 
realism argues that reality is not limited to one realm: the actual world we see around 
us. Rather, these actual forms are created from non-actual processes or ‘generative 
mechanisms’ operating in a different area of reality, which critical realists confusingly 
term, ‘the real’ (Bhaskar, 1998). According to Sayer, studies in critical realism are 
characterised by their search for these ‘mechanisms of causality’ (Sayer, 1992; 2000). 
 
Approaching critical realism from a Deleuzian stance, it is tempting to translate these 
mechanisms as an equivalent to Deleuze’s ‘becomings’. However, if we look at these 
generative mechanisms in further detail we can see why this is problematic. In his 
review of critical realism, Reed notes that, 
 
Generative mechanisms operate at different levels of analysis with different 
‘causal powers or influences’ triggered under variable contextual conditions. 
So, some generative mechanisms, such as models of production, class 
structures, labour markets, gender regimes, and surveillance systems will be 
highly abstract, broad ranging and structurally constraining…Other 
generative mechanisms, such as neighbourhood networks, peer groups 
subcultures and household support systems, are more localized… (Reed, 
2009: 436) 
 
From a Deleuzian stance, one would not consider a neighbourhood network as a 
becoming. This is because a network is not a long-term tendency; a potential to become 
something, but rather a structure that influences which becomings will or will not be 
actualised. So, a neighbourhood network might block a potential to become diverse, by 
resisting certain kinds of proposed housing development. Or it might encourage a 
potential to become safe by promoting community surveillance. Thus, thinking back to 
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Halsey’s study in Chapter 3, the critical realist’s reference to a generative mechanism is 
much more akin to the Deleuzian concept of the machine.  
 
With this in mind, Figure 5 shows how critical realism’s ‘layered’ ontology might be 
positioned against Deleuze’s three part ontology, and how the concept of generative 
mechanisms might be compared to the concept of machines. Using such comparisons 
one might propose that the methods used by critical realists to identify machines 
(generative mechanisms) can be further extended into the virtual i.e. to identify 
becomings (shown as a dashed arrow in Figure 5). However, in the following I will try 
to explain why this strategy is problematic, but, also, what other lessons can be learned 
from the comparison. 
 
Figure 5: Schematic of Deleuze’s and critical realism’s ontological structures. 
 
 
The critical realist, Roy Bhaskar suggests that, to identify generative mechanisms 
(machines) a researcher should follow a series of methodological stages. Firstly, they 
should set out a ‘…description of significant features [within a given event]’ (Bhaskar 
1998: xvii). This description is undertaken by collating ‘the key components… the real 
objects of the case, for example persons, organizations and systems. They constitute 
structures, i.e. networks of objects, with causal powers’ (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011).  
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This descriptive exercise leads to the second stage, described by Bhaskar as a, 
‘retroduction to possible causes’ (Bhaskar 1998: xvii). Or, in other words, a move from 
the description of an event or phenomena to an abstraction of possible causes (Yeung, 
1997: 59). According to Danermark et al, such abstraction is achieved through the 
identification of patterns and trends in the empirical data, and the linking of such 
patterns to existing causal explanation and concepts in the field of study (Danermark et 
al, 2002). According to Danermark et al, such explanations then provide the basis for 
what Sayer termed, ‘…postulating [and identifying] mechanisms which are capable of 
producing [the event or phenomena under study]’ (Sayer, 1992: 107; Yeung, 1997: 59). 
In Lawson’s study of housing divergence, for example, a review of the literature 
revealed a number of explanatory concepts that were then ‘elaborated and synthesised to 
form a postulated causal mechanism’ (Lawson, 2006: 63). 
 
Subsequent stages of the research strategy are intended to ‘eliminat[e] alternatives and 
identify[y] the generative mechanism or causal structure at work” (Bhaskar 1998: xvii). 
For critical realists, this is made possible by collecting more empirical evidence on the 
phenomena, testing, revising or reaffirming the postulated mechanisms until no further 
contradictory evidence is obtained (Yeung, 1997: 59; Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 34). 
 
This sequence of methodological stages highlight two ways in which critical realists 
respond to the question noted above, namely, how does one design empirical research 
to account for a pre-actual area of reality that cannot be accessed by the researcher’s 
sensory observations? The first is captured in the idea that mechanisms in the pre-actual 
realm can be traced from empirical, sensory data either by identifying trends or by 
testing and refining a postulation (Figure 6). The second is captured by the idea of 
abstraction i.e. the idea that a researcher can access the pre-actual realm by introducing 
abstract concepts or postulations (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Two processes used by critical realists to access the pre-actual. 
 
 
For Deleuze, the first of these two methods, tracing trends, is problematic. Whilst 
Deleuze does not discuss critical realism directly, he does discuss the Kantian 
arguments on which critical theory is based. According to Deleuze, such Kantian 
inspired methods,  
 
…amount to both a circular argument (the conditions are supposed to 
account for the conditioned, yet we arrive at the condition by tracing them 
from the conditioned), and to arriving at the transcendental based on its 
resemblance to the actual or the condition. (Bryant, 2008a)  
 
This circular argument within the critical realist method can be seen in Bhaskar’s 
methodological steps discussed above and captured in Figure 6. For Deleuze, this 
circularity arises because critical realism tries to combine two incompatible ideas: (i) 
that mechanisms can be identified empirically and (ii) that they operate within a pre-
actual, transcendental field.  
 
Deleuze’s philosophy resolves this problem by linking these two ideas to two different 
kinds of mechanism (or machine): the concrete machine and the abstract machine. The 
machines discussed in Halsey’s study, are good examples of what Deleuze terms 
concrete machines. As the name suggests, such machines, can be identified through 
empirical observation (i.e. concrete). In Halsey’s case, these machines take the form of 
concepts identified in policy documents. If we were to locate these concrete machines in 
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the Deleuzian ontology, we might place them close to, or even within, the actual realm 
(Figure 7).  
 
Another machine in Deleuze’s ontology is the abstract machine. Whilst concrete 
machines operate in, or around the actual realm, abstract machines operate within the 
transcendental field (Figure 7). As the name suggests, abstract machines do not take on 
a concrete form that would allow them to be identified through empirical observation. 
But like concrete machines, they also act as a kind of filter: encouraging or blocking 
becomings from moving across the processes of actualisation towards the actual realm 
(Figure 7). Deleuze captures this idea of the abstract machine in A Thousand Plateaus, 
when he notes that,  
 
An abstract machine in itself is not physical or corporeal, any more than it is 
semiotic; it is diagrammatic (it knows nothing of the distinctions between 
the artificial and the natural either). It operates by matter, not by substance; 
by function, not by form. . . . The abstract machine is pure Matter-Function 
— a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and 
contents it will distribute. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 156) 
 
It is important to note that, for Deleuze, the abstract machine is very different to the 
referential model discussed in Chapter 2. This distinction exists because, for Deleuze, 
an abstract machine has no clear link to the actual entities we see around us. They are, 
as Bell notes, ‘…not to be confused with the stable forms of meaning, the established 
relationships between content and expression, form and substance’ seen in a referential 
model (Bell, 2006).  
 
Figure 7: Concrete and abstract machines set within Deleuze’s ontological framework. 
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For Deleuze, the abstract machines shown in Figure 7 and the becomings that they 
block or encourage can only be accessed through processes of abstraction. Deleuze’s 
texts suggest that these processes of abstraction are dependent on the field of study. So, 
for example, in What is philosophy? Deleuze suggests that to access the pre-actual, a 
philosopher must pose abstract questions (problems) and to respond to these questions 
by creating abstract concepts (solutions). It is only by doing so, he argues, that 
philosophers can ‘lay out their own plane of immanence (their own philosophy): … an 
abstract machine of which these (concepts) are the working parts’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 36).  
 
Similarly, in The logic of sensation, Deleuze discusses the abstract process used by 
Francis Bacon to create his paintings. He describes this as the formation of a diagram (a 
synonym for the abstract machine
25
) through which becomings can be revealed or 
hidden on the canvas. The most cited of these becomings include a becoming meat and 
a becoming animal of the human subject (Deleuze, 2003). Whilst Deleuze uses different 
terms to describe these processes, this method of abstraction to reveal and select 
becomings for further development can also be seen in his review of Franz Kafka’s 
literature (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986) and Luc Goddard’s cinematic films (Deleuze, 
1986). 
 
The above review of critical realism and Deleuze’s onto-epistemological stance 
demonstrates why I decided not to use critical realist methods as the basis for empirical 
enquiry. In doing so, it also highlights two important features in a Deleuze-compatible 
method of empirical enquiry:  
 
1. Out of the two critical realist methods for accessing the virtual, tracing and 
abstraction, only the latter is compatible with Deleuze’s philosophy  
2. Methods of abstraction are field dependent.  
 
 
 
 
2.3. A speculative method. 
                                                     
25
 As noted by Deleuze himself in The logic of sensation (Deleuze, 2003), and again in 
his study of Foucault (Deleuze, 2006). 
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This latter point is important because it explains why I decided to look outside of 
Deleuze’s texts, and the references he makes to his methods of concept creation, or the 
artistic methods used by Bacon, Kafka or Goddard. 
 
Looking at my own field of interest, I returned to my review of Jean Hillier’s proposals 
for a new, Deleuze-inspired method for strategic planning. As noted in Chapter 3, 
Hillier argues that, to create a strategic plan, different actors should be encouraged to 
consider existing spatial relations and forms of practice, and speculate what they might 
‘become’ in the future i.e. the potential for these things to operate in different ways26.  
 
In keeping with Deleuze’s stance, this approach to abstraction does not trace pre-actual 
mechanisms (machines) or becomings from sensory observation. It does, however, 
differ from the methods used by Deleuze as philosopher, Bacon as artist, Kafka as 
novelist and Goddard as filmmaker in two important ways. Firstly, unlike these methods 
of abstraction, Hillier’s method is not centred on the abstractions made by a single 
person i.e. the planner. Instead, this method encourages other professional actors to 
contribute to the process of abstraction, and the becomings that are identified from that 
process. This distinction is important to this piece of empirical research because, like 
Hillier’s strategic plan-making strategy, it too relies on the input of participants, albeit 
for the purposes of testing a proposed planning tool rather than developing a strategic 
plan.  
 
The second point relates to the way Hillier envisages empirical observations and the 
role they play in the process of abstraction. In Deleuze’s philosophical method, it is not 
clear how abstract questions take account of the philosopher’s own empirical 
observations. Similarly, whilst Bacon uses live models in his work, it is not clear how 
the link between the empirically observed model and the ‘painting as diagram’ is made. 
Hillier’s proposals are much clearer in setting out this relationship. Hillier suggests that 
the process of abstraction relies on the participant’s memory of sensory observation. 
                                                     
26 It should be noted that Hillier’s reference to speculation could be linked to a broader 
movement known as ‘speculative realism’ (see Bryant et al, 2011). I have not made this 
link for two reasons. Firstly, Hillier does not acknowledge this link in any of her texts. 
And, secondly, at the time of writing, speculative realism contains a wide range of 
different positions, which I felt, might introduce lines of argumentation that cannot be 
sufficiently covered in the space of this thesis, or that might risk detracting the reader 
from the purpose of the chapter.  
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Participants then imagine the different ways in which the entities forming those 
observations might play out in different circumstances. In doing so, Hillier’s method 
offers a clear use for empirical observation without falling into the circular arguments 
seen in critical realism. Hillier avoids this circularity by defining a method in which 
speculated potentials (becomings) are created from observations rather than traced from 
observations (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Accessing the transcendental field through speculation. 
 
The above figure situates Hillier’s method of speculative abstraction in Deleuze’s 
ontological framework. Unlike the other Deleuzian research methods discussed in the 
first body of literature, Hillier does not suggest using empirical observations as data, 
and becomings as the result of subsequent analysis. Rather, she seems to suggest that 
empirical observations provide a basis from which data (speculated potentials) is 
generated.  
 
To ensure the speculative data generated serves the process of plan making, and the 
process of data generation, Hillier introduces a number of control mechanisms that I 
deemed to be equally useful to this study. As I noted in Chapter 3, Hillier argues that, 
the process of speculating potentials ‘should include concepts towards which actants 
desire to move such as sustainability’ (Hillier, 2007: 249). Rather than looking for, or 
defining an ‘…explicit, concise, significance’ for such concepts, she argues that they 
should be treated as ‘empty signifiers’ (Hillier, 2007; Gunder and Hillier, 2009). As 
such, these ‘empty signifiers’ are able to ‘…secure multifarious points of view, chains 
of significations constituting conflicting narratives, or unique interpretations pertaining 
to particular situations, all under one common label’ (Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 17). 
Methodologically, these, ‘empty signifiers’ provides Hillier with some control over the 
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kind of potentials generated by different actors. But it also ensures that the participants 
have control over the kind of potentials they speculate as relevant, and the kind of 
experiences they use to form these speculations.  
 
These two ideas: that speculated potentials can be taken as data, and empty signifiers 
can direct these speculations, were instrumental to my proposals for SIAM, as well as 
my empirical research. This transition between epistemology / methodology and 
detailed design is set out below. 
 
3. A detailed research design.  
 
3.1. Delphi techniques. 
 
In developing a detailed research design I considered and dismissed several methods for 
testing the SIAM proposal through empirical enquiry. The most notable of these were: 
the use of informal interviews undertaken within a participant observation framework, 
and the use of formal questionnaires as the basis for data generation. I considered the 
first of these methods because I believe that it would have offered a unique insight into 
the relationship between decision making and assessment within specific contexts. The 
observations, comments and speculations arising from these interviews could have been 
generated from within ‘real’, ongoing projects, reflecting one of my study objectives i.e. 
to test the practicable viability of a method intended for use by actors working in 
development and regulatory practice. However, this method also introduced a number 
of significant disadvantages.  
 
Given the time constraints of the PhD, it is not possible for an empirical study to capture 
all stages of the design, development and regulatory processes affecting a given 
scheme
27
. With this in mind, a participant observation framework would need to focus 
on one period of the process in detail, or several stages covered in less detail and 
spanning across many such projects. The conclusions drawn from such interviews 
would only capture a limited and detailed series of ‘snapshops’. Whilst these snapshots 
might provide detailed insight into the internal workings of the two methods, they 
would offer limited scope for appraising the practical viability of SIAM as an 
                                                     
27 This is because the design, development and regulation of a medium sized project 
could last several years 
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alternative to the BRE family of methods. With this in mind, I decided that informal 
interviews undertaken within a participant observation framework would be better 
suited to subsequent studies aimed at more detailed ‘testing’ and refinement (see 
Chapter 10).  
 
Another constraint associated with this approach concerns the sensitive nature of the 
‘live’ data generated. Whilst some of this information could be anonymised, the 
specificity of the points raised would inevitable render these efforts partial. Such 
limitations could expose the respondents to professional risk, which would have serious 
ethical implications for the research, or lead to more reserved interview responses. 
 
The second method considered, formal questionnaires, overcomes some of these risks. 
Questions could be designed to encourage respondents to explore broader concerns, and 
the results of this exercised could be anonymised in such a way as to protect the 
respondent from professional scrutiny. However, it is difficult to imagine how a formal 
questionnaire led approach could be designed to encourage respondents to develop 
observations about existing and assessments into more general commentaries, and to 
abstract these further to speculate about the future of these methods. With this in mind, I 
decided that a formal questionnaire would be more suited to secondary stages of the 
research design i.e. when respondents have already made initial comments and 
speculations, and appreciate why such kinds of data are considered valuable to the 
research (see below).  
 
After considering these concerns I decided to structure my study around a group of 
methods known as the Delphi techniques. These Delphi techniques are often used in 
studies aimed at exploring and testing new proposals through speculations (Nowack et 
al, 2011). Methodologists such as Wright and Rowe suggest that this suitability is owing 
to the structure common to all Delphi projects (Wright and Rowe, 2011; see also 
Nowack et al, 2011; Linstone and Turoff, 1975). All Delphi methods are formed as a 
collection of ‘rounds’. In each round data is generated by interviewing or surveying a 
number of respondents, collating this data into an anonymised report and sending the 
report to respondents for review, thus forming the basis for a subsequent round. The 
anonymous nature of the Delphi rounds assures the respondents that the comments and 
ideas they make during an interview do not have negative consequences on their 
professional status. The iterative process of the Delphi rounds also means that these 
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comments and ideas can be reviewed by other professionals working in the same or 
similar fields. These two techniques avoid the issues identified with interviewing as part 
of participatory observation and formal questionnaires because it encourages detailed 
discussions about specific issues in a ‘live’ scheme as well as broader issues drawn 
from multiple, historic schemes; interviews can encourage respondents to use this to 
identify observations, to abstract these into broader commentaries and abstract them 
further to speculate about the way these points might play out in the future; respondents 
can omit details that would expose them to professional risk without limiting the quality 
of the data generated.  
 
In the following I will explain how I used these Delphi techniques to direct data 
generation and analysis. 
 
3.1.1. Data generation: first Delphi round. 
 
Prior to commencing the first round of data generation, a summary of the SIAM 
proposal was sent to all participants for review. This document contained a table 
comparing BRE and SIAM assessments and a set of statements explaining SIAM as a 
sequence of statements related to assessment and design practice (as outlined in Chapter 
7 and Appendix A). These two documents provided a description of SIAM and helped 
explain why SIAM was different from existing assessment methods. Issuing these 
documents in advance of the first Delphi round reduced the likelihood of 
misunderstanding between researcher and participant and allowed the data generation 
and data analysis to run smoothly and efficiently (see below).  
 
The first Delphi round was undertaken as a series of intensive, semi-structured 
interviews with 11 respondents (see below). One of the most notable strengths of the in-
depth interview format is its capacity to ‘access self-reflexivity among interview 
subjects’ (Miller and Glasser, 2010). This process of self-reflection was paramount to 
the demands of the research. By reflecting on their experiences, respondents were able 
to critically examine existing forms of practice (BRE assessments) and consider the 
benefits of new, proposed forms of practice (SIAM).  However, as Blumer notes, this 
depth of insight is only possible when the interviewee is made to feel comfortable and 
competent in the area of discussion (Blumer, 1969). To achieve these conditions, 
interviews were only partly structured. This ‘open-ended’ approach to questioning is 
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supported by Nowack et al’s review of 24 Delphi studies, in which they advise using 
open-ended questions, such that:  
 
…the Delphi technique mainly serves as a source of creative input for the 
idea generation. If the Delphi technique is used for judgment purposes, it 
depends on the extent of creativity needed, and open-ended questions are 
recommended (Nowack et al, 2011). 
 
Interviewees were encouraged to identify and discuss issues that they believed to be of 
greatest importance, and to afford whatever time they felt most appropriate to their 
unique knowledge base and interests. As a result, the average duration of interviews per 
respondent was 1 hour 47 minutes and each respondent spent this time in different 
ways: focusing on different aspects of the SIAM proposal. 
 
Where possible, all interviews with the 11 respondents were conducted on a one-to-one 
basis so that each respondent could influence the exchange of questions and answers 
according to their own area of expertise. The only two exceptions to this can be seen in 
an interview with R2,3 and 4 and in an interview with R5 and 6. This small group 
format did offer some advantages. During these small group interviews there were 
instances when a comment or speculation made by one of the respondents led to a 
subsequent comment or speculation by another respondent. This is visible in the 
following extract from the interview with R2, 3 and 4: 
 
GA: Well – the decision might be about whether or not to accommodate 3 
recycling bins internally. Putting them in might encourage more sustainable 
behaviour, but the knock on effect of putting them in might be as we 
mentioned before that I have less useable work space in the kitchen which 
means it doesn’t work as well, it is less likely to appeal to different buyers 
or it affects the way I set out the rooms, their shape or size, or affects 
storage.  
R2: But I think in those instances you are going to find that people will find 
excuses not to do things  
R3: That is what I thought. I think the important thing is about who is 
appointed as the coordinator – to act like a referee. 
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R2: Otherwise people will just say, ‘There is no room for bins’, ‘Ok what 
about bike storage?’, ‘The people that will live here probably won’t want to 
ride bikes’, ’What about a home office?’, ‘We did market research and most 
people don’t want to work from home’. 
R3: Well, no because people who know about sustainability think about the 
people that might live here in the future so you couldn’t base it on market 
research.  
 
This short extract shows a quick succession of comments and speculations made by 
myself (GA), R2 and R3. Some of the speculations are introduced to highlight potential 
risks or issues not identified by others (R2 highlighted the risk of manipulation in the 
scenario set out by GA; R3 highlights the issues surrounding the way R2 develops an 
opposing scenario). It also reveals how some speculations provide new directions for 
improving the proposal to resolve these risks (R3 suggesting new directions for the role 
of sustainability coordinator, R3 suggestions about acceptable assessment responses). 
This complex process of turn-taking helped to refine the comments and speculations 
made by interviewer and interviewees.  
 
However, there were also instances when this format seemed to limit participation. The 
only striking example of this can be seen in the interview with R2, 3 and 4. The 
interview lasted 3 hours and 37 minutes in total, during which time R4 made only one 
detailed comment. R2 and 3, however, provided long descriptions, commentaries and 
speculations about different areas of assessment practice similar to the extract above. To 
encourage R4’s participation in the discussion I made every effort to keep questions 
open. However, this dynamic seemed to be the result of internal hierarchies within the 
company. R2 and R3 are company directors, whilst R4 is an employee of the company. 
Similar observations have been noted in wider academic literature on group interviews 
and focus groups (see Kitzinger, 1995 for example). 
 
All efforts were made to limit the number of group interviews and, when necessary, to 
limit the range of professionals within the group. To achieve this, all interviews were 
arranged at times and locations suggested by the respondent, and were recorded and 
analysed by consent. To protect the professional identify of the individual or company, 
all transcriptions were anonymised using terms R1-R11 for each respondent. All 
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references to specific projects or companies were omitted or captured using general 
descriptions such as ‘large, private housing developer’.   
 
The interviews with all 11 respondents (see Table 8 below) followed a roughly two–part 
structure. The first part focused on existing BRE forms of assessment whilst the second 
part focused on my proposals for SIAM. Whilst every attempt was made to retain this 
loose structure, many of the respondents shifted between both forms of assessment. This 
was particularly noticeable in the second stage, during which several respondents 
developed their position on SIAM by returning to comments already made on existing 
BRE assessments.  
 
The statements set out in the comparative table sent to respondents prior to the 
interview (Appendix A) helped to direct speculations in the interviews. As shown in 
Appendix A there was 14 statements in total, 2 for each of the following seven themes:  
 
1. What is the relationship between assessments and design? 
2. When are assessments made? 
3. Who carries out an assessment? 
4. How are assessments judged? 
5. How are targets and benchmarks used? 
6. What constitutes the ‘sustainable’ scheme? 
7. How are assessments used as part of other practices? 
 
Like Hillier’s empty signifiers, these statements helped direct the process of abstraction 
from sensory observations (the actual realm) to speculations about what might become 
(pre-actual). During the interview, respondents were asked to review these statements 
and use them to explore observations from professional practice, to make comments 
from these observations and to speculate how some of the issues or ideas raised from 
this line of enquiry might play out over time. The following extract from a transcript 
with R9 helps illustrate how the two statements used in the fifth theme helped to direct 
this process. 
 
At the stage when we tendered for [a scheme], it had to be BREEAM 
excellent and carbon neutral, but it also had to comply with the LSE’s cost 
model. When we submitted our tender I said, ‘we can do BREEAM 
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excellent, but the carbon neutral just can’t be done within that budget. So we 
will not enter into an appointment that says we will do that’. Then we 
started to design the building, … I was asked, ‘these walls are really 
expensive, why have you designed the walls like this? What sort of architect 
designs walls with 300mm of insulation in them?’ And I said, ‘the kind of 
fool that has accepted a brief to get as close to getting carbon neutral as 
possible’ I said, ‘that is what the brief asks us to do’. And they went, ‘oh 
well yes, I suppose you’re right’. People ask for these things and they don’t 
know what they mean. And they know what they are asking for and they 
don’t know what the consequences of it will be. And when the 
consequences become apparent they say they don’t like it. And so the brief 
of that particular college ended up being, ‘you don’t have to achieve 
BREEAM excellent, you don’t have to make it carbon neutral’ and the 
consequent brief was almost equally as impossible because the brief 
thereafter just said, ‘do your best’. Well how do you demonstrate that you 
have done your best? … you could use this [SIAM] to demonstrate that 
you’ve done your best. 
 
In the extract, R9 explores both statements within the theme, ‘how are targets and 
benchmarks used’28 by focusing on one sequence of events from practice. In the first 
section of the extract, R9 shows how the use of a points-based benchmark identified in a 
project brief resulted in expensive design solutions that were deemed ‘foolish’ in 
subsequent review. R9 abstracts these observations to suggest that many professionals 
working in the industry are unable to envisage the effect such targets (including 
BREEAM targets) have on the design process.  
 
This short extract shows that the process of abstraction discussed in the last sub-section 
is not necessarily undertaken in clear sequences between observation and speculation. 
As this extract suggests, respondents moved back and forth from observations (in the 
actual realm) to different levels of abstraction, either as comments or as speculations (in 
                                                     
28
 Fifth theme, How are targets and benchmarks used? Is based on two statements:  
(i) In BRE assessments, a sustainability score acts as a benchmark that the 
design must achieve   
(ii) In SIAM there is no benchmark. Each design decision is judged as more or 
less sustainable according to the complex factors that contributed to the 
decisions taken during its actualisation.  
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the pre-actual realm). This happened throughout all interviews, and with such fluidity 
that it was not immediately obvious when the respondent was drawing from 
observations, or when they were abstracting these observations into comments and 
speculations. 
 
3.1.2. Method of analysis: first Delphi round. 
 
To unpick this complexity and to draw meaningful conclusions from the interviews, the 
transcribed data was analysed in three stages. Firstly, the data was coded according to 
the seven thematic questions noted above and then according to the two statements 
within each theme (as presented in Appendix A).  
 
Secondly, these themes were grouped according to their role in the process of 
abstraction discussed in the last sub-chapter: namely: sensory observation, commentary, 
and speculations about ‘what might become’ of these issues in the future. This two-way 
coding exercise resulted in one table for each interview (a complete set of tables is 
presented in Appendix B). 
 
Each table was structured into four columns. The first column relates to the seven key 
themes, each subdivided into ‘existing’ and ‘SIAM’ relating to the two corresponding 
statements. The second, third and fourth column set out different degrees of abstraction 
from observation of actual entities to speculations about pre-actual becomings. 
 
This format successfully captured the way each respondent formed links between 
observation, comment and speculation during each interview. There were several 
instances, for example, in which comments were abstracted from observations without 
any further speculation about how these issues might play out in the future. Similarly, 
there were many instances in which the respondent makes abstract comments without 
relating these to a specific experience in practice.  
 
The absence of a clear pattern between groups suggested that this method of abstraction 
was not necessarily dependent on the individual’s role in design/development or 
assessment/regulatory practice. With this in mind, I decided not to further consolidate 
the data according to professional categories.  
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In the third stage of my analysis, I compared the tables formed from each interview to 
identify areas of agreement and disagreement within the group concerning: the kinds of 
observations made, how these observations are understood as part of broader issues, 
what measures might be taken to respond to these issues and how these measures might 
play out over time. Patterns identified across the data were presented in a report 
structured according to each of the seven themes for the two forms of assessment: 
existing BRE assessments and proposed SIAM assessments. The main points from this 
report were captured in an executive summary and feedback sheet issued to each 
respondent for review and comment (Appendix C). These two documents were sent to 
all respondents for review and comment. The feedback from this exercise formed the 
second Delphi round.  
 
3.1.3. Data generation: second Delphi round. 
 
This second Delphi round was based on written responses rather than face-to-face 
interviews. This structured, less intensive approach afforded direct comparison between 
respondents and, thus, a strong base on which to identify future changes to the SIAM 
proposal. On a practical level, this method of data generation was less time-consuming, 
which I felt would improve the likelihood of further participation (see below). 
  
3.1.4. Method of analysis: second Delphi round. 
 
As in the conclusion to the first Delphi round, the feedback from this second round was 
analysed using the seven thematic questions and the three degrees of abstraction.  
 
In their study of Delphi techniques, Rowe et al found that subsequent Delphi rounds of 
data generation provided an opportunity for respondents to re-consider their initial 
responses in light of broader, anonymous commentary (Rowe et al, 2005). However, of 
the nine respondents participating in both rounds, none of the feedback points to a clear 
change in viewpoint. A similar observation is made in a study by Bolger et al, (2011) 
who suggest that changes in opinion are less common amongst participants with strong 
opinions formed from extensive expertise in their field of study.  
 
The points made in the feedback from experts in this study follow two rough groups. 
Most respondents use the feedback to re-affirm or develop the points raised in the first 
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Delphi round, and several respondents draw on some of the suggestions made by others 
to expand their original stance. This suggests that, in this instance, the Delphi 
techniques were more successful as a framework for refining the data generated rather 
than achieving consensus across different points of view.  
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Table 7: Breakdown of Research Stage B into two sub-stages 
Research Stage B: 
Is there any empirical evidence to suggest that such a tool could be made practicable? 
Research Stage B1: First Delphi round Research Stage B2: Second Delphi round 
First part of the interview: 
Participants were asked to outline 
their experiences working with BRE 
assessments, to discuss the way such 
tools have affected practice and 
opportunities for improving these 
assessments. 
Second part of the interview: 
Participants were asked to consider 
the 14 statements drawn from the 
proposal in Research Stage A 
(Appendix A), and to speculate how 
these statements might play out in 
practice. 
Feedback: 
Each participant was asked to review the executive summary and report 
from Stage B1 and consider how the experiences and speculations from 
other participants might help them adapt, revise, expand or add to the 
speculations they made in Stage B1.  
Report: 
The principle comments and speculations from each interview were 
compiled into an executive summary (Appendix C) and a comprehensive 
report. These documents were distributed to each of the participants.  
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3.2. Selecting participants for the study. 
 
Many key figures in the literature on Delphi techniques suggest that, to make the most 
of the Delphi process, participants should be selected who reflect high levels of 
expertise in the field (Nowack et al, 2011; Hussler et al, 2011). Criteria for selecting 
experts vary across Delphi methods literature. In their study of 24 selected Delphi 
techniques, Nowack et al found that many studies relied on self assessment. Of the 24 
studies reviewed by Nowack et al, just over 40% introduce and discuss the criteria used 
for assessment. Common criteria used included professional qualifications and the 
number of years spent working in the field and membership of a professional body 
(Nowack et al, 2011). Whilst self-assessment has proven popular amongst many Delphi 
studies, a number of methodologists suggest that it should be avoided in favour of 
criteria devised to accommodate different kinds of expertise or expertise relevant to 
specific research problems (Nowack et al, 2011; Hussler et al, 2011). This argument for 
expertise is important to this thesis. A thorough and extensive knowledge of BRE 
assessments and the field in which such assessments operate is necessary if participants 
are to offer useful comments and speculations.  
 
The literature on Delphi methods also acknowledges that the decision to focus on 
experts in the field must be balanced against their willingness or capacity to participate 
in the study (Nowack et al, 2011; Bolger et al, 2011). This is because experts are likely 
to have a high, or key position within the industry suggesting their time will be deemed 
more valuable, both in terms of the time that can be taken away from the industry and 
the cost of this time. This is particularly problematic in the Delphi method outlined 
above because it demands several rounds, each divided into different time slots.  
 
These time constraints also affect the sample size. Even if it was possible to obtain a 
large sample of experts willing to participate in the first round of interviews, the use of 
Delphi techniques means that the results of these interviews must then be captured into 
a report that forms the basis for the second round. Given that such experts are unlikely 
to read a very long report, a balance must be struck between the number of participants 
and the depth of the interviews (see Nowack et al, 2011).  
 
Taking this into consideration I used the following criteria and method to produce the 
sample of respondents shown in Table 8 below.  
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Criterion 1: Experience. All selected respondents have worked with one or several BRE 
assessments on at least 5 projects over the last 5 years. These projects include large 
residential and mixed use master-plans, refurbished and new build schools, commercial 
and industrial schemes, affordable and commercial housing developments ranging 
between 1 and 12 units. This criterion ensures that the comments respondents made can 
be generalised across their own experiences and reflects some of the most recent trends 
in the field as a whole. 
 
Criterion 2: Breadth of knowledge. All respondents work in senior or project 
management roles. This includes several founding directors of small consultancy firms 
(R2, R3 and R7) and one principle director in a large national consultancy firm (R9). 
This ensures that the comments made by respondents take account of a broad range of 
concerns and the roles played by others in the project / regulation team 
 
Criterion 3: Breadth of selection. Participants work in a range of associated fields. The 
sample is formed from an approximate 50-50 split between professionals with vested 
interest in the design (such as architects, masterplanners and clients) and those with a 
role in assessing and regulating designs (such as Code for Sustainable Homes assessors, 
CDM coordinators and planners). This breadth reduces some of the single party bias 
likely to be found in any one discipline, and ensures that a range of interests and 
concerns are represented as far as is reasonable within the time constraints of the study.   
 
Criterion 4: Willingness to participate. As noted above, the average duration of an 
interview per respondent in the first Delphi round was 1 hour 47 minutes and the 
longest interview lasted a total of 3 hours and 37 minutes. Factoring in the amount of 
time needed to prepare for this interview, to read the report from this interview, to 
complete the resulting feedback sheet and review the results of the second Delphi round, 
a conservative estimate of the average time needed from each participant is 
approximately 3 hours. Given the experience of these respondents (criterion 1), it is fair 
to assume that the average cost of this time was between £100 and £250 per hour 
resulting in an average, in-kind investment of £525 per respondent. This equates to an 
estimated total in-kind investment of £5,775. Such an investment significantly limits the 
number of respondents willing to participate in the study.  
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Targeted sampling and snowball sampling methods were used to identify respondents 
that met all four criteria. By drawing on my former and extended professional network, 
I was able to identify several professions. However, this targeted method only 
indentified a small portion of the sample (33%). All other respondents were identified 
by subsequent recommendations. In one example, I contacted the head of my local 
Parish Council who, drawing on their recent experiences working with an affordable 
housing developer, identified and introduced me to the head of the development 
company. This contact pointed me to a key member of staff who, after agreeing to 
participate in the research, also introduced one of their colleagues working in an 
associated department (R5 and R6). 
 
Without these recommendations, many of these key roles in the design/development 
and assessment/regulation process would have been unknown or/and inaccessible to me. 
The use of snowball sampling to access such hard-to-reach populations has been 
discussed at length in wider methods literature (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997; Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981; Heckathorn, 1997), as well as in Delphi methods literature (see 
Mead and Mosley, 2001; for example). 
 
According to Wright and Rowe, the use of targeted and snowball sampling methods can 
also reduce the drop-out rates before or between Delphi rounds (Wright and Rowe, 
2011). This is supported by this research. Of the 15 experts asked to participate in the 
study, 11 agreed (73%). None of the 11 experts who agreed to be interviewed dropped 
out prior to Delphi round 1 (Research Stage B1). Of these, I decided to omit one of the 
respondents from subsequent analysis owing to their limited participation (see above) 
and only 1 of the remaining 10 participants dropped out of Delphi round 2 (Research 
Stage B2)
29
. Whilst this respondents, R10, expressed their willingness to participate in 
the second Delphi round, professional obligations on his time meant that he was unable 
to provide a detailed response to the first Delphi round. 
 
This equates to a 0% drop out rates for Delphi round 1 and a 10% drop out rate for 
Delphi round 2. These figures compare favourably with other Delphi studies. Newack et 
al noted that, on average, only 22% of experts asked to participate completed the first 
                                                     
29 R5 and R6 combined their feedback in Delphi round 2.  
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Delphi round
30
 and, on average, an additional 18% of these participants dropped out for 
the second Delphi round.  
 
The resulting sample was formed of 11 experts across different roles in the 
design/assessment process, working in different sized companies or departments and 
with different status in those companies /departments (Table 8). Whilst this group was 
relatively small compared to other methods used in the social sciences, Nowack et al 
note that effective Delphi studies have been carried out with a wide range of sample 
sizes, the lowest of which being 6 in the first Delphi round (Nowack et al, 2011:1611). 
This point is supported by a similar review undertaken by Hasson and Keeney (2011; 
see also Dunn, 1994).  
 
This small sample of respondents begs the question as to whether it offers a good 
representation of professionals working with BRE assessments. In response to such 
concerns, I would like to draw on an argument set out by Mitchell, who notes that the 
focus on a statistically representative sample does not necessarily provide a strong basis 
for extrapolation. Rather, ‘extrapolation is in fact based on the validity of the analysis 
rather than the representativeness of the events’ (1983: 190). Such validity, he adds, is 
achieved by a logical or explanatory linkage between two or more characteristics 
identified in analysis (1983: 199–200). Such links were clearly visible in the report 
issued at the end of the first Delphi round (as discussed in Chapter 8). 
                                                     
30Nowack et al express this as ‘Researchers invited, on average, 4.4 times more experts 
than actually participated in the first Delphi round.’ (Nowack et al, 2011: 1611) 
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Table 8: Experts participating in Research Stage B. 
Respondent  Sampling Professional role Professional role  Completed stages  
R1  Targeted Design and development: Strategic planner / designer  Design director in large company Stage B1 and B2 
R2  Targeted Assessor / regulation: CSH Assessor  Founding director Stage B1 and B2 
R3   Snowball Assessor / regulation: CSH Assessor Founding director Stage B1 and B2 
R4   Snowball Assessor / regulation: CSH Assessor Senior assessor Stage B1 
R5   Snowball Developer/client: Affordable housing Development partnerships officer Stage B1 and B2 
R6   Snowball Developer/client: Affordable housing Senior development officer Stage B1 
R7   Targeted Designer: Urban designer Founding director in small practice Stage B1 and B2 
R8   Targeted Designer: Architect Architect in medium practice Stage B1 and B2 
R9   Targeted Designer: Architect Senior director in medium  practice  Stage B1 and B2 
R10  Snowball Assessor / Regulator: CDM assessor Senior assessor in medium practice Stage B1 and B2 
R11  Snowball Assessor / Regulator: Planner Senior planner in large practice Stage B1 and B2 
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Chapter 7: Results for Research Stage A 
 
1. Overview of the chapter. 
 
In this chapter I present the results of Research Stage A according to the sub-stages 
identified in Table 6, and use these results to reflect on the overarching question 
directing this stage: Can Deleuze’s philosophical concepts be translated into a new 
theoretical framework for constructing formal assessments? 
 
2.  Research Stage A.1: Reviewing and (re)thinking BRE forms of assessment. 
 
In 1990 the Building Research Establishment (BRE) set out their first sustainable 
assessment methods. This assessment was conceived as an attempt to: 
 
 reduce the environmental impacts of developments.  
 enable developments to be recognised according to their environmental benefits.  
 provide a credible, environmental label for buildings to aid comparison & 
benchmarking  
 stimulate demand for environmentally sustainable buildings 
(Willmott Dixon, 2010). 
 
These objectives remain central to the BRE suite. Yet, over the last 24 years, these 
assessments have undergone a number of changes.  The key stages in this development 
are identified in a presentation made by a key member of the BRE team (Aubree, no 
date) and expanded in Table 9 below. The first column of the table is broken into three 
periods of development 1990-1993; 1998-2006 and 2006-2012.  These periods of 
development identify stages in which the most significant changes were made. The 
second and third columns identify domestic forms of assessment and those belonging to 
the collective BREEAM suite. The fourth column details the key changes made to the 
BREEAM suite (Table 9). 
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Table 9: Table showing development of BREEAM assessments and the modelled concepts that underpin them 
BREEAM 
Timeline 
BRE 
Assessments 
Assessment structure / categories Key observations / changes 
1990-1993 
 
1990: 
Introduction of 
1/90 offices 
 
1991: 
Introduction of 
2/91 
supermarkets and 
3/91 New Homes 
 
1993: 
Revision of 1/93 
offices and 
introduction of 
4/93 existing 
offices 
1/93 Offices 
 
1) Global issues and use of resources 
2) Neighbourhood or local issues 
3) Indoor issues 
 
All of the BRE assessments in this suite are based 
on the same three categories. Minor differences 
within these categories are determined by building 
type.   
1998-2006 
 
1998: 
BREEAM suite 
launched with the 
exception of 
housing 
 
2000:  
BREEAM 1998 
suite 
 
1) Management 
2) Health and comfort 
3) Energy 
4) Transport 
5) Water 
6) Materials 
7) Land Use  
8) Site ecology 
9) Pollution 
The BRE moves away from the scalar categories 
of global, local and indoor by introducing 
assessment categories.  
The BRE introduce category weighting to provide 
a single, comparable score for each building 
assessed.  
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Ecohomes 
assessment 
launched 
 
2001: 
Bespoke 
assessment 
launched 
 
2006:  
Ecohomes, 2006 
(Baldwin et al, 1998) 
BREEAM, 
EcoHomes 
2000; 2006 
1) Energy 
2) Transport 
3) Pollution 
4) Materials 
5) Water 
6) Land use and ecology 
7) Health and well being 
8) Management (in 2006 only) 
Ecohomes 2000 is formed as a domestic-focused 
assessment in the BREEAM family 
Ecohomes is revised in 2006 to include additional 
assessment category, ‘management’.  
2006-2012 
 
2006: 
Code for 
Sustainable 
Homes launched 
 
2008: 
Revised 
BREEAM suite 
published updates 
include category, 
‘innovation’.  
 
2010:  
Revised Code for 
Sustainable 
Homes published  
  
Code for 
Sustainable 
Homes, 2006; 
2010  
1) Energy and CO2 Emissions 
2) Water 
3) Materials 
4) Surface Water Run-off 
5) Waste 
6) Pollution 
7) Health and Well-being Management 
8) Management 
9) Ecology 
 
Code for Sustainable Homes form of assessment 
builds on Ecohomes by simplifying the weighting 
system and adding other supporting assessments, 
such as the Lifetime Homes assessment. 
Changes are introduced to some of the categories: 
omission of ‘transport’ category, addition of 
‘Waste’ category and ‘Surface water run-off’ 
category 
The Code for Sustainable Homes 2010 makes no 
notable changes to the assessment 
BREEAM 2008 
and 2011 suite  
 
1) Management 
2) Health and wellbeing 
3) Energy 
4) Transport 
5) Water 
6) Waste  
7) Pollution 
8) Land-use and ecology 
9) Materials  
The 2008 BREEAM suite introduces innovation 
as a category to the former 1998 suite; The 
addition of a ‘waste’ category; and the ‘land-use’ 
and ‘site ecology’ are merged. 
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2011: 
Revised 
BREEAM Suite 
published 
 
2012: 
BREEAM 
Communities 
published 
 
10) Innovation 
 
BREEAM 
Communities, 
2011/12 
1) Governance 
2) Social and economic wellbeing 
3) Resources and energy 
4) Land use and ecology 
5) Transport and movement 
6) Innovation 
The Communities assessment is introduced with 
the intention of capturing masterplanning as an 
iterative process, moving from developing plans, 
stakeholder consultation and revising plans 
(BREEAM, 2012: ix) 
Consultation and engagement is introduced in 
each category (BREEAM, 2012: xiii)  
Much greater flexibility introduced into the 
method 
2012-2014 Code for 
Sustainable 
Homes, 2010 
 A working group commissioned by the DCLG 
propose the ‘wind-down’ of the CSH and to 
integrate these standards into the UK building 
regulations. BREEAM resists these changes. 
2014: 
BREEAM suite 
to be updated 
  Awaiting updates 
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In each of the assessments constructed and revised over the 24 year period since its 
inception, the sustainability of a particular building type has been determined according 
to a number of traits. As summarised in Table 9, the kind of traits used to form these 
definitions fall into two groups.   
 
The first grouping of traits is scalar, and is used by the BRE in the period 1990-1993. 
This suggests that, the concept of the ‘sustainable new home’, for example, is formed 
from three different definitions of the concept: the definition of the sustainable home as 
a global entity, the definition of the sustainable home as a local entity and the definition 
of the sustainable home as a space in which to live (its interior). Such scalar definitions 
have been discussed in other areas of spatial policy.  In European spatial planning, for 
example, Davoudi argues that polycentricity should be seen as a scale dependent 
concept in which polycentricity at the national scale does not necessarily imply 
polycentricity at the regional or city scale (Davoudi, 2003; see also Hall and Pain, 
2006). 
  
In the second period of BREEAM assessment, 1998-2006, this idea of three different, 
scalar constructs of sustainability is abandoned in favour of a more ‘holistic’ form of 
assessment formed from essential traits (Baldwin et al, 1998). Whilst changes are made 
to these assessments in the following period, 2006-2012, this holistic approach to 
definition is retained. The move to holistic traits rather than scale dependant traits is 
reinforced by the addition of weighting in 1998 (shown in the fourth column of Table 
9). By weighting each of the essential traits in the assessment method, BREEAM were 
able to relate the relative impact of each characteristic and combine this to score the 
sustainability of the building as a whole: a score used to compare different buildings. 
This weighting system emphasises the BRE’s commitment to essentialism as an 
underlying principle i.e. the idea that concepts like ‘sustainability’ can be defined 
according to a number of essential traits that can, in turn, form the basis for assessing a 
building or masterplan design. 
 
Changes made to the BREEAM non-domestic suite of assessments in 2008 introduced 
the category ‘innovation’ to the essentialist traits identified in the 1998 suite. This trait 
provides an additional 10% credits to the full assessment (i.e. resulting in a total 
combination of categories equal to 110%). Innovation, it is argued, occurs when a 
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building goes beyond the criteria set by the other eight, essential traits (Baldwin et al, 
2010). In this sense, innovation has a very limited meaning and role. It is understood 
within the confines of the modelled concept of the sustainable scheme, but is not 
necessarily essential to that concept. 
 
From the history of BREEAM assessments set out in Table 9, I identified three 
initiatives that I felt revealed the limitations of the essentialist, modelled concept 
structure. These are as follows: 
 
1. The introduction of BREEAM Bespoke in 2001 
2. The emphasis on flexibility in BREEAM Communities 2012 and 
3. The emphasis on community consultation in BREEAM Communities 2012 
In the following I explore these three potentials by considering two questions in keeping 
with Deleuze’s epistemological stance: 
 
1. What do these aspects do in current assessments?  
2. What might these aspects do if they were not set within a modelled concept 
structure? 
Concept/ initiative 1: BREEAM Bespoke.  
 
The BREEAM Bespoke form of assessment was introduced in 2001. It was intended to 
assess buildings whose uses and contexts were not easily accommodated using existing 
BREEAM forms of assessment. To accommodate such cases, BREEAM Bespoke was 
designed to adapt the modelled concepts used in other assessments. In each bespoke 
assessment, a modelled concept is selected from the established suite, traits are added or 
removed, and weightings are adjusted. Thus, in terms of what the Bespoke assessment 
does, it ensures that established modelled concepts are made applicable to all projects, 
including unique and complex projects. More broadly it ensures all buildings regardless 
of their use and context can be compared against each other according to the BRE’s 
universal assessment scale, and thus, can be judged and regulated accordingly. As 
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discussed in Chapter 1, this approach to assessment reflects Fischer’s argument about 
the importance of systematic assessment as part of a national agenda (2003). 
 
However, as part of efforts to offer an alternative, non-essentialist method I explored the 
possibility of developing a ‘bespoke assessment’ in the absence of a modelled concept. 
This line of enquiry can be approached in two ways: by looking at bespoke assessments 
made by actors as part of the design process, and a bespoke assessment made by an 
assessor as part of an evaluative process.  
 
Hillier’s concept of the ‘empty signifier’ suggests that the concept of the ‘sustainable 
home’ has no inherent meaning. The meaning of the concept changes throughout the 
design process. Thus, when one is designing the layout of a home, the sustainability of 
the design might be based on the way the rooms are used and how they might be 
adapted to accommodate different uses in a changing family environment. When one is 
designing a cladding detail, one might think about sustainability as the expected life of 
the materials and how much maintenance is needed across that life. Thus, the concept of 
sustainability is part of the immanent process of design: it is dependent on the entities 
that are brought together at different stages of the design process. It is in this sense that 
Hillier might discuss the idea of a bespoke, immanent assessment of sustainability. 
 
A similar position might be developed from concepts introduced in Bonta’s theoretical 
framework. My review of this framework would suggest that the ‘space’ in which the 
design is to be introduced, and the broader space of the project, is a complex space: a 
combination of assemblages formed of entities each with their unique operational 
demands. Because all complex spaces are different, an entity (human or non-human) 
must assess the complex combination of assemblages around them in order to determine 
how they should striate or smooth space. If this is the case, then it is questionable 
whether one should then assess these striations and smoothness by referring to a set of 
criteria located outside of the process.  
 
To develop these ideas further one might argue that all non-essentialist assessments 
should be seen as bespoke forms of assessment made immanent within rather than 
transcendent to (outside of) a complex space. In other words, as I noted in my own 
experiences in Chapter 1, assessment is already part of the design process and this 
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should form the basis for assessing a sustainable home rather than introducing a 
separate, or partially separate evaluative exercise.  
 
Whilst Hillier’s and Bonta’s (re)created and expanded Deleuzian concepts can be used 
to consider a bespoke form of sustainable assessment within the design process, 
Halsey’s study provides some direction for a bespoke sustainable assessment used to 
evaluate completed designs. Building on Halsey’s naming machines to include non-
textual machines (Bonta, 2008; Abrahams, 2013a), one might assess a building or a 
masterplan by asking, ‘what becomings are blocked or encouraged as a consequence of 
the design in this instance’.  Thus, assessing the sustainability of a scheme would 
require efforts to consider how the design encouraged or blocked the ‘becoming 
sustainable’ of entities within a complex space (Bonta and Protevi, 2004).  
 
This offers two Deleuze-inspired directions for developing the concept of a Bespoke 
sustainable assessment in the absence of a modelled concept. These are:  
 
 As part of the design process within a complex space and  
 Through the evaluation of that design and how it affects a complex space. 
Concept/ initiative 2: Flexibility.  
 
The technical manual for the 2012 Community assessment emphasises its flexibility 
(BRE, 2012). The BRE consider flexibility important because it ‘reflect(s) the unique 
challenges and opportunities on different development sites’ (BRE, 2012: 2).  Whilst 
flexibility was a key part of former assessments, this was mostly achieved by offering 
designers and assessors different criteria for achieving a given Code level. Yet, in the 
Communities assessment, most of the criteria used in two of the three assessment stages 
are optional. The only mandatory criteria are those belonging to the initial scheme 
design stage and the criteria for consultation with stakeholders in subsequent design 
stages.  
 
By allowing greater degrees of flexibility, the Communities assessment goes much 
further than the Bespoke form assessment. It suggests that many of the seven categories 
and the 39 criteria within those categories are not essential to all projects. This is the 
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first visible sign that BREEAM might be moving away from essentialism. It is not yet 
clear whether this is owing to the focus of the assessment i.e. a masterplan rather than a 
building design, or whether it is part of a broader trend in BREEAM. This will only be 
evident in subsequent revisions to the BREEAM suite.  
 
As with the Bespoke form of assessment, this focus on flexibility serves a very specific 
role in the assessment. It allows the overarching structure of the modelled concept to be 
used to assess greater degrees of complexity. As with the Bespoke assessment, I 
considered how the concept of flexibility could be expanded in the absence of the 
essentialist, modelled concept used to structure the Communities assessment.  
 
Hillier’s (re)creation of the Deleuzian concept, ‘plane of immanence’, suggests that the 
early, strategic design phase is the point at which actors draw becomings from the 
virtual plane of immanence into a figure of the virtual plane (a strategic plan). It is thus 
at this early, strategic stage that actors speculate what might become of the actual world 
around them. The Communities form of BREEAM assessment suggests that this stage 
should include a number of mandatory steps, captured in the mandatory aspects of the 
assessment criteria. By basing these speculations on pre-conceived design stages and 
using these as mandatory criteria in subsequent assessment,  Hillier might argue that 
these actors are using a blueprint (plane of transcendence) to set out a strategy (a 
plan(e) of immanence) and to assess this strategy. And, as a result, this strategy is 
limited to what is already known, or what has already been identified and assessed in 
other projects sharing some definable similarities.  
 
Thus, expanding on the Deleuze-inspired concepts developed by Hillier, a flexible, 
sustainable assessment would be one that allows for the greatest number of 
speculations: one that allows actors to stretch as far as possible ‘beyond the horizon’ of 
what we already know and see (Hillier, 2007). According to Hillier, this can only be 
achieved by removing these blueprints as starting points. 
 
These concepts, therefore, provided a direction for developing a flexible sustainable 
form of assessment in the absence of a modelled concept. This is rooted in: 
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 A design process that allows the greatest degree of speculation about ‘what 
might become’ during the earliest, strategic stages of a design and an assessment 
that encourages such speculations. 
Concept/ initiative 3: Community consultation.  
 
BREEAM Community 2012 is the first assessment to emphasise the importance of 
community consultation in assessing the sustainability of a design. Despite its 
importance, community consultation has a limited role to play in BREEAM 
Communities. Consultation is deemed an integral part of the design process but not the 
process of assessment. In other words, the assessment emphasises the importance of 
stakeholder engagement to resolve design problems arising in different contexts but not 
to assess the results of these decisions. This method remains under the control of the 
BRE. In doing so, the BRE form a clear distinction between design and assessment. 
 
Thus, if one was to explore how the concept of consultation might be expanded in the 
absence of this structure, one might consider what would happen if the means of 
forming an assessment was also determined through consultation. In terms of the 
concepts discussed and expanded from the literature review, this would mean 
integrating design-based assessments of sustainability drawn from Hillier and Bonta’s 
frameworks, and evaluative assessments of sustainability drawn from Halsey’s 
framework.  
 
To explore this idea I started by considering Hillier’s position on community 
consultation through ‘consensus building’. As noted in Chapter 3, Hillier rejects the idea 
that consultation between different actors should conclude in consensus. In the same 
way that a flexible assessment should not start with a blueprint that determines what 
should be speculated, she notes that consultation should not start with pre-defined ideals 
about what consultation is supposed to achieve. 
 
Developing this idea in the context of design and assessment, consultation in both 
processes would be seen as a form of ‘bricolage’. This would mean assessing the 
sustainability of a project as the project team moves through the design process. In the 
same way that consensus is removed as an end-point in consultation, it would suggest 
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removing the idea of a pre-determined code level that the design must achieve and a 
scale by which all projects can be compared ie what Hillier termed the ‘transvaluative’ 
approach (to consultation) (Hillier, 2007).  
 
This points to an expanded understanding of transvaluative bricolage from public 
consultation to regulatory assessment. One may argue that these two uses of bricolage 
have different moral implications on the basis that one reflects inclusion in the 
development process whilst the other is intended as a professional evaluation. Whilst I 
accept that such concerns offer a strong line for further study, I have decided not to 
pursue these differences further. I hold that such arguments pre-suppose a set of values 
and role for regulation that are not useful to the aims of this study i.e. by assuming that a 
new approach to regulation cannot be formed through transvaluative methods because 
regulations are based on universal values.  
 
This transvaluative approach to assessment might reduce the risks of manipulation. 
Without a known end-point, it would be difficult for actors to predict what the 
implications of this immanent assessment process might be. As a result, the decisions 
and the assessment of decisions would be based on the group of entities under 
consideration at any given point in time, rather than thinking about how those decisions 
might affect a final sustainable score.  
 
This presented a direction for developing a sustainable assessment method based on 
community consultation in the absence of a modelled concept, or a group like the BRE 
enforcing a modelled concept. This direction suggested: 
 
 Combining the assessments made as part of the design process and the 
assessments made to evaluate this design.  
 Consulting with the same actors in both design and evaluation assessments 
 Constructing this assessment in a way that avoids a pre-conceived end point, 
either in terms of what the design will become or what the evaluation of that 
design might mean 
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This first part of Research Stage A shows how concepts taken from the BREEAM 
assessments might be developed differently if they were developed through Deleuze’s 
ontological position rather than the essentialist stance underpinning modelled concepts.  
 
3. Research Stage A.2: Developing these ideas as a summary of the BRE method 
and an outline for a theoretical proposal. 
 
Up to this point in the thesis, I have presented, discussed and elaborated on a number of 
Deleuzian concepts and Deleuze-inspired ideas. I have shown how these concepts can 
be used to explain the design process (Chapter 2), to analyse and help us engage in a 
range of different spatial issues (Chapter 3) and to develop some of the concepts used in 
BREEAM to inform a new, non-essentialist assessment method (this Chapter).  
 
The aim of this sub-section is to bring these ideas together to provide a summary of the 
BRE assessment method from a Deleuzian perspective, and to present my proposals for 
a new, Deleuze-inspried method, which I have termed, ‘the Speculative and Immanent 
Assessment Method’ (SIAM).  
 
3.1. Deleuze’s concepts and a summary of the BRE Assessment Method (BREEAM).  
 
Objects and their properties.  
 
According to BRE forms of assessments, a building or city can be assessed as an object 
according to its discernible properties. In doing so, this approach to assessment does not 
consider how the design came to have these properties, the decisions that were made 
and the decisions that might be made in subsequent stages. In this sense, the point at 
which an assessment is undertaken, and the object that is assessed, is considered 
transcendental to the processes of actualisation. 
 
As I noted in Chapter 2, this approach is made possible because of the essentialist stance 
taken by the BRE, and, the relations of interiority that underpin essentialism (DeLanda, 
2002). As DeLanda notes, relations of interiority assume that a whole can be understood 
according to the cumulative properties of its components. This applies to all material 
and non-material entities and to different aspects of a building or city including: the 
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processes of design, the spaces that form this design, the materials that form these 
spaces and the methods used to assess the design. Looking at these in turn, a final 
building design is considered as a collection of partial stages, as captured in the RIBA 
stages of work, for example. The BRE use these stages to determine when an 
assessment should be undertaken. The collation of these stage-based assessments is then 
used to form conclusions about the building as a whole.  
 
Similarly, at each of these component stages, a building can be understood as a whole, 
formed from its components such as its rooms, its walls, the roof, foundations etc.  Each 
of these components can, in turn, be broken down into their components. Thus, the wall 
is considered as a whole, formed from bricks, blockwork, brick ties, insulation, 
plasterboard, screws, wet plaster skim and so forth. As shown in Figure 3 (Chapter 2) 
and Figure 4 (Chapter 4), the BRE use these material components as criteria within an 
essential trait of the sustainable home, building or community. This shows how the 
relations of interiority are related across different aspects to form a ‘holistic’ 
assessment.  
 
Referential model.  
 
Relations of interiority explain the construction of assessments based around a modelled 
concept, whilst Deleuze’s concept of the referential model helps explain the role this 
modelled concept plays in processes of design and assessment. By linking across 
different aspects of a building design, this referential model determines what a 
sustainable home, building or community is; what it should be made of; and how it 
should be designed. Because all buildings and urban schemes are judged against this 
model, any variation is considered as differences from the model. Likewise, all 
similarities are judged to be repetitions of this model.  
 
End points.  
 
The modelled concept serves as a preconceived, transcendental end point, broken down 
to form a value system. In BREEAM assessments this is the rating of a building as pass, 
good, very good, excellent, whilst in the Code for Sustainable Homes, this is broken 
into levels 1-6. The decision to reach a minimum rating on this value system is 
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determined before most of the design processes begins, and, thus, before assessing what 
entities form a site and project, or what the operational demands of these entities are or 
might become.  
 
3.2. Deleuze’s concepts and a proposal for a Speculative and Immanent Assessment 
Method (SIAM). 
 
Assemblages.  
 
A Deleuze-inspired, non-essentialist alternative form of assessment would approach the 
building and its actualisation in a very different way. Once constructed, a building or a 
city would be understood as an actualised assemblage. Drawing on Deleuze’s realist 
stance, this building or city assemblage would be treated as one of many assemblages 
forming the actual world around us. In this respect, a building or city assemblage has no 
ontological distinction from any other actualised assemblage and cannot be separated 
from them. This is because all assemblages are actualised according to relations of 
exteriority. In simple terms, this means that an assemblage operates in ways that are 
more than the summation of its parts. Thus, if we were asked what does a house 
assemblage do? We will gain little insight by listing the walls, bricks and slates that 
form the building, the people who live in the building or the assessments used to 
evaluate the building. These components do not explain how the building affects 
regeneration, the movement of people through a city, the effects on tourism, the 
movement of water through the ground or birds through the sky. Similarly, the entities 
that form the building assemblage do, and can do more than their role in the 
assemblage.  
 
Becomings and blocks of becoming.  
 
Rather than focusing on a modelled concept acting as a referential model, a Deleuzian 
assessment would focus on the processes of actualisation, or in this instance, the design 
process.  In Chapter 2, I used Deleuze’s ontological concepts of becoming and blocks of 
becoming to help make sense of this complex process.    
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I showed how, in simple terms, the design process is formed from a number of blocks of 
becoming, each based on, what architects might term, a ‘design problem’. Such blocks 
might include, a ‘becoming structurally stable of the design’, ‘becoming corrosion 
resistant of the steel’, ‘becoming concrete of the frame’ and so forth.  
 
To develop these blocks of becoming, a design team experiments with the entities in a 
developing building or urban design assemblage, as well as entities found in other, 
connected assemblages such as manufacturing assemblages, and transportation 
assemblages for example. Each of these experiments demand that the project team 
speculate and assess how such entities might help resolve the ‘design problem’ under 
consideration, or, in Deleuzian terms, how their becomings contribute to the broader 
block of becoming. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are some instances in which 
these assessments might lead to significant changes in the design, re-directing the 
design process along a new block of becoming. In other instances this process of 
speculation and assessment might identify new ‘design problems’, which also result in a 
new set of experiments directed along a new block of becoming. 
 
To assess this process in terms of sustainability, a Deleuzian assessment would be 
positioned within the design process itself. This immanent form of assessment would be 
undertaken by members of the design team rather than an external assessor. As in the 
design process itself, members of the design team would be encouraged to speculate 
how the entities they bring together, and the experiments they develop might have the 
potential to become sustainable. In this sense, this assessment acts as a broad becoming 
sustainable block running through the entire design process.  
 
Unlike essentialist forms of assessment, the concept of sustainability is used as an empty 
signifier. As such, its meaning is not determined in advance, but, rather is derived from 
within the process itself. To illustrate this immanent and speculative form of 
environmental assessment I return again to the extracts from practice discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Drawing on this example, I noted that the design team had decided to 
change the design from a steel structural frame to a concrete structural frame in 
response to a number of factors, including the corrosive tendencies of airborne salt from 
the sea. Because the building was assessed using a modelled concept-based 
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environmental assessment (the Code for Sustainable Homes), this decision was deemed 
unsustainable, owing to the higher CO2 emissions of concrete over steel.  
 
Using an immanent and speculative form of assessment, CO2 emissions would be seen 
as a potential ‘to become sustainable’. However, it would not be seen as the only 
potential to become sustainable within this area of the design.  Other becomings would 
be drawn from factors taken into account during the design process. Thus, whilst CO2 
emissions offered a potential to ‘become sustainable’ blocked by the introduction of 
concrete, this same decision encouraged other potentials to ‘become sustainable’, such 
as those associated with reduced maintenance (necessary if the steel was to resist the 
long term corrosive tendencies of airborne salt); reduced depths of insulation (owing to 
the improved thermal properties of concrete over steel); reduced contractor programme, 
road closures and the number of tradesmen working on site (owing to a structural design 
that could support poor ground stability as well as an above ground building structure). 
All these potentials to become sustainable, offer different meanings of the concept. 
Taking this into consideration, an immanent and speculative form of environmental 
assessment might have concluded that the decision to use a concrete frame rather than a 
steel frame encouraged more sustainable becomings than it blocked, thus judging this 
decision favourably. 
 
A project team’s capacity to identify and assess becomings, either as part of a design 
process or a sustainable assessment process, is limited by their imagination. For a 
Deleuzian assessment to operate effectively, it is important that every effort is made to 
encourage these actors to ‘stretch’ their imagination as far away from the actual as 
possible, or what Hillier termed, to ‘stretch beyond the horizon’. But there will always 
be a number of potentials (becomings) that cannot be imagined: what one might term, 
‘un-speculatable potentials’31. These potentials emerge during the process of 
actualisation. In the same example, ground surveys revealed deep sand strata below the 
site, aspects of the design became the focus of local concern resulting in a number of 
planning objections, the price of steel rose considerably between the initial sketch 
design and the detailed planning application, a report was published that highlighted the 
damaging effects caused by seagulls to rubber-based roofing membranes used on 
                                                     
31 See my review of Hillier’s study in Chapter 3. 
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coastal buildings (Wells, 2007). Each of these events emerged during the design process 
and revealed potentials that affected the design. Thus, an immanent and speculative 
form of sustainable assessment would need to assess how the design responded to these 
un-speculatable potentials by asking what sustainable becomings were encouraged or 
blocked as a consequence of the emerging event and the corresponding design change.  
 
This brief description illuminates the differences between a modelled concept-based 
form of assessment (BREEAM) and a Deleuze-inspired form of assessment (SIAM).  
This distinction is captured in Table 10 below.  
 
Table 10: Distinction between the BRE assessment method and the proposed 
Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method (SIAM). 
 BRE SIAM 
O
n
to
lo
g
ic
a
l 
fr
a
m
ew
o
rk
 
Essentialist Pragmatist (in a Deleuzian sense) 
Modelled concept of ‘the 
sustainable home, office’ etc 
A block of becoming ‘sustainable’, 
where sustainability is an empty 
signifier 
Transcendental process Immanent process 
Referential model Speculated potentials  
Building as a whole defined by 
its properties 
Building as assemblage formed of 
actualised potentials 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
in
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
 
Assessment process is separate or 
parallel with design process 
Assessment is part of / inseparable 
from design process 
Assessment undertaken at pre-
determined stages of the design 
No pre-determined stages for 
assessment. Assessment undertaken 
when member of the project team 
feels a key or difficult design 
decisions is made during the design 
process 
Assessment by external assessor Assessment by members of the 
project team 
Assessment results in a score 
judged against a universal value 
Assessment results in an ongoing 
record of key design decisions, the 
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system (valuative) entities that were instrumental to that 
design decision and how the decision 
encouraged or blocked their potentials 
to be become sustainable 
(transvaluative) 
Sustainability score acts as a 
benchmark that the design must 
achieve   
There is no benchmark. Each decision 
is judged as more or less sustainable 
according to the complex factors that 
contributed to the decisions taken 
during the process. 
One sustainability score is used 
to explain the sustainability of the 
scheme as a whole 
No attempt to explain the 
sustainability of the design as a 
whole. Rather, a series of connected 
assessments that show how a building 
was actualised through a series of 
decisions judged as more or less 
sustainable.  
 The score as benchmark is 
enforced as a condition of 
planning approval or a condition 
of a client’s brief. This ensures 
that the project team work in 
ways that are deemed 
‘sustainable’ (through the 
essentialist understanding of the 
term). 
How would SIAM be introduced into 
current practice?  
How would SIAM ensure that the 
project team prioritised speculations 
for becoming sustainable in the 
design process? 
 
Table 10 summarises some of the points raised above concerning the distinction 
between BRE assessments and SIAM. The table is separated into two sections. The first 
section, ‘ontological framework’, captures some of the concepts drawn from, expanded 
and (re)created from Deleuze’s philosophy to suit the unique demands of sustainable 
assessment, whilst the second section starts to think about how these ideas might play-
out in practice. This transition is important because it highlights the key issue guiding 
this thesis: the practical, usefulness of Deleuze’s philosophy in planning. Looking along 
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this second section, this table shows how I used Deleuze’s ontological framework to 
create a new assessment tool. However, the final row highlights two questions that must 
be resolved if this tool is to be made viable:  
 
 How would SIAM be introduced into current practice?  
 How would SIAM ensure that the project team prioritised speculations for 
becoming sustainable in the design process? 
 
To answer these questions, and to expand and develop Table 10, I explored another area 
of assessment practice affecting the way architects, masterplanners and planners form 
design decisions. In the UK, all project designs are subject to Health and Safety 
assessments as set out by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and defined by the 
Construction and Design Management regulations (CDM), 2007 (HSE, 2007).  
 
Unlike BREEAM, this regulatory framework is not constructed around an essentialist 
definition, such as the ‘safe design’. Indeed, as in my proposed SIAM, the CDM 
regulations suggest that assessment should be undertaken as part of / within the design 
process, through speculations about what might become of the design if constructed. In 
this sense, the CDM form of assessment is much closer to the speculative, Deleuze-
inspired approach to assessment outlined above.  
 
4. Research Stage A.3. Developing the proposal by drawing on other forms of 
assessment used in the design process.  
 
The first CDM regulations were introduced in 1995 in response to the EU directive, 
92/57/EEC on the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at 
temporary or mobile construction sites (HSE, 1994; CEC, 1992). These regulations 
intended to reduce deaths and injuries during the construction and management process 
by changing the procedures used by associated professionals. The CDM regulations 
were revised in 2007 (HSE, 2007) and are likely to be revised further in 2014 (ICS, 
2012). These latest revisions are intended to reduce perceived bureaucracy and to form 
closer links with EU directive, 92/57/EEC, as set out in the Lofstedt report (Lofstedt, 
2011). 
 
168 
 
In the following, I will provide a brief overview of current CDM regulations and 
proposed revisions using the three points identified above as sub-headings. As part of 
this review I will discuss the compatibility of these points against a Deleuze-inspired 
theoretical framework and as part of a practicable assessment method. The results of 
this exercise will be used to consider which, if any, of these ideas could be usefully 
incorporated into SIAM, and what the implications of this would be in terms of 
Deleuze’s usefulness to forming a viable tool for practice. The resulting proposal will be 
used to expand and develop Table 10 above (see Table 11).  
 
Assessment during the design process.  
 
The CDM regulations ‘integrate health and safety into the management of the project’ 
both in terms of management of the design process and the construction process (HSE, 
2007: 7). The intention of which is, 
 
…to focus attention on planning and management throughout construction 
projects, from design concept onwards... to ensure that health and safety 
issues are identified, integrated into the overall design process and 
addressed as they go along. (HSE, 2007: 7; 32 emphasis added).  
 
Whilst approached from a practice-based rather than a theoretical angle, this proposal 
for a form of assessment undertaken as part of, and within the design process, or what 
Deleuze might have termed, an ‘immanent’ form of assessment, reflects the broad 
objectives captured in SIAM.  
 
Speculations.  
 
Under the CDM regulations, all designers have a legal duty to ensure that every effort is 
made to reduce foreseeable health and safety risks in their proposed design. There are 
no formal mechanisms used to enforce this obligation. As the HSE note: 
 
risk assessment of a design should be integral to, and evolve with, the 
design work itself.  Every design is different, and every design will require a 
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degree of calculation, assessment, review and the proper exercise of 
judgement. (HSE, no date).   
 
These risk assessments are constructed for a specific project or for a specific practice 
(HSE, no date), and are intended to help the designer speculate foreseeable risks and 
measures to reduce these risks. This idea of the foreseeable versus the unforeseeable 
risk is captured in the regulations which note that,  
 
Designers are required to avoid foreseeable risks ‘so far as is reasonably 
practicable, taking due account of other relevant design considerations’. The 
greater the risk, the greater the weight that must be given to eliminating or 
reducing it. Designers are not expected to consider or address risks which 
cannot be foreseen, and the Regulations do not require zero risk designs 
because this is simply impossible (HSE, 2007: 32). 
 
Whilst expressed differently, this reference to foreseeable and unforeseeable risks 
captures the two areas of speculated potential discussed by Hillier i.e. the potentials that 
one can imagine (speculated potentials) and those that one cannot imagine 
(unspeculated potentials). As I argued above, the latter occurs when the design team do 
not have sufficient information about assemblages in the project to make these 
speculations, or because they were not accounted for in the early stages of the design.   
 
Another area of compatibility with a Deleuze-inspired approach can be seen in the way 
these speculations are formed. The HSE suggest that the CDM 
 
 …regulations do not prescribe design outcomes [or pre-defined end-points 
such as those captured in the BREEAM coding system], but they do require 
designers to weigh the various factors and reach reasoned, professional 
decisions (HSE, 2007: 32).  
 
Whilst the CDM regulations do not rule out the use of referential models entirely, this 
comment rejects the idea that such referential models should determine when an 
assessment should be undertaken or how speculations should be formed and judged. 
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In Deleuzian terms, the CDM 2007 regulations suggest that assessment should be seen 
as a constant process of speculation of potentials to become safe (or unsafe). The 
decision to capture these speculations as a separate document (ie a risk assessment) is 
determined by the designer. Whilst there is no formal guidance available for making this 
decision, the assessment process incorporates two mechanisms to ensure that risk 
assessments are undertaken at key points in the design: by incorporating risk 
assessments across all overlapping design elements, and by introducing a CDM Co-
ordinator role. These two mechanisms are discussed below. 
 
Assessment by members of the project team.  
 
In CDM 2007, the legal responsibility to reduce health and safety risks to the best of 
their ability and judgement is applicable to all members of the project team including 
the designers, the client, the contractor and associated building trades. To operationalise 
this responsibility, each designer is expected to undertake a risk assessment within the 
limitations of their design proposal and to consider how their proposals might impact on 
other, associated aspects of the design or management of the building. Thus, the 
architect would assess the risks associated with the design of a particular roof 
configuration and how this might introduce or mitigate the risks associated with 
erecting, maintaining or replacing this roof. They must also consider how this design 
affects the risks associated with the structural engineer’s proposed design for the steel 
frame used to support this roof, who will, in turn consider the risks associated with 
fabricating the frame, bringing it to site and erecting the frame. The structural 
engineer’s risk assessment will also consider other aspects of the design such as how the 
proposed steel frame effects the risks associated with the ductwork design proposed by 
the mechanical and electrical consultant and so forth. Because these overlaps must be 
discussed between different groups of designers, the assessment of risk, and the 
speculations that form these assessments are subject to constant review within the 
design team. 
 
A more formal mechanism for identifying key areas of the design for assessment, and 
the speculations used in this assessment can be seen in the role played by the CDM Co-
ordinator. Unlike the assessor described in BREEAM and the Code for Sustainable 
Homes, this CDM Co-ordinator is described in the 2007 regulations as a member of the 
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project team whose principle tasks are, to facilitate co-operation and co-ordination in 
matters of health and safety in the design process, to liaise with the principle contractor 
on design matters as they arise and to prepare and update the health and safety file.  
 
During the design process, the CDM Co-ordinator ensures that members of the design 
team speculate potential health and safety risks (becoming unsafe) through all areas of 
decision making. They work with these designers to identify areas where, and how, such 
speculated risks can be reduced. They ensure that the risks assessments record these 
speculated risks, the way the design responds to these risks and why the resulting design 
is considered the most appropriate solution.  
 
The CDM Co-ordinator discusses this developing sequence of assessments with 
different members of the design team as well as the contractor team. In doing so, they 
can ensure that the resulting design accounts for a range of speculations, both in terms 
of what might become of the building when complete, but also what might become of 
the building as it is being constructed. To illustrate this process, I would like to draw on 
one of my experiences from architectural practice.  
 
In 2010, I acted as one of several architects on a large school design. During the detailed 
design stage, the design team considered a number of options for the external wall 
construction. The two principle options were: masonry construction designed with a 
brick outer leaf, and a part masonry construction with an external cladding system. To 
decide which of these was most suitable, we speculated a number of potentials to 
become durable (bricks are more resistant to the wear and tear associated with the 
building type), to become structurally stable (brick construction offers greater lateral 
stability than cladding panels), to become cost effective (bricks are cheaper, both in 
terms of material and labour costs) to become easier and faster to construct (setting out 
brickwork on site is easier than setting out cladding panels) etc. In the risk assessment, 
we focused on potentials to become safe / unsafe. We noted the risks that might result if 
the design required a number of trades working in the same space at the same time 
(brick layers erecting both leafs rather than combining bricklayers and cladding panel 
specialists), the reduced demand for heavy machinery to erect brickwork rather than 
cladding, the reduced maintenance and thus the reduced risks associated with 
replacement or repair of brickwork over cladding etc. After discussing these options and 
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reasons with the CDM co-ordinator, it was agreed that brick was a design solution with 
a lower safety risk than all other, viable options.  
 
However, the CDM Co-ordinator’s consultation with the Principle Contractor 
introduced other speculations not considered during the design process. Building a large 
brick wall requires prolonged use of scaffolding. Working from scaffolding increases 
the risks of falling during construction and the risks of falling from an unattended site 
(ie by possible tress-passers). Measures to reduce these risks also affect other 
becomings within the design process. They extend the construction programme and 
limit the ways in which the school can operate during the construction process. Taking 
these points into consideration, it was later agreed that a brick-slip cladding system ie a 
system that uses small sections of brick fixed to a cold steel frame, would be used. This 
system could be erected and maintained using cherry-pickers around the perimeter. 
 
This short example shows how the CDM Co-ordinator worked as part of the project 
team, encouraging different members of that team to speculate potential risks associated 
with their area of knowledge and to bring these speculations together. Similar 
observations are identified in broader literature. In interviews with contractors, Atkinson 
and Westall note how one  interviewee believed that using such processes ‘allowed the 
contractor to educate the designers to look at the design from a site safety point of view’ 
(Atkinson and Westall, 2010).  
 
This short overview of CDM forms of assessment shows areas of compatibility with the 
three ideas used to structure SIAM: a form of assessment based on speculations; a form 
of assessment made as part of, within the design process (immanent); and a form of 
assessment made by members of the design team rather than an external assessor. In 
doing so, CDM provides some directions for responding to the two questions left 
unanswered above. With this in mind, the following table draws on CDM to expand and 
develop the comparison between BREEAM and SIAM. For the sake of clarity, additions 
to the table are shown as italicised text.  
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Table 11: Developing the distinction between the Building Research Establishment 
Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) and the proposed Speculative and 
Immanent Assessment Method (SIAM). 
 BRE  SIAM 
O
n
to
lo
g
ic
a
l 
fr
a
m
ew
o
rk
 
Essentialist Pragmatist (in a Deleuzian sense) 
Modelled concept of ‘the 
sustainable home, office’ etc 
A block of becoming ‘sustainable’, 
where sustainability is an empty 
signifier 
Transcendental process Immanent process 
Referential model Speculated potentials  
Building as whole object defined 
by its properties 
Building as assemblage formed of 
actualised potentials 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
in
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
 
Assessment process is separate 
from design process 
Assessment is part of / inseparable 
from design process 
Assessment undertaken at pre-
determined stages of the design 
No pre-determined stages for 
assessment. Assessment undertaken 
when member of the project team 
feels a key or difficult design 
decisions is made during the design 
process 
Assessment by external assessor Assessment by members of the project 
team. Each member of the project 
team undertakes an assessment based 
on their own contribution. The only 
exception being the addition of a 
Sustainability Assessment Co-
ordinator whose role is to ensure co-
operation and co-ordination between 
assessments and to encourage 
designers to prioritise sustainable 
speculations in their proposals. 
Assessment results in a score 
judged against a universal value 
Assessment results in an ongoing 
record of key design decisions, the 
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system (valuative) entities that were instrumental to that 
design decision and how the decision 
encouraged or blocked their potentials 
to be become sustainable 
(transvaluative). These assessments 
are compiled by the Sustainable 
Assessment Co-ordinator. 
Sustainability score acts as a 
benchmark that the design must 
achieve   
There is no benchmark. Each decision 
is judged as more or less sustainable 
according to the complex factors that 
contributed to the decisions taken 
during its actualisation.  
One sustainability score is used 
to explain the sustainability of the 
scheme as a whole 
No attempt to explain the 
sustainability of the design as a whole. 
Rather, a series of connected 
assessments that show how a building 
was actualised through a series of 
decisions judged as more or less 
sustainable This series of assessments 
are compiled during the design 
process. 
 The score as benchmark is 
enforced as a condition of 
planning approval or a condition 
of a client’s brief. This ensures 
that the project team work in 
ways that are deemed 
‘sustainable’ (through the 
essentialist understanding of the 
term). 
How would SIAM be introduced into 
current practice?  
How would SIAM ensure that the 
project team prioritised speculations 
for becoming sustainable in the design 
process?: 
One possibility is to introduce a 
formal duty applicable to all members 
of the project team to ensure that 
every effort is made to make the most 
of, or account for foreseeable 
potentials to become sustainable. This 
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could be a legal duty as in CDM or a 
condition of planning  
 There are no formal, referential 
models that determine how this duty 
should be met. Thus, SIAM provides 
only a broad framework open to 
adaptation. In this instance, all 
members of the project team would be 
encouraged to undertake sustainable 
assessments throughout the project. 
The role of encouragement and co-
ordination would be the responsibility 
of the Sustainability Assessment Co-
ordinator who would be appointed 
from within the project team. 
 
5. Research Stage A.4. Setting out a practical proposal.  
 
The aim of this final sub-stage was to ‘translate’ the theoretical proposals for SIAM 
from Table 11 into a practical proposal that could be understood and operationalised by 
practitioners whose knowledge of Deleuze’s philosophy might be very limited. To do 
this, I set out a brief presentation of SIAM, and how it might be operationalised and 
institutionalised in practice. This presentation is set out as a series of numbered 
statements used to generate data in interviews. These interviews are presented in 
Research Stage B.  
 
1. SIAM is described as an ‘immanent’ form of assessment because it is designed to be 
part of / within the design process.  
2. SIAM recognises that assessments are already part of / within the design process. To 
form a design decision, a designer must identify important factors affecting the scheme 
and assess their potential contribution. 
The SIAM aims to bring these design-based assessments into the foreground of 
assessment methodology. 
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3. SIAM recognises that these assessments in the design process are not made in isolation. 
Assessments based on sustainability, must be balanced against other goals such as the 
‘cost effective building’, the ‘structurally stable building’, the ‘innovative building’, the 
‘building that meets user requirements’ etc  
The SIAM focuses on one of these aims ‘the sustainable building’, but encourages 
assessors to discuss the way other goals impact on a design decision. 
4. SIAM recognises that a sustainable solution in one building may be deemed less 
sustainable for another. This is because there are different ways of thinking about 
sustainability: as longevity, CO2 emissions, maintenance demands etc. SIAM also 
understands that all materials used in a design make a unique contribution to the scheme 
and to different understandings of ‘the sustainable building / urban design’.   
The SIAM is conceived to allow for these different ways of thinking about 
sustainability and for the different ways in which parts of a design might contribute to 
these understandings. 
5. SIAM recognises that designers do not conceive a building or urban design as a 
coherent whole but rather as a collection of design decisions that work together. 
The SIAM is thus conceived as a collection of assessments made for each key decision 
as and when they arise. 
6. SIAM recognises that these decisions and the assessments that form these decisions are 
complex and are best understood by the person who made them: the designer. 
SIAM aims to avoid any distinction between the designer and the assessor. It does this 
by making each member of the design team responsible for assessing their own 
contribution to the building or urban design. Thus, each designer must decide which 
areas of the design process should be assessed, which factors are important to the 
assessment and how these factors contributed to a sustainable design. 
7. SIAM is offered as a ‘speculative’ method of assessment because it recognises that all 
design decisions are made speculatively ie about a building or an urban design that may 
or may not exist in the future. It recognises that these speculations are made with no 
way to be sure whether they will materialise and no way of knowing whether all 
important factors have been accounted for and assessed accordingly. 
The SIAM aims to capture this speculative approach. It does not assess a building based 
on the properties of a final proposal. Rather, it aims to assess a design decision based on 
speculations made by a designer concerning potentials to become sustainable, how the 
designer assesses these speculations and uses them to influence their design. 
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To illustrate how a SIAM assessment might be carried out in practice, the following 
points sketch out a sequence of events based on a traditional appointment and 
procurement route as defined by the RIBA. Other variations of this sequence based on 
other forms of appointment or procurement routes would need to be explored in future 
research. 
 
8. During the early briefing stages of a design (RIBA stage A), the lead designer will 
inform the planning department that they will undertake a SIAM assessment rather than 
a BREEAM or CSH assessment. This marks the beginning of the assessment process.  
9. The client or the lead designer is appointed as the Sustainability Assessment Co-
ordinator. This role may or may not be transferred to a different member of the project 
team as the project moves through subsequent stages of design development. This may 
be particularly useful in the detailed design stages during which other members of the 
team may have a key role in the design process.  
10. As the design develops, the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator encourages 
designers to continuously assess the sustainability of a scheme and balance these against 
other assessments such as those based on cost, user requirements, health and safety etc. 
On larger projects this may be best undertaken through regular design team meetings, 
on smaller projects this may be done in-house through regular, informal discussions 
between staff.  
11. Regular discussion with the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator helps the designer 
to decide when an assessment should be undertaken.  
12. Such assessments are most beneficial when the designer feels that a design combines 
and negotiates different definitions of sustainability made possible through the selection 
of different materials.  
13. To form this assessment the designer is encouraged to follow three rough stages: 
 
Stage 1: Identify entities in the project.  
 
14. The designer undertakes a ‘mapping exercise’ of all the entities that constitute the 
design ‘problem’. These will include a range of material entities such as site conditions, 
or other aspects of the building / urban design. But it will also contain non-material 
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entities such as key areas of the design brief, planning guidance, survey 
recommendations.  
 
Stage 2: Speculation  
 
15. In the second stage of assessment, the designer is encouraged to make a note of their 
speculations. These will concern questions such as, what do these entities do currently? 
What else might they do if they were part of this scheme? In what way is this 
sustainable? How does this affect other goals for the project, such as cost efficiency, 
meeting user requirements etc? 
 
Stage 3: Discussion  
 
16. In the third stage of assessment, designers are encouraged to discuss the way in which 
they tackled these speculations: which speculations from stage 2 were taken forward 
and which were not? Why? What benefits were thought to result from this decision? 
How did they affect other areas of the design and how were these accommodated? And, 
most importantly, after taking these things into consideration, why they believe this to 
be the most sustainable solution for the scheme. 
17. This assessment is then discussed with the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator. 
During this discussion, the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator introduces 
speculations that have not been considered by the designer. These speculations are 
drawn from other areas of the design being assessed by other members of the design 
team. These discussions may result in no changes to the assessment / design, revisions 
of the design or to highlight areas for future revision / review as the design develops 
further.  
18. Once agreed in principle, the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator adds the 
assessment to the sustainability assessment file, which can be accessed by all members 
of the project team at any given stage in the design process.  
19. The sustainability assessment file is discussed in early planning consultation with the 
planning officer and discussions with the building regulation officer or appointed 
inspector during detailed design stages. During these consultations, the planning officer 
or building regulation officer is also asked to speculate potentials and to discuss these 
with the Sustainability Assessment Co-ordinator.  
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20. These discussions are noted in the file and sent to relevant members of the project team 
for subsequent amendments of the assessment.  
21. All sustainability assessments are collated by the Sustainable Assessment Co-ordinator 
and submitted as a supporting document in the formal planning application and later as 
a supporting document in a full plans building regulation submission. 
 
6. Conclusion to Research Stage A. 
 
In my review of the three Deleuze-inspired voices, Bonta, Halsey and Hillier I 
suggested that to make Deleuze’s philosophy useful, one must be prepared to (re)create 
his ontological concepts to respond to the specific demands of a given field of interest. 
Failure to do so, I argued, left gaps and problems in the resulting theoretical framework. 
This pragmatic approach has served as the methodology for the first of two Research 
stages in this thesis. The results of this theoretical exercise discussed in this chapter 
suggest that Deleuze’s concepts can be adapted to inform a new, non-essentialist tool 
for assessing the sustainability of building and urban designs. This research stage also 
shows that, to make this transition, one must identify opportunities for adaptation from 
within the field, within other related fields as well as within broader Deleuzian 
scholarship. 
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Chapter 8: Results for Research Stage B  
 
1.  Aim and structure of the chapter. 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of Research stage B across the two Delphi 
rounds of data generation, and considers how these findings relate to the ideas presented 
in Deleuze’s philosophy.  
 
This chapter is structured into two parts, corresponding with the two-part structure used 
in the interviews: existing BRE forms of assessment, and the proposals for SIAM. 
Within these two sections, the data is compiled, analysed and discussed according to 
two themes emerging from the data generated in the first Delphi round of interviews and 
expanded in the second Delphi, feedback round: 
 
Theme A: The relationship between sustainability assessments and the design process 
Theme B: The relationship between national targets and specific contexts 
 
These two themes are discussed in turn according to three sub-sections:   
 
i. The identification of a problem,  
ii. Comments and speculations about the factors causing or exacerbating the 
problem 
iii. Speculations about ways to adapt BRE assessments / SIAM to resolve the 
problem  
 
In each sub-section, I bring together the initial findings from the interviews in the first 
Delphi round, highlight any significant points raised in the second Delphi round, and 
identify parts of the data that demonstrate agreement or disagreement with Deleuze’s 
ontological framework. 
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2. The data: observations, comments and speculations about BRE assessments. 
 
2.1. Theme A: The relationship between sustainability assessments and the design 
process. 
 
2.1.1. The identification of a problem. 
 
All respondents
32
 in the first Dephi round noted that, in practice, the design process and 
the process of assessing a building or urban design through BRE forms of assessment 
are highly disconnected. Respondents saw BRE assessments as the principle source of 
this disconnection, describing them as ‘a series of questions that you have to tick or 
cross … a very literal way of trying to extrapolate what is a very complex process’ (R1); 
something that ‘does not relate to what they (designers, contractors etc) do in the project 
team’ (R2); something ‘impractical’(R5); something that is ‘only based on stuff that you 
can measure’ (R7); something that is ‘back to front in terms of the design process’  
(R8); something that ‘stops the building doing what it is supposed to do’ (R9); a 
‘standalone element… quite isolated’ (R10). Whilst using different terms, these 
comments suggest that this problem is evident to professionals working in the field of 
design and development, as well as those working in the field of assessment and 
regulation. 
 
Drawing on their observations from practice, all of the respondents went on to identify 
instances in which design solutions were introduced to achieve assessment points rather 
than to meet the functional, contextual, budgetary or long term maintenance 
considerations of a project. Two of these respondents suggested that some schemes 
were designed to meet BREEAM or CSH levels with the prior knowledge that they 
would be re-designed following planning approval (R7, R11). One of these respondents 
referred to such schemes as ‘fake’ master plans (R7).  
 
The other eight respondents focused on entities introduced into a scheme to increase the 
assessment rating. These included the introduction of solar panels, bat boxes, bird 
tables, cycle hoops, bike sheds, compost bins and home offices. Drawing on their 
                                                     
32 Of the 11 respondents only 10 were used as the basis for analysis. The reasons for this 
are explained in Chapter 6 
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experiences and opinions, these respondents suggested that the following problems 
might result from such measures:   
 
 The resulting design might have a larger overall carbon footprint  
 Such measures might be used to offset very poor design decisions, especially 
given that assessments do not penalise bad decisions. 
 Such measures might clash with the architect’s professional duty to the client to 
meet their project brief and to achieve the best possible value for money  
 These measures might impose difficult long-term issues concerning maintenance 
and use 
 Introducing such measures might limit the design or financial viability of 
achieving broader objectives, such as providing the number of homes needed to 
meet housing demand  
 Such measures often clash with other regulations. This may cause difficulties in 
the design process and introduce delays to the programme / funding.  
 
In their appraisal of these speculations, all respondents noted that assessment-driven 
design changes shifted the design away from, what they held to be, a ‘sustainable’ 
scheme. Respondents offered different understandings of sustainability including, 
sustainability as holistic carbon footprint, longevity, functionality, reasonable 
judgement, time efficiency etc and noted that such definitions were not accounted for in 
existing BRE assessments. This range of definitions supports the argument 
underpinning the SIAM proposal and Deleuze’s non-essentialist ontology more broadly.  
 
2.1.2. Comments and speculations about the factors causing or exacerbating the 
problem. 
 
The data points to three underlying issues that respondents believe are causing or 
exacerbating the disconnection between the design process and existing BRE 
assessment processes.  
 
1. The construction of BRE assessments: Some of the comments are directed at the 
principles used to construct BRE assessments. 
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2. The use of BRE assessments: The data also suggests that, in some instances, 
respondents see the problems resulting from use more than from construction. 
3. Inherent differences in skills and knowledge: The data also points to an inherent 
difference between the skills and knowledge particular to assessors and 
designers. 
These three points are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
The construction of BRE assessments: 
 
Four of the respondents interviewed in the first Delphi round suggested that the 
disconnection between design and assessment might be owing to the difference between 
a flexible design process and an inflexible assessment method. In the second Delphi 
round R2, for example, comments: 
 
I think the main reason it (the CSH assessment) is treated as separate is due 
to the lack of flexibility within the assessment. A one size fits all solution 
does not produce good designs. You need to have a holistic view of the site, 
the end user and client's aspiration and attitude.  
 
One respondent, working in a design role, also noted that most designers start by 
identifying a specific problem in the scheme and explore ways of resolving that problem 
through the design. The fixed nature of the assessment, they added, means that this 
individual design solution cannot be assessed without taking account of the building as 
a whole, which, in many instances, is not practical or appropriate (R8).  
 
Given these limitations, two respondents describe such assessments as ‘blunt tools / 
instruments’. R7, for example, discusses an instance in which BRE-like criteria were 
used to evaluate a scheme during a judicial review. After considering the evidence 
presented by the assessors the inspector, 
 
…threw it out completely, and when they gave their evidence first he said, 
‘Look, I’m going to have to stop you there because these design criteria 
tools are too blunt an instrument because they don’t take into account 
building programme. The urban criteria for a supermarket is different to a 
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library, or a hospital’. And suddenly it was like a breath of fresh air that 
somebody else got it. That architecture cannot be stamped with a generic 
solution. Every building is different. (R7) 
This experience and commentary demonstrates R7’s frustration with an assessment tool 
that he believes is unable to capture the uniqueness and complexity of the design 
process. R10 expresses a similar frustration with the BREEAM criteria: 
 
… that isn’t to say that a BREEAM rated building isn’t sustainable but I 
don’t think it is optimised. You can spend money getting the points. There 
are other things that you could do, which in terms of sustainability would 
represent better value for money, but you might not get the points so it’s just 
blunt, that’s all (R9). 
 
In both instances, R7 and R9 suggest that sustainable assessments like BREEAM are 
‘blunt’ because they are based on measurable traits to the exclusion of other issues in 
both the design, and use of the building. Such issues include the judgement made by 
designers in an effort to achieve ‘a good compromise between (different)… criteria’ 
(R9) as well as the way it will be used when it is ‘up and running’ and whether people 
will be happy using the building (R7).  
 
These arguments against a standard ‘one-size fits all’ assessment method found in the  
data captures Deleuze’s stance against the referential model, articulated most strongly in 
Difference and Repetition (see Chapter 2). Like Deleuze, these respondents suggest that 
designs should not be assessed as ‘repetitions of’ a model, or judged as ‘differences to’ 
a model, but as a unique response to context.  
 
The use of BRE assessments: 
 
The comments above suggest that the problems associated with referential models are 
mainly found in the assessments used to evaluate an otherwise complex and unique 
design (such as BRE assessments). However, contrary to R7’s remark that ‘architecture 
cannot be stamped with a generic solution’, the data shows that the use of standard, 
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referential models are as influential in the design process as they are in the assessment 
methods used to assess the design.  
 
R2 notes that many large, private developer clients have developed ‘standard house-
types’ (R2) that capture all the requirements of the BRE assessment and use these across 
all sites. Three of these respondents believed that these standard house-types are the 
results of standardised design, development and procurement processes used by this 
particular sector. These were described as ‘a production line’ (R1), a ‘set’ process (R2) 
and ‘generic’ process (R7), but also as a manipulative process, particularly of the 
planning system (R7).   
 
On the face of it, these critiques of ‘standard designs’ and ‘standard processes’ suggest 
parallels with the critique of standard models of assessment noted above. Indeed, R6 
suggests that they are partly constructed in response to assessments criteria used by the 
BRE: 
 
Those regulations lead the design decisions so much of the time. We are 
often stood on site and we ask, does that comply with Secure By Design or 
Lifetime Homes? And that is the decision process. It’s not about whether its 
right for the site and the end user, it’s just about complying with this or that. 
So you are completely led. We are forever saying that aren’t we? (R6) 
 
However, the data suggests that the problems associated with standard, referential 
models are not derived from this link alone. As some of the comments above 
demonstrate, most respondents hold that the problems associated with standard designs 
and processes can be traced to a very specific area of the construction industry: private, 
commercial developments. R1, for example, notes that,  
 
…housebuilders work very much on a production line process. Their 
procurement is based on an end product and anything new that you bring in 
basically derails what is a very fixed procurement process. … they would 
just find what the cheapest way of doing it was. 
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Many of the respondents interviewed in the first Delphi round support the link R1 
makes between the creation and use of standard models and a private, commercial 
companies’ objective to make profit. However, the data suggests that referential models 
are not used to design private, profit-making schemes alone. During an interview with 
two professionals working for a not-for-profit housing development company, it was 
noted that   
 
…things like kitchens, tiles, door handles, boilers – anything that our 
maintenance team will need to replace on a day-to-day basis. These are 
standardised. This is better for us than having a different spec in every 
house.  (R5,6) 
 
This quotation demonstrates that standardised interior designs and specifications are 
also used by not-for-profit development companies to reduce maintenance costs. Thus, 
whilst referential models are used by profit and not-for profit groups alike, many 
respondents only identify the former as problematic. The difference, it seems, revolves 
around an apparent distinction between ‘making profit’ and ‘making cost-savings’.  
 
Later in the interview, R5 and R6 offer some indications as to why these two becomings 
(becoming profit and becoming cost-saving) are viewed differently. 
 
(R5): We’d like to design the schemes so you can walk down the road and 
not distinguish tenant types. So we want our schemes to be tenure blind. 
(R6): …So a private developer will put their emphasis on profit whereas 
ours will be on social value and providing the things we are most proud of 
like sustainability. As long as it breaks even, that is our only financial 
interest. We don’t need to make a profit on it. Our emphasis as a business is 
about adding value and social benefits rather than making money.  
 
In this quotation, R6 suggests that the design of commercial schemes is problematic 
because the referential models used to determine the design, development and 
procurement process are dominated by a singular objective: to make profit, or in 
Deleuzian terms, by a single block of becoming formed from a becoming profit of the 
scheme. In contrast, referential models used in not-for-profit schemes are conceived as a 
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way to make cost-savings which facilitate and supports other objectives, or, in 
Deleuzian terms, a block of becoming that encourages the actualisation of other 
becomings such as becoming tenure blind (equal), becoming sustainable and becoming 
socially responsible. 
 
From a Deleuzian perspective, this argument against profit confuses the ontological role 
played by the concept of becomings and the concept of machines. For Deleuze, a 
potential to make profit in itself cannot block other potentials. After all, a potential to 
make profit has also contributed to the actualisation of the bricks, slates and concrete 
used to construct the not-for-profit, social housing discussed by R5 and R6, as well as 
the actualisation of the consultancy and construction companies designing and building 
the schemes.  
 
In Deleuze’s ontology, the filtering of one potential over another is determined by 
machines (Halsey, 2006). In this instance, Deleuze would argue that R5’s critique 
against private developments is a critique of several concrete machines: standard house 
types and standard design processes. Given that these are found in commercial and not-
for-profit companies, Deleuze would argue that the same critique must apply to each. Of 
all the respondents participating in the research only one respondent highlighted this 
issue. In the second Delphi round, R9 asks,  
 
Why do you single out “large, private developers”? The public sector is at 
least as likely to behave cynically and manipulatively in my experience! 
 
The data, therefore, suggests that most respondents perceive referential models in the 
assessment/regulatory process differently to referential models in the 
design/development process. Problems in the former are located in the tools themselves, 
whilst problems lie in the dominant role played by a specific becoming. As a result the 
data both supports and contradicts Deleuze’s ontological framework. 
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Inherent differences in skills and knowledge: 
 
The third group of comments relating to the disconnection between the design process 
and existing assessment methods points to differences in knowledge and skills across 
design/development and assessment/regulatory roles.  
 
Two respondents working in regulatory roles suggested there was a lack of technical 
knowledge amongst designers and small-scale developers about the assessment process. 
R2 recalls instances in which, 
 
I’ve sat in meetings and the client, developer or architect has said, ‘You tell 
me what I need to do – just tell me, I don’t want to have to choose. You 
choose – tell me what is the simplest, quickest, cheapest way to get Code 
level 3’….The main problems with Code is the small developers in our 
experience because they don’t know about it, they don’t understand it.  
 
However, they also acknowledged that this knowledge deficit might result from the 
language used in BRE assessments. Such language, they argued, is highly technical and 
does not reflect the language used by those working in design, development and 
construction roles. Using a simple analogy, R2 discusses the difference between the 
language used in the BRE assessments and the language used by designers, developers 
and user groups: 
 
I suppose the problem is that there are two people using different kinds of 
language. Going back to the jeans / Gap example, the first person 
(representing the designer or user group) is asking, ‘Are these comfortable?’ 
But the shop assist (representing the CSH assessor) is saying, ‘Well these 
jeans have a low crotch and a wide boot cut’. And the first person will think, 
‘Does that mean that they are comfy or not?’  They are using different 
language –‘ I use these words, are they the same?’ They don’t quite match 
up. 
 
This analogy suggests that assessments do not correspond to the immediate, practical 
issues facing the design of a building. This same problem is expressed differently by 
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two other respondents, working as design professions. They argue that the 
disconnection between design and assessment results from a lack of awareness about 
how assessments affect a given design. For one of these respondents, this is particularly 
problematic because most designs are assessed by ‘someone who doesn’t understand the 
(design) decision making process’ (R7). Whilst for the second respondent, the problem 
lies in the lack of design awareness applied to the formation of a company’s 
environmental policies. This, they added, is not limited to the policies used by clients to 
set-out a design brief, but also to the policies used by designers and developers in order 
to determine how they will respond to a design brief (R9). 
 
Whilst approached from a different stance, all four of these respondents suggested that 
to overcome the deficit in knowledge and, thus, help resolve the problem of 
disconnection between design and assessment, the BRE should change their assessment 
methods to better reflect the design, development and construction processes.  
 
For several respondents, the best way to do this is by re-thinking the role played by 
assessors. These respondents argued that problems with BRE assessments were 
exacerbated by, what they perceived as, the CSH or/and BREEAM assessors 
detachment from the design process. By working ‘outside of the design team’ (R10), 
two respondents in particular felt that BRE assessors do not have a nuanced 
understanding about the process through which design decisions are made. As a result, 
they held that assessors are unable to make informed judgements about the relevance of 
assessment criteria. R10 expressed this position clearly when he notes that the, 
 
CSH assessor seems to be, pretty much, a stand-alone element - not even of 
the design team. They seem to be quite isolated. Whilst they provide 
comments and information to the overall project they are not as coordinated 
within the team as everyone else in the design team …They chip away from 
the outside but don’t actually understand what needs to be done and the 
issues in the scheme 
 
Drawing on their experience as BRE assessors, two respondents argued that the 
assessor’s detachment from the project team was not intentional. Rather, it was the 
result of two factors: the construction of the assessment, which favours completed 
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buildings over work in progress; and reluctance amongst members of the project team to 
engage in discussions that they feel do not attend to the immediate issues facing the 
design, development and construction of the scheme.  
 
The best people to speak to about this are site managers – I went to visit a 
site in London and the site manager said, ‘All this sustainability stuff, do 
you know how much I need to think about and do, and all these charts I 
have to work to? I have the welfare, and CCS man coming – I have guys out 
there all need managing and now you are coming here saying I need to do 
this that and the other.’ They hate it. It’s just more things to think about 
while they are building (R2). 
 
2.1.3. Speculations about ways to adapt BRE assessments to resolve the problem.  
 
Developing these observations, comments and speculations further, respondents 
considered how the existing BRE suite of assessments might be re-directed to help 
resolve this problem of disconnection between assessment and design. These 
recommendations fall into two broad categories: 
 
1. Standardising and simplifying assessments  
2. Adapting the method to allow for different contexts and roles 
 
Standardising and simplifying assessments  
 
Three respondents suggested that simplifying the BRE assessments by focusing on CO2 
alone might make the assessment easier to understand and to ‘roll out’ across all 
design/development/construction and regulatory industries (R1, 2, 3).  
 
R1 stressed this argument throughout both Delphi rounds claiming that a focus on CO2 
would capture many other design objectives: 
 
R1:…So, if you create a place of good design quality, a sustainable place to 
be and to live that and gives you a sense of wellbeing when you are there, 
and all of that is embodied in its sustainable value. And I wouldn’t 
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necessarily say that I like living in that place because it has good carbon 
value, but its carbon value, hopefully, if you get all the ingredients right, it 
would also be a sustainable place to live and therefore it would have a 
smaller carbon footprint…. 
GA: But how do you justify those links or translate between a sense of place 
or a sense of community, or whatever, which are abstract ideas and a carbon 
level? It doesn’t seem to translate easily. 
R1: It does though. If you think of a green strategy for a place, for example, 
now we all know that the healthier people are and the more leisure pursuits 
they engage in – the happier they are. If they have really high quality green 
spaces where they live the chances are, they are going to be happier. And 
the greener the place is, the smaller its carbon footprint. Because you are 
providing the green spaces the trees etc, that will have environmental value 
and so I think the two things are inextricably linked.  
 
This short exchange highlights an underlying, and questionable argument within R1’s 
suggestion for a carbon-focused assessment method. R1 sets out a set of relations in 
which a low carbon design inevitably leads to a sustainable design; an environmentally 
conscious design; a design that increases happiness, wellbeing and health. In doing so, 
R1 points to an inherent set of relations not dissimilar to the essentialist models used to 
explain ‘a sustainable home’ (Figure 3) or a ‘sustainable building’ (Figure 4). Therefore, 
it seems that, for R1, some form of essentialist model is an inherent feature of effective 
assessment design. 
 
The idea that assessments should be focused on CO2 draws an interesting parallel with 
the perceived differences between profit and cost-savings. Like profit, CO2 is offered as 
a dominant objective for assessment methods. But unlike profit, this objective is seen as 
a way to facilitate other objectives. R1’s comment suggests that this is possible because 
of inherent (essentialist) relationships between CO2, health, happiness, sustainability 
and wellbeing.  
 
In their feedback to the second Delphi round, R11 notes that, 
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From a planning perspective there are three dimensions to sustainable: 
economic, social and environmental. If an alternative assessment method is 
to be devised (i.e. SIAM) it should include a variety of indicators to ensure 
that national policy targets can be balanced against the social, economic and 
environmental benefits of a development project. 
 
In this response, R11 draws on the normative, three-part definition of sustainability used 
in the UK’s National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012a), but also found in 
wider literature (see OECD, 2009 for example). This suggests that the modelled 
concepts used in BRE assessments are part of a larger ‘network’ of modelled concept 
definitions related to different scales, roles and uses of the sustainability concept. 
 
Adapting the method to allow for different contexts and roles 
 
The data also shows a great deal of support for a very different method, one that 
challenges the kind of essentialist principles advocated by R1 in particular. Rather than 
focusing on one objective, many respondents outlined their vision of a sustainable 
assessment that could adapt to different professions, contexts and judgements.  
 
Three respondents suggest that BRE should tailor the method and the understanding of 
‘sustainability’ to different professionals at different parts of the design process (R2, 3, 
10). R2 notes that, 
 
If everybody is your customer then nobody is. It’s (CSH and BREEAM) 
trying to be one size fits all sustainability – and you can’t do that. It’s 
different for different people, not just that but it does not relate to what they 
do in the project team. If you speak to contractors they start to speak about 
materials ‘well I’ve got this wood and it’s FSC registered. So does that 
mean I get CSH certified?’ But the architect says ‘I’ve got 100mm mineral 
wool in the wall so does that mean its Code level 3?’ The site manager says, 
‘Well, we cover the tips up and all our boys come from the local area’, 
because that is what sustainability is to them. So everyone has a different 
understanding about what it is. But then, we [as assessors] come along and 
say, ‘No. You’ve got sustainability all wrong. This is it’. 
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In this quotation, R2 uses their experiences working with a range of design and 
construction professionals to argue one of the key points within the SIAM proposal and 
within Deleuze’s ontology more broadly. R2 argues that concepts like sustainability 
have no inherent meaning. Not only do they mean different things to different people, 
he also suggests that the concept of ‘sustainability’ cannot be divorced from the 
decisions those people make during a design or development process. This idea is 
elaborated further by R2 who goes on to suggest that BRE assessments would work 
much better if they could be used early and throughout the design. 
 
Many respondents felt that this bespoke approach to concepts like sustainability was 
already visible in the method used to assess the health and safety of a scheme under the 
CDM regulations. Of the ten respondents participating in the first Delphi round, only 
one respondent (working in a design role) objected to the use of a CDM-like 
methodology to assess the sustainability of a scheme. This objection focused on two 
factors: the costs associated with the approach and, what they perceived as, the lack of 
responsibility assumed by the assessor (R9).  
 
Building on the idea of responsibility, R9 went on to suggest that BRE assessments 
would be improved if they took account of the, ‘reasonable judgements’ (R9) made 
during the design process rather than focusing on the results of those judgements i.e. the 
building or urban design.  
 
All you are trying to do really is demonstrate that what you did was 
reasonable. You’ll never make all the right decisions in any job. And all you 
are looking for really is, first of all a methodology that assists you in making 
as good a decision as you can. And secondly, you are looking for something 
that leaves a record that that is what you have done. 
 
This idea of ‘reasonable judgement’ is emphasised further in the second Delphi round. 
R4, for example suggests that the,  
 
…The assessment needs to give some autonomy and ownership to the 
assessor and designer. They should be able to make their own minds up 
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whether a design has achieved certain criteria and allowing flexibility if for 
some justifiable reason it cannot achieve certain criteria. 
 
Developing this position, four respondents went on to suggest that a more sophisticated 
approach to sustainability assessment might favour some form of self regulation. Of 
these, two suggested that this could be underpinned by registration to an accredited 
body (R2, 3) and 2 suggested the creation of a new,  scheme focused on the design and 
assessment processes (R9, 10). This last stance is articulated most clearly by R9, who 
notes that, 
 
…a different way that you might consider this is rather than comparing it 
with CDM, to compare it with ISO 9001
33
. Whereas in ISO 9001 you 
establish a system: a quality system. The quality system doesn’t mean that 
every decision you make is always right. But it does say that these are the 
standards in terms of the process that we are setting for ourselves. And this 
is the standard that we have got to always achieve. That is a standard 
determined process ‘we will always follow this process and the decisions we 
will make, are made as a consequence of this process.’ but that doesn’t 
mean that all decisions will be right. 
 
For R9, the idea of reasonable judgement and self-regulation are already captured in a 
previous form of BRE assessment introduced in 2002 as the BRE Checklist model and 
superseded by subsequent developments of BREEAM (R9).  
 
Whilst R9 provides a strong argument against essentialist modelled concept-based 
assessments his subsequent calls for quantitative measurement and criteria suggest a 
return to these principles, 
 
I think that the BRE Checklist is of great value and I do not understand why 
it is not used more as the comprehensive framework for assessing 
sustainability. I would like to see it expanded and developed to include more 
objective methods of quantifying or scoring each criterion.  
                                                     
33 ISO 9001 are standards that set out the requirements of a quality management system 
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2.2. Theme B: The relationship between national targets and specific contexts. 
 
2.2.1. The identification of a problem.  
 
The second theme emerging from the data relates to two scales of policy/plan-making: 
national and local / context specific. Four respondents participating in the first Delphi 
round discuss these two scales in detail. They describe national sustainability targets as 
ways to ‘focus the mind’ (R1), to ‘raise the bar [in sustainable design]’ (R1), to ensure 
that ‘things get done’ (R2), to avoid extreme differences between projects (R8) and, to 
demonstrate that developments are ‘driving in the right direction’ (R10). Yet, in 
developing these comments further, three of these respondents suggest that these targets 
do not translate to local, contextual considerations. They note that, ‘strategic targets can 
lead developers to chase the wrong goal – not design to the end user’ (R1). Targets can 
also be ‘restricting in some instances’ because developers only work up to the target 
rarely beyond the target (R2).  
 
The data suggests, therefore, that there is a broader problem affecting BRE assessments, 
concerning the link between national and local scales, and the way this link plays out 
over time. R1 describes this as a ‘fight between national policy and local groups’, and 
later, as a gap between both scales of policy/plan-making (R1). 
 
2.2.2 Comments and speculations about the factors causing or exacerbating the 
problem. 
 
Respondents identified three factors they believe might be causing or exacerbating the 
conflicted relationship between national and local policy/plan-making. As in the last 
theme, these can be summarised according to two underlying themes: 
 
1. The construction of BRE assessments. 
2. The use of BRE assessments 
 
 
 
The construction of BRE assessments: 
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R10 suggested that the problem between national and local scales might be owing to an 
underlying assumption in many assessments, including those set out by the BRE: that 
the tools used to assess and engage in a specific context can be translated to broader 
national targets and vice versa.  
 
R10: …Its probably better to think of those (national targets) as the key 
drivers, the large targets for the HSE is to reduce deaths on construction 
sites and in maintenance.  
GA: but, given your earlier comments, the way its operationalised (CDM) 
seems much more developed – more complex and sophisticated. 
R10: Yes, much broader brushed. Things such as repetitive strain disorders 
and sunlight disorders are all considered as part of our role. 
GA: but how would you link sunlight disorders to the number of windows in 
an office building? And how would you link that to death or injury? It’s 
difficult if not impossible. So, for me, there must be something else going 
on there in the operationalising of the CDM that is more than the target set 
by government.   
R10: Yes, true. But that is the guidance, it’s about being part of an 
organisation whose objective is to improve H+S in the work place, in social 
environments. So, it’s not a set of rules in the guidance…. 
 
This respondent goes on to suggest that this assumption is misplaced and national 
targets and contextual assessment tools should focus on different levels of detail used in 
different ways (R10).   
 
The use of BRE assessments 
 
For others, like R1 and R11, the problem does not relate to the principles used to 
construct assessments, but in the way they are used by specific groups. For R1, the 
problem between national and local scales is exacerbated by the normative practices 
used in the determination of a planning application. Whilst several key planning 
documents, such as the National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012a), stipulate 
that proposals should ‘defer to local knowledge’, R1 noted that planning inspectors still 
prioritise national targets over local concerns.  
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Looking at the problem from a slightly different angle, R11 suggested that the problem 
might be exacerbated by the kind of groups driving developments towards national 
targets. According to R11, BRE benchmarking, as a driver for national sustainability 
targets, are mostly used as a condition of development set out by the developer (by the 
environmental policies defined by large commercial companies and housing 
associations). They are rarely set out as a condition attached to a specific site of 
development. As such, these targets are driven by national rather than contextual actors.  
 
Thus, as with the disconnection between design and assessment, these comments 
suggest that the difficult relationship between national and local scales can be traced to 
issues associated with the construction of assessments as well as the way these 
assessments are used by certain groups and the priority they give to certain objectives 
(or becomings). 
 
2.2.3. Speculations about ways to adapt BRE assessments to resolve the problem.  
 
The data suggests four ways in which the BRE might develop their suite of assessments 
to help resolve this problem. Many of these suggestions reiterate the suggestions made 
for resolving the disconnection between design and assessment. These suggestions are 
as follows: 
 
R2 suggested that targets should have a motivational role in sustainability assessments, 
and considered whether it would be better to introduce abstract or purposefully 
unachievable targets. This proposal corresponds with one of the ideas in SIAM, namely 
using the concept of ‘sustainability’ as an empty signifier that assessments are directed 
towards but is too vague to be achieved in a definable way. 
 
R10 suggested that the BRE re-think the link between national targets and assessments 
in order to produce a more sophisticated assessment tool, and advocated the CDM form 
of assessment as a model for future development.  
 
R9 notes that, ‘BREEAM falls down because you are trying to get over a threshold.’ As 
in the last theme, this respondent suggest that the BRE suite of assessments might be 
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improved if they were to return to the method used in the BRE Sustainability Checklist, 
which does not use benchmarks. 
 
2.3. Synthesis of both themes relating to existing BRE assessments. 
 
This first section of the results and analysis  has highlighted the problems associated 
with BRE assessments and sets out the observations, comments and speculations made 
by the respondents to explain why these problems occur, and how they might be 
resolved. The following five statements capture the key points raised in the data. 
 
1. The use of referential models in assessment methodology is problematic because 
they do not allow for the different potentials captured in the design process.  
2. Referential models are only problematic in the design process when they are 
created and used by private developers. This is because they are developed 
according to one kind of potential, the potential to make profit.  
3. Referential models can be beneficial when used by non-profit developers, 
because they facilitate other potentials. 
4. Assessment methods can be improved by changing the referential model so that 
it is focused on CO2 or broader definitions of sustainability.  
5. Assessment methods can be improved by removing fixed criteria (the referential 
model) and adapting the methodology to different contexts and roles. Such 
improvements would favour ‘reasonable judgement’ and self-regulation.  
 
These five statements reveal inconsistencies within the data concerning the existing and 
potential role played by referential models and, more broadly, by the role played by 
essentialism. Of the five statements, only statements 1 and 5 capture Deleuze’s 
ontological stance and my proposals for SIAM. Statements 2 and 3 reflect views which 
confuse or blur the roles played by the ontological concepts of becomings and 
machines. The source of this confusion is not clear, nor is it clear why this position 
differs from the arguments raised against assessments in statement 1. It is possible that 
this confusion and contradiction within the data may stem from more subtle professional 
bias or/and perceptions within certain areas of the construction industry. This finding 
would need to be explored further in subsequent research. 
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Of the five statements, statement 4 is the least compatible with Deleuze’s philosophy. It 
reinforces the essentialist position underpinning existing BRE assessments, suggesting 
that an attempt to better capture inherent traits would result in a better model, and thus a 
better method.  
 
3. The data: observations, comments and speculations about SIAM. 
 
This third section of the chapter turns to my proposals for an alternative method used to 
assess the sustainability of a building or urban design. This proposal is termed, the 
Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method, or SIAM, as developed using Deleuze’s 
ontological concepts (see Chapter 7).  
 
3.1. Theme A: The relationship between sustainability assessments and the design 
process. 
 
3.1.1. How might SIAM resolve problems identified in BRE assessments, and what new 
problems might be introduced by SIAM? 
 
All respondents felt that the philosophy and construction of SIAM better reflected the 
design process than existing BRE assessment methods. Respondents referred to SIAM 
as a ‘design led’ assessment with a ‘more fluid approach than CSH and BREEAM’ 
(R1); as ‘integrated into the design before building starts on site’ (R2), as ‘a common 
sense assessment. There is no commonsense in the Code for Sustainable Homes’ (R2); 
‘a really good concept – a toolkit … (that) makes decisions with sustainability in mind’ 
(R5); an assessment ‘rooted in architectural thinking itself’ (R7); an assessment that 
‘allows you to address real situations’ (R8) as well as the architectural process, 
particularly in respect to the ‘the speculative aspect … because the building doesn’t 
exist yet’ (R8); ‘A more sophisticated approach (to sustainability)’ (R9);  a ‘more 
rounded approach (than BRE assessments)’ (R10); an assessment that ‘is all about 
balance…taking a balanced view (on)… the most appropriate scheme….’ (R11). 
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3.1.2. Comments and speculations about the benefits and problems with SIAM. 
 
Responsibility and ownership was cited by many respondents as one of the factors in 
SIAM that might usefully ameliorate the problem of disconnection between design and 
assessment seen in existing BRE assessments. 
 
All respondents made reference to responsibility in the first Delphi round of interviews 
and seven respondents discuss this explicitly. One such respondent notes that, 
 
SIAM is about making people responsible for their own decisions and 
actions … a sustainability responsibility (R10).  
 
Several respondents extend this idea of responsibility to consider subsequent impacts on 
the design profession as a whole. R7 noted that the architect’s role has diminished over 
the last few years, and SIAM could help re-valorise the profession (R7).  
 
Maybe you need to give more control to the architects – rather than a 
profession falling apart; maybe it is consolidated by something around being 
more responsible for everything that goes on. 
 
Whilst the data shows overwhelming support for the ideas used to construct SIAM, it 
also highlights a number of concerns relating to its use in practice. Most respondents 
highlighted the difficulties associated with the introduction of SIAM into existing 
design, development, construction and regulatory practices. One such respondent noted,  
 
I think it (SIAM) is fantastic, but it falls down when you have to plug it into 
the system. The current system can’t cope (R7).  
 
The difficulties associated with the introduction of SIAM into practice vary across 
respondents. Five respondents believe that SIAM’s open and self-regulatory approach 
might be manipulated by a number of different actors including large, private 
developers (R2, 3, 5, 6); designers (R2, 3) and the appointed sustainability coordinator 
(R1, 2, 3). However, these respondents also suggested that introducing a robust 
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framework for self regulation, and targeting the right audience for SIAM might 
overcome these risks. 
 
R1, 5 and 6 argue that SIAM might be incompatible with existing methods used to 
implement and record progress against broader government policy, whilst R2 and 3 
expressed their concerns that actors in design, development, construction and regulatory 
roles might not have sufficient imagination to assess sustainability on a case-by case 
basis i.e. without a universally applicable description and corresponding set of criteria: 
 
If there wasn’t one model then I’m not sure people and society are 
sophisticated enough to come up with their own way to improve 
sustainability. So it probably isn’t perfect but the Code is best for the most 
number of scenarios (R3). 
 
Another area of concern related to the time pressures needed to complete the SIAM 
assessments, particularly on simple schemes and in the early design stages of larger 
schemes However, all four respondents who expressed these concerns (R2, 8, 9, 11) 
went on to suggest that if practices were willing to dedicate time to SIAM, these 
assessments could reduce the risks associated with planning approval, late and costly 
changes to the design as well as providing an audit trail for decision making if disputes 
were taken to court.  
 
The data reveals instances in which similar, and equally robust methods of assessment 
are already used in practice, albeit on a case by case basis. Four respondents noted 
similarities between proposed SIAM assessments and the reports used to request a 
waiver of conditions attached to a planning approval (R5, 6, 8, 11). All of these 
respondents suggested that such reports were very helpful in the relationship between 
design, development and regulation. Drawing on experiences as a designer, R8 suggests 
that this is because,  
 
if you can understand what is going on, it’s explained, and it’s real then you 
can accept difficult things (R8).  
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From a regulatory perspective, R11 felt that such reports ‘tell the story’ of the scheme, 
which, unfortunately, is an aspect that is often overlooked in the current design and 
regulation process (R11). For R11, this is particularly evident in the use of Design and 
Access statements submitted as part of a planning application to provide evidence that 
the proposed scheme meets current planning policy and regulatory requirements, 
 
The D+A statement is usually just ‘here is the site, here is a scheme, it uses 
a similar palette of materials to that house over there, landscape is beautiful, 
it’s a great scheme, it uses modern architecture, please sign up to this now’. 
They miss that key storytelling stage of, actually, how you came to this 
scheme on the site.  
 
3.1.3. Speculations about ways to improve SIAM.  
 
These issues led several respondents to speculate opportunities to improve SIAM as a 
practicable assessment tool. The four, most developed suggestions are set out below.  
 
The role of the sustainable coordinator 
  
Five respondents suggested that the sustainability coordinator role should be expanded 
to make them more accountable. Just over half of these respondents suggested that the 
sustainability coordinator should ‘sign off’ the final building design (R5, 6, 7), whilst 
the remaining respondents argued that they should ‘sign off’ the design process (R9, 
10). Of these two groups, the latter is a better reflection of the SIAM proposal. 
 
New directions for SIAM 
 
Rather than an assessment tool, many respondents suggested other directions for 
operationalising the ideas underpinning SIAM. Respondents outlined three such 
directions. The first suggestion builds on speculations directed at BRE assessments in 
the last section of the report.  
 
R9 and R10 suggest using SIAM as a foundation for a new ISO registration, possibly 
linked to ISO 14006: 2011: Implementing and managing eco design (ISO, 2011). These 
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two respondents differed in the way they conceived this ISO. R9 suggests that a SIAM-
informed ISO would replace or, at least, offer an alternative route to assessment,  
 
…a new ISO for sustainable design would be a valuable outcome of this 
type of research…(with) more safeguards in terms of the overall approach to 
the sustainability of the building than you would if you used a point scoring 
exercise. 
 
Whilst, for R10, this ISO system would be used to complement a SIAM-like assessment 
method,  
 
SIAM is the model that the coordinator uses to assess the sustainability of 
each project and that focuses the ISO audit to make sure that the guidance 
from government is being applied. 
 
This comment from R10 seems to suggest that SIAM could be situated within a broader 
essentialist framework. As noted in previous areas of the data, this seems to suggest 
reluctance to entirely abandon essentialist, structuring principles. 
 
Rather than using SIAM to set out a new assessment method, another suggestion 
outlined in the data focuses on possible links with the existing BRE suite. Three 
respondents suggested that SIAM might have a greater impact if it was used to change 
existing BRE assessments rather than provide a new, stand-alone assessment (R5, 6, 9). 
This point is captured in the following extract taken from an interview with R5 and R6: 
 
R5: The problem is how you get those people on board – BRE and those 
using these measures 
GA: So you think I need to find a way for CSH and SIAM to link in some 
way?  
R5: To take the good bits from both and combine them 
R6: Yes – find a way for them to come together… 
 
Thus, whilst many respondents believed that SIAM could be developed in new 
directions, the two directions outlined in the data point to very different kinds of 
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method. One pushes SIAM further away from the essentialist model used in BRE 
assessments, whilst the other looks to combine SIAM into the BRE model.  
 
A broader scope for SIAM 
 
The third suggestion points to a very different role for SIAM. For R7, SIAM might be 
best used as a new method for teaching potential architects and urban designers about 
the design process. This teaching method, could, he suggests, help students understand 
how design practitioners balance different interests. 
 
Several respondents also suggested that SIAM might be more successful if it expanded 
the focus of assessment. Respondents offered three ways in which this might be 
achieved. 
 
R7 discussed a growing trend in metropolitan planning authorities to draw on expertise 
in non-spatial disciplines, such as those working in the field of health and wellbeing. 
SIAM, it was speculated, should not focus on, 
 
 …just one thing but several things. And that is the mistake we are making 
at the moment, we are just thinking about one thing at a time. 
 
In Deleuzian terms, this quotation suggests that the problem with current assessments is 
that they are focused on one single block of becoming. A similar point is made by two 
other respondents who suggest that SIAM could help merge or link existing roles. One 
of these respondents suggested combining the role played by the sustainability 
coordinator with the CDM coordinator (R10), whilst the other suggests using SIAM to 
form the Design and Access statements used by planning consultants (R11).  
 
Target market 
 
An important point raised in the interviews concerns the audience for SIAM 
assessments. For many respondents, the success or failure of SIAM would depend on its 
target market. Most respondents identified markets best suited to a speculative and 
immanent approach to assessment. Such markets include one-off house builders (R2, 3), 
205 
 
small scale developers (R2, 3, 5, 6), affordable housing groups (R5, 6), government led 
projects (R7, 9), renovations (R7), home improvements (R8) and base builders (R8). 
Whilst these markets differ, all respondents identified these markets as areas in which 
bespoke designs are deemed important or necessary, and all felt that the existing BRE 
assessment method could not accommodate the bespoke nature of such markets. 
 
3.2. Theme B: The relationship between national targets and specific contexts. 
 
3.2.1. How might SIAM resolve problems identified in BRE assessments, and what new 
problems might be introduced by SIAM? 
 
As in the review of BRE assessments, there was a mixed response to the way SIAM 
responded to the relationship between national targets and specific context.  
 
Three respondents felt that SIAM did not provide suitable links between a specific 
scheme and national targets (R1, 2, 3). As a result, these respondents suggested that 
SIAM might be problematic for policymakers and planning departments, who could not 
use SIAM to demonstrate that developments were making progress as part of a national 
sustainability strategy: 
 
…How do they (planners) weigh up if it’s acceptable or not. Because at the 
minute they can refer to policy and say, ‘yes it meets policy’ or ‘no it 
doesn’t’, whereas if they were having this evidence presented to them, 
would there be any consistency amongst planning officers? What would 
they be assessing against to say whether or not it is sustainable? (R6) 
 
A different line of speculation is offered by R11 who suggested that SIAM could ‘assist 
with knowledge sharing and an education piece for the whole of the project’s lifecycle’ 
(R11).  
 
Another area of concern, related to the use of national targets to direct funding to 
housing associations (R5, 6, 8). These respondents felt that removing the link between 
assessments and targets might be problematic for funders, but not necessarily for 
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housing associations, who might welcome a funding framework favouring design 
decisions (R5, 6).   
 
Rather than seeing this lack of comparability as an issue, R9 and R10 argue that clear 
links between national targets and context specific schemes are not necessary as long as 
a scheme could provide robust, demonstrable evidence that all reasonable efforts have 
been made to introduce sustainability into the decision process (R9, 10). For these 
respondents, SIAM could be used to provide such evidence.   
 
You need to be able to demonstrate that you have taken things into account 
and you’ve made the best, no, not even the best decision, you’ve made a 
justifiable decision…. you could use this [SIAM] to demonstrate that you’ve 
done your best (R9). 
 
3.2.2. Speculations about ways to improve SIAM.  
 
Drawing on these comments and speculations, respondents identified three opportunities 
to improve SIAM as a practicable assessment tool. These are outlined below. 
 
Introducing quantifiable measurement 
 
Three respondents suggested introducing some form of measurement into the 
assessment (R1, 5, 6). This suggestion gained greater support in the second Delphi 
round, in which R2 makes the following comment:  
  
I think the idea of introducing some form of quantitative measurement 
would be a good idea.  
 
R3 also offered some support to this proposal:  
 
Yes I agree that to take it forward, it would need to be adapted to create 
links or introduce a quantitative form of measurement (to avoid 
manipulation).  
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An advisory list 
 
Rather than a fixed set of quantifiable criteria, R2 and R3 suggested introducing an 
advisory list, the contents of which could broadly relate to national targets. In 
developing this idea further, it was suggested that items could be added or removed 
from this list to suit changes in the design. 
 
A robust process for decision making 
 
R9 and R10’s suggestions for SIAM provide a very different direction for development 
to the ones noted above.  Building on their proposals for self-regulation and ISO 
approval, they suggest evaluating the robustness of the design process used rather than 
the resulting building. Such processes, it was argued, could be very ‘broad brush’ or/and 
unique to different companies working on given schemes (R9, 10).  
 
As in previous themes relating to SIAM and to BRE assessments, these suggestions 
reflect support for the essentialist models used in existing BRE assessments, and 
arguments for a shift away from such models.  
 
3.3. Synthesis of both themes relating to SIAM. 
 
This second section of the results and analysis chapter has highlighted the benefits and 
problems associated with my proposals for a Speculative and Immanent Assessment 
Method (SIAM) and sets out the observations, comments and speculations made by the 
respondents to explain why these problems occur and how they might be resolved. The 
following five statements capture the key points raised in the data. 
 
1. SIAM is much closer to the design process than the method used in BRE 
assessments 
2. SIAM places responsibility with individuals  
3. SIAM resolves many of the issues raised against BRE assessments 
4. Whilst SIAM is a strong proposal, it is difficult to operationalise. Part of this 
difficulty relates to the risk of manipulation and its incompatibility with existing 
government targets.  
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5. SIAM might be improved by introducing quantitative measurements and by 
focusing on the traits used in the assessment 
6. SIAM might be improved by focusing on the robustness of the design process 
and the decisions taken rather than the outcomes of that process i.e. the building 
 
Whilst the first four statements support SIAM and the Deleuzian concepts that underpin 
SIAM, the last two statements point to very different stances: one consistent with 
Deleuze’s ontology and one in conflict with Deleuze’s ontology. These two proposals 
for SIAM reinforce, what seems to be, an underlying tension in the responses. This 
tension centres on the role played by essentialism.  
 
For some, the essentialist, modelled concept seems to be integral to the way they 
understand and engage in professional practice. This is because, such models allow for 
comparison between schemes as well as comparison against targets and ideals of best 
practice. For others, such comparisons are less important than designing a scheme that 
maximises the potentials of the site, user demands, health and safety and budgetary 
limitations.  
 
Interestingly, these two stances (essentialist and non-essentialist) do not correspond to a 
professional role. The data shows that professionals working in a regulatory/assessment 
capacity have been as critical of essentialist models as those working in a 
design/development capacity. Equally, some of the respondents working as designers 
and developers have been the strongest advocates of essentialist principles.   
 
4. Conclusion to Research Stage B. 
 
Taken together, the two sections that form Research Stage B provide some evidence to 
support the possibility that the Deleuze-inspired proposals created in Research Stage A 
(Chapter 7) can be translated into a practicable tool useful to actors in the planning and 
development process. However, it also suggests that making this transition to practice 
will demand a number of changes.  
 
One group of changes proposed in the data is more-or-less in-keeping with the 
Deleuzian concepts used to create SIAM. These include efforts to link with, or draw 
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lessons from similar or complementary frameworks (BRE Sustainability Checklist, 
CDM assessments and ISO ratings), as well as  select enhancements that take account of 
its use in specific areas of practice (using SIAM to inform other practicable tools, 
broadening the remit of SIAM,  targeting the right markets, developing complementary 
software). Of these suggestions, I find the parallel to BRE Sustainability Checklist to be 
particularly important to the line of enquiry underpinning this empirical stage of the 
research, namely, whether SIAM can be operationalised into a practicable tool. There is 
nothing in the literature to suggest why the BRE decided to pursue the essentialist 
‘universal’ method used in BREEAM over the non-essentialist method used in the 
Checklist. Understanding this decision might provide further clues as to whether or not 
an assessment method like SIAM could be operationalised. This could be a subject for 
further research.  
The second group of changes proposed in the data contradicts many of the non-
essentialist concepts structuring Deleuze’s ontology and used to create SIAM. These 
include the search, and subsequent use of a universal definition of a ‘sustainable design’ 
(possibly based on CO2) and the use of quantitative information related to the properties 
of the proposed building or urban design. Such changes would bring SIAM closer to 
BRE assessments. These speculations within the data suggest that Deleuze’s ontological 
concepts can be made useful to planning practice, but doing so may demand significant 
compromises to the ontological arguments underpinning the creation of these concepts. 
These themes will be discussed further in the following Chapter (9). 
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Part 4:  
Synthesis, discussion and conclusions 
Part 3 presented and analysed the results of a case study. In this fourth part of the thesis, 
I bring these results together, discuss them in the context of the two research questions 
introduced in the introduction, and expand these results to reflect on some of the 
broader issues that have unfolded throughout the course of the study. I will use these 
discussions to review the contributions made by this thesis as a whole as well as 
outlining limitations and directions for further research.  
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Chapter 9: Synthesis and discussion 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the last chapter I presented, analysed and discussed the findings from the empirical 
stage of the research (Research Stage B). In the first part of this chapter I expand these 
discussions by synthesising the findings from Part 3 (Chapters 6 and 8) and my review 
of other Deleuze-inspired theorists in Part 2 (Chapter 3) to answer the two research 
questions that introduced this thesis. In the second part of the chapter, I outline and 
discuss two much broader themes surrounding these research questions: 
 
1. The role of ‘grand theory’ and 
2. The role of planning 
 
These two themes have been debated within the field of planning since the 1970’s. It is, 
therefore, beyond the limitations of this thesis to discuss these two themes in great 
detail. However, by outlining some of the main points within these debates, I would like 
to show how this thesis might feed into proposals and arguments made by others.  
 
2. Synthesis: Answering the two research questions 
 
In the introductory chapter I set out two overarching research questions that I have 
expanded and developed over the last eight chapters: 
 
1) Can Deleuze’s philosophical concepts be translated into a new theoretical 
framework for constructing formal assessments? 
 
2) If so, can this be translated into a practical tool useful to actors in the 
planning and development process?  
 
To answer these questions I start by reflecting on the specific case explored in Part 3 
and expand this line of enquiry to consider other forms of essentialist and non-
essentialist assessments used in practice.  
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2.1 A theoretical framework for sustainable assessments. 
 
My proposal for a Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method (SIAM) in Chapter 6 
demonstrates that, at a conceptual level at least, Deleuze’s philosophical concepts can 
be translated into a new theoretical framework for constructing a formal assessment tool 
used to assess the sustainability of a building or urban design. The degree to which this 
framework was or was not successful was determined through empirical testing in the 
subsequent Research Stage (B) discussed in sub-section 3 below. The development of 
this first, conceptual proposal reveals three strategies used in this translation process: 
  
 Strategy 1: Recreating Deleuze’s concepts  
Strategy 2: Borrowing Deleuze-inspired concepts from other studies  
Strategy 3: Learning from other tools used in the field  
 
Strategy 1: Recreating Deleuze’s concepts 
 
The first of these strategies was discussed in my review of three Deleuze-inspired 
spatial studies in Chapter 3. This review showed that all three of the reviewed studies 
produced their respective theoretical framework by interpreting and adapting Deleuze’s 
concepts to meet the specific demands of their enquiry. Whilst all three studies draw on 
Deleuze’s concepts of the ‘assemblage’ and ‘becomings’, for example, their definitions 
for these terms are dependent on their role in the respective study (see Tables, 2,3,4).  
 
In Chapter 6, I also adapted these concepts to discuss and develop an alternative to 
current BRE assessment methods, notably in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. In these two 
subsections I drew on Deleuze’s conceptual distinctions between ‘objects’ and 
‘assemblages’, ‘properties’ and ‘becomings’, ‘referential models’ and ‘blocks of 
becoming’ to set out a comparative synopsis of the BRE form of assessment, and my 
proposals for an assessment method constructed using Deleuze’s concepts: SIAM. 
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Strategy 2: Borrowing Deleuze-inspired concepts 
 
The second strategy I used to make this transition relied on concepts borrowed from 
other Deleuze-inspired studies and adapted to suit my own framework.  
 
In Chapter 3, I identified concepts in all three frameworks that were created specifically 
to resolve contextual or practical limitations identified in Deleuze’s texts. In my review 
of Mark Bonta’s study (2001; 2004) I showed how Bonta expanded Deleuze’s concept 
of assemblages to form the concept of ‘complex space’. For Bonta, this concept better 
reflected the process of entanglement identified in his observation of land use in the 
Honduras. I showed how Halsey created the concept of ‘violence’ to help him form 
judgments about the way different machines affect the development of assemblages 
over time (Halsey, 2006). I also showed how Hillier introduced the concept of 
‘speculated potentials’ to resolve the practical problems associated with identifying 
becomings during the strategic planning process (Hillier, 2007; 2011).  
 
By borrowing these concepts and adapting them to my own line of enquiry I designed a 
sustainable assessment method that treated the developing building as a ‘complex 
space’. Design decisions were conceived according to judgements over ‘speculating 
potentials’ about ‘what might become’ of these spaces. 
 
This broader approach to Deleuze’s concepts helped me resolve problems similar to 
those identified and tackled by others. Such problems related to the way one perceives 
entities
34
, and the way one identifies and judges the way such entities might change over 
time
35
. As a result I was able to expand much further along the theoretical line between 
philosophy, theory, and practice than the three studies reviewed in Chapter 3. Whilst the 
three studies do not state this intention so explicitly this transition from philosophy to 
theory and practice is fundamental to all three studies. For Bonta it is a transition from 
philosophy into analytical practice, for Halsey it is a transition into environmental legal 
practice, and for Hillier, it is a transition from philosophy to strategic planning practice. 
                                                     
34 Either as a complete object with properties that can be used to define it (relations of 
interiority) or as an incomplete assemblage related to other assemblages (relations of 
exteriority). These differences are presented in Chapter 2. 
35
 i.e. an assemblages ‘becomings’ (potentials to become something else) 
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The developments made in this thesis show that Deleuze’s philosophy can be translated 
into a theoretical framework for conceptualising the planning and development process. 
In other words, at this stage in the study, the task of making Deleuze useful was 
successful at a conceptual, rather than a practical level.  
 
Strategy 3: Learning from other tools used in the field  
 
Whilst these adapted Deleuzian concepts helped me resolve gaps in the theoretical 
framework, and demonstrated that Deleuze’s concepts can be used to resolve issues in 
the conceptual development of planning, they were unable to answer some of the more 
practical questions related to the implementation of my outline proposals for a 
Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method. In Table 8, I identified gaps in the 
proposal related to the introduction and implementation of SIAM into practice. I 
resolved these issues by drawing on a method currently used in design assessment 
practice: the assessment method used as part of the UK’s CDM Regulations. I selected 
this assessment because it reflected some of the Deleuzian arguments developed in my 
framework, namely the idea that assessments should be undertaken during (immanent 
within) the design process, and the idea that assessments should be based on 
speculations (speculated potentials) rather than the properties of a completed design. 
 
The sequence of development noted above reveals a steady shift from primary sources 
in the first strategy (Deleuze’s seminal texts) to secondary interpretations of Deleuze’s 
work in the second strategy (other Deleuze-inspired studies), and Deleuzian 
interpretations of practice-based sources in the third and final strategy (existing 
assessments used in practice). As such, the findings from Research Stage A demonstrate 
that, in order to make the transition from philosophy to a proposal for planning practice 
one must be prepared to look outside of Deleuze’s seminal texts and, indeed, outside of 
Deleuze’s philosophy to other, non-philosophical sources. 
 
One reading of this observation would conclude that there are clear limitations to the 
practical usefulness of Deleuze philosophy within the field of planning, because to use 
his concepts appears to demand that the method design shifts away from Deleuzian 
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philosophy
36
. The problem with this reading is that it is centred on a historical account 
of Deleuze’s philosophy. After all, one must remember that the primary sources against 
which this conclusion is derived are historical documents. Most of Deleuze’s key texts 
were written in a period of 30 years between the 1960’s and the 1990’s, and many of the 
concepts within these texts were dependent on the latest advances in the fields he 
studied. The concept of becomings, for example, was derived from the discovery and 
study of singularities in several areas of science during the period that Deleuze was 
constructing his ontological stance (see Chapter 2).  
 
Similarly, one must remember that, whilst Deleuze’s concepts were created within 
different fields of knowledge, like science, such studies were far from exhaustive. His 
work does not include many spatial disciplines, such as planning. And whilst some of 
his texts show his willingness to move from theory to practice
37
 he does not explore this 
practical dimension in sufficient detail to offer a working alternative. This point re-
iterates Campbell’s and Richardson’s argument discussed in Chapter 1, namely that 
abstract theory, especially theory with a strong link to philosophy, cannot be transferred 
directly into planning practice: 
 
Few, if any … philosophers had planning in mind as the context in which 
they intended their ideas to be applied... Their horizons are therefore broader 
than a subsection of public policy making concerned with the creation of 
place and the mediation of space. This is not to dismiss this hugely 
significant body of work but to caution the appropriateness of direct 
translation (Campbell, 2006: 93). 
   
Thus, whilst the data shows that Deleuze’s philosophy, as it appears in Deleuze’s texts, 
is only relevant to the early theoretical stages, such conclusions are inevitable, because 
these primary sources are historically situated documents written for very specific 
purposes. In other words, if one focuses on Deleuze’s texts, then one cannot expect his 
                                                     
36 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether this observation is particular 
to Deleuze’s philosophy, or whether other philosophies can be adapted to practice 
without demanding similar shifts (see Chapter 10)  
37
 Such as his critique of Freudian psychoanalytical techniques 
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concepts to be directly useful to the latest advances in disciplines that Deleuze did not 
study.  
 
With this in mind, I support a second reading of the results from Research Stage A. This 
second reading suggests that, whilst the concepts created and used by Deleuze in his 
studies are not directly transferable into planning, they can be adapted to these fields, or 
offer directions for creating concepts specific to these fields. Not only is this stance 
more reasonable, it also captures the spirit through which Deleuze’s concepts were 
created.  As noted in the introductory chapter, Deleuze notes that: 
 
'It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity
38
. What 
defines it is the AND, as something which has its place between the 
elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering.' 
(Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 26) 
 
Thus, it seems that Deleuze anticipated the need for scholars to re-create his concepts 
and to add new concepts to respond to a given field (hence the AND, AND, AND). 
Taking these points into account, I hold that the results from Stage A show that 
Deleuze’s concept can be developed into a theoretical framework used to set out a new 
practical tool, but such concepts must be adapted to suit the unique demands of this tool. 
Taking forward this conclusion I turn now to the broader question as to whether the 
findings in Chapter 6 are specific to the case study of BRE assessments or whether they 
are sufficiently generalisable to apply to other essentialist tools and non-essentialist 
tools alike. 
 
2.2 A theoretical framework for other essentialist assessments 
 
In Chapter 2 I outlined a number of other planning tools constructed according to 
essentialist principles. These include multiple indicators, such as European Territorial 
Cohesion Indicators (ETCIs), the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and Housing 
Quality Indicators (HQIs); impact assessments, such as the Territorial Impact 
Assessments (TIAs) and the Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA); and design guides.  
                                                     
38 The concept of the ‘multiplicity’ is explained and discussed in Chapter 3 
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Looking at two of these tools in particular, one can see how essentialist principles 
underpin the multiple indicators used by the European Union to measure territorial 
cohesion across the member states (ETCIs) and impact assessment tools used to 
measure the territorial impacts of European and member state policy (TIAs).  As in my 
review of the BRE assessments, a historical study of these two tools demonstrates the 
fundamental role played by the essentialist modelled concept. However, unlike BRE 
assessments these two assessment tools are constructed using two different kinds of 
model: the ‘tree model’ and the ‘storyline model’ (Abrahams, 2013).  
 
The former assumes that concepts like, ‘territorial cohesion’ (also, the sustainable 
home) can be sub-divided into component dimensions. These dimensions are thought to 
capture all or some of the essential traits, characteristics, or themes of the concept. 
Taken together, these dimensions provide one essential and universal meaning for the 
concept that can be used to measure or assess variations. As I showed in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4, BRE assessments like the Code for Sustainable Homes and the BREEAM 
New Construction assessment are good examples of this tree-model. 
 
The ‘storyline model’, however, is not constructed on the assumption that a concept can 
be defined according to only one set of essential traits. Rather, this model is conceived 
as a collection of competing definitions deemed essential to many other policy concepts. 
The history of ETCI and TIA development is governed by the interplay between these 
two models. Whilst the tree model has dominated this development process to date, 
many of the latest assessment methods point to a hybrid approach, in which tree-model 
and storyline modelled definitions are included in the assessment’s construction 
(Abrahams, 2013). This suggests that the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 6 
would only apply to areas of the ETCI and TIA constructed around tree-models and 
would be less applicable to areas of the ETCI and TIA methods developed around 
storyline models. 
 
A further point for consideration relates to the third strategy of development used to 
adapt the proposal by drawing on assessment tools already used in practice (see above). 
In my review of Chapter 6 I concluded that Deleuze’s concepts were unable to respond 
to some of the most practical issues that arose during the study. These issues centred on 
a complicated relationship between design exploration and evaluation of the resulting 
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proposals, as well as responses to the specific demands of a scheme, and regulation of 
the scheme against broader criteria. I responded to these issues by developing links to 
existing forms of assessment within the field. This showed that Deleuze’s concepts 
alone could not meet all the demands expected of professional planning. Thus, one 
might suggest that the success of a Deleuze-inspired planning tool is dependent on the 
kinds of regulatory tools already used in a given field of assessment, the context in 
which these tools operate and the purposes for which these existing kinds of tools were 
selected. If this study had been undertaken in an area of planning with less sophisticated 
forms of regulatory assessment, it is possible that the transition from a theoretical 
framework to a practice-focused tool would not have been made. In such instances, the 
conclusions to this study would have been that Deleuze’s concepts are unable to make a 
valid contribution to planning practice.  
 
This suggests that some of the Deleuzian concepts translated and adapted as part of this 
study would be applicable to other forms of assessment practice, particularly those 
constructed around essentialist ‘tree models’, whilst others would demand further 
adaptation. As such, I hold that only some of the findings in Chapter 6 can be 
generalised to include other forms of essentialist assessment. 
 
2.3. A theoretical framework for other kinds of assessment 
 
Expanding this question further one might ask how the findings from Chapter 6 relate to 
other assessments whose construction is less clearly, or not defined by essentialist 
principles
39
.  
 
In Chapter 2 I identified several different framings of Deleuze’s ontology. Such 
framings include Deleuze’s philosophy as a non-essentialist ontology (DeLanda, 2002), 
an object-orientated ontology (Bryant, 2011) and an event-orientated ontology 
(Massumi, 2011). Elsewhere I argue that these differences do not reveal contradictions, 
but, rather, ‘…offer us a variety of starting points for navigating through Deleuze’s key 
ideas and, by extension, through our own work’ (Abrahams and Hillier, 2013: 5).  
                                                     
39 The BRE’s Sustainability Checklist method provides a good example of this kind of 
assessment. The evidence from Research Stage B suggested that the construction of the 
Checklist method is less clearly, or not defined by essentialist principles.  
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Reflecting on my review of other Deleuze-inspired studies as well as my own, it is 
highly likely that the limitations associated with identifying and judging becomings 
would be equally problematic to other studies, as would the practical problems 
surrounding the introduction and use of these concepts in planning and development 
practice. Thus, whilst an alternative framing might provide a different starting point, 
there is no reason to believe that framing Deleuze’s philosophy in a different way would 
avoid some of the practical limitations in his concepts, such as the difficulties associated 
with the identification and assessment of ‘becomings’. I hold, therefore, that the 
findings in Chapter 6 offer general guidance for other studies focused on non-
essentialist assessments in planning and development practice.  
 
3. A practical and useful tool 
 
As above, the following discussion will consider how the findings from the empirical 
stage of the research (Research Stage B) relate to the specific case of sustainable 
assessments and to assessments more generally. 
 
3.1. A practical, useful sustainable assessment tool  
 
Overall, respondents showed a great deal of support for the Deleuzian ideas used to 
underpin the proposals for a Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method (SIAM), 
namely, that the assessment method should be undertaken during the design and 
development process; that it should be undertaken by those working throughout this 
process; and that it should be based on the contexts in which these decisions are made 
rather than a set of criteria determined in advance. However, this support was mostly 
identified with philosophical and theoretical strengths rather than its practicability, or its 
usefulness. The empirical evidence in Research Stage B suggests that, to make the 
theoretical tool into a practicable tool, further adaptations would need to consider its 
relationship with other tools, and how actors in the planning and development process 
might engage with them in ways that have not been envisaged in the development of the 
SIAM proposal. 
 
The evidence suggests that the principle motivations for adapting SIAM are: to avoid 
manipulation by various actors in the planning/development process, to introduce 
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accountability, and to allow for comparison between buildings and between a building 
and national government targets. The evidence suggests that meeting these demands 
would require the introduction of a fixed process or fixed set of criteria, and some form 
of quantitative measurement. In other words, to make these non-essentialist ideas of 
practicable use, they must be adapted to accommodate an essentialist model.  Such 
changes would move SIAM away from its underlying principles, namely to explore the 
possibility of a non-essentialist approach to assessing sustainability of a given building 
or urban design.  
 
Two readings of the results from Research Stage B. 
 
There are two possible readings that can be drawn from this finding, each resulting in a 
different response to the second research question. In the following, I will review these 
readings in turn and assess their plausibility. 
 
The first reading is based on the non-essentialist ontological frame outlined in Chapter 
2. From this perspective, one would conclude that calls to re-integrate the essentialist 
modelled concept into SIAM shows that Deleuze’s concepts and the arguments on 
which they are based, do not, and cannot, correspond to certain demands of planning 
and development practice. Such demands include the role played by planning to 
regulate different developments in order to reflect broader objectives
40
. As such, the 
evidence generated in the second research stage lends itself to the null hypothesis 
outlined in Chapter 4. In other words, Deleuze’s concepts cannot be developed into a 
practicable tool used by actors in particular aspects of the planning and development 
process. 
 
Whilst this reading of the evidence is a rational one, I believe that it places too much 
emphasis on the framing of Deleuze’s philosophy rather than tackling the more 
pragmatic issue of usefulness underpinning this study. In Chapter 2, and as re-iterated 
above, I noted that Deleuze’s philosophy has been framed in many different ways, and 
that my use of the non-essentialist frame was a strategic one. It is important to 
remember that Deleuze did not align himself with any single, ontological frame and so 
                                                     
40
 Such as regulation for the ‘public good’ as discussed later in the chapter 
221 
 
all efforts to collate Deleuze’s concepts into such frames are interpretative. Selecting 
one frame over another, I argued, should, therefore, be based on its relevance to the 
problem under study and its ability to direct a field of enquiry.  
 
A second reading of the evidence in Research Stage B would place more attention on 
the idea of usefulness rather than focusing on a single ontological frame. This reading 
would conclude that Deleuze’s concepts can contribute to a practicable tool because 
respondents hold that Deleuze-inspired tools like SIAM do something useful that is not 
currently accommodated by essentialist tools like BREEAM, namely, that it better 
accommodates creative responses to specific problems arising in a given context. It 
would also suggest re-framing Deleuze’s concepts to explain why respondents might 
favour essentialist and non-essentialist tools. 
 
Looking at the data, it seems that respondents support these two kinds of tool because 
they serve different roles, and relate to different actors in the planning and development 
process. The evidence suggests that essentialist tools are very effective when used to 
relate a specific building, its context and the actors that form a given project team to a 
much broader regional or national context, and to the actors that operate in that broader 
context (such as regional councils and UK government departments). The trade-off with 
such tools is that they are unable to take sufficient account of the unique considerations 
specific to a given context. Respondents suggested that non-essentialist assessments 
achieve the opposing benefits and limitations. They are very successful at accounting 
for the complexity of a specific scheme, but unable to account for the work undertaken 
by actors operating at much larger scales, and their attempts to steer change towards 
broadly defined objectives. 
 
Thinking about this in Deleuzian terms, these conclusions suggests that these two 
different kinds of machine (essentialist and non-essentialist machines) filter different 
potentials to serve the operational demands of different assemblages. Thus, essentialist 
machines like BREEAM block potentials that are useful to the design-team assemblage 
but encourage potentials that are useful to the national government assemblage. 
Inversely, non-essentialist machines like SIAM block potentials useful to national 
government assemblages but encourage potentials useful to the design-team 
assemblage. This seems to reiterate Hillier’s broader argument that the transcendental 
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plane cannot be removed from planning altogether because it serves a functional role in 
planning, particularly in instances when planners need to enforce broader regulatory 
demands (see Chapter 2).  
 
Halsey’s study is equally relevant to this observation. If one assumes Halsey’s stance on 
judgement, i.e. that a machine should be judged according to the potentials it 
encourages and blocks, then an entirely non-essentialist approach to assessment would 
result in a case of ‘violence’ (Halsey, 2006). This is because a system based exclusively 
on non-essentialist machines would prevent any potential for comparison across scales, 
to different groups of actors or the broader aims of these actors (such as reducing CO2 
levels nationally). The inverse is also true. A system based exclusively on essentialist 
machines also results in violence because it prevents any potential for responding to the 
specific demands of a given context. 
 
Thus, whilst Deleuze’s concepts can be made useful to sustainability assessments, this is 
only useful because this area of assessment has been dominated by essentialist machines 
(tools). Instances may arise when a non-Deleuzian, or a less Deleuzian, approach might 
be needed, especially if one is to explore the possibility for creating new essentialist 
tools to respond to broader planning objectives. This suggests that, any effort to create 
new assessment tools based on Deleuze’s ontological concepts should also consider the 
specific context in which these new tools would operate.  
 
3.2. A practical, useful assessment tool more broadly  
 
Expanding the second research question further one might ask how the findings from 
Chapter 8 relate to other assessments used in other areas of planning. Given the 
comments above, there is no reason to believe that the roles played by essentialist and 
non-essentialist tools would be any different when used in a different area of 
assessment. This is reflected in the data. Many respondents discuss essentialist 
assessment models by relating them to other essentialist models used in different areas 
of development and regulatory practice  
 
It is likely, therefore, that developing new tools for these other areas of planning 
practice would also demand that the researcher re-consider the use of DeLanda’s 
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essentialist/non-essentialist framework. This assertion would need to be explored in 
further research. 
 
However, the question of usefulness does not necessarily preclude the continued 
presence and engagement with a variety of essentialist tools. This point is captured by 
R8 who notes that there is no way to remove (essentialist) models from the design 
process. Indeed, such models are tied into the way designers form their designs and the 
time pressures set out in the project programme. Rather, the role of SIAM, and thus, one 
might imagine, all such Deleuze-inspired tools, is to make designers aware of these 
tools, what they do and do not do, and how they might play out differently. Such 
consciousness would be beneficial, R8 adds, because it would ensure that one would use 
models with a greater sense of awareness about their impacts: 
 
I think you will probably always get a stance that says this is how we do 
things – how we solve these problems. We only change it when it doesn’t 
work. And I think you will still get that – which isn’t necessarily a problem. 
But you will be more in control of determining the models. (R8) 
 
This conclusion partly reflects some of the points drawn from Chapter 3 concerning the 
three Deleuze-inspired studies and directions for responding to the modelled concept. 
Like Bonta and Halsey, R8 suggests that modelled concepts are part of the ‘complex 
spaces’ considered in the design process. Like Bonta and Halsey, R8 also suggests that 
our efforts should not be directed at removing these modelled concepts, but in 
developing an awareness about how these models affect the way assemblages come into 
being and adapt over time. 
 
4. The role of ‘grand’ theory 
 
The above responses to the two research questions lead me onto a much broader issue 
raised in the research concerning the role played by ‘grand’ theory and the relationship 
between planning theory and planning practice. Above I concluded that in order to 
move from a philosophical framework to a planning theory and a practicable tool for 
planning practice one must follow a sequence of strategies. Above I identified and 
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discussed three strategies of development from Research Stage A, and a further strategy 
from Research Stage B. These are summarised as follows:  
 
 Strategy 1: Recreating Deleuze’s concepts 
Strategy 2: Borrowing Deleuze-inspired concepts from other studies 
Strategy 3: Learning from other tools used in the field 
Strategy 4: Moving away from an ontological framing  
 
As noted above, these four strategies reflect a progressive move away from established, 
theoretical understandings of Deleuzian philosophy to a case specific, applicable 
understanding of Deleuze’s philosophy. In its purest sense, therefore, this thesis has 
shown that grand theory like the one presented in Deleuze’s philosophy has a role in 
theoretical analysis and debate but has a less obvious role in applied theory and practice. 
To expand this role, grand theory must be adapted to form case specific theory.  
 
These conclusions highlight the link between planning theory and planning practice and 
can be situated within broader debates within the field. The theory-practice relationship 
has been debated and theorised within the field of planning for decades (Lord, 2014). 
Whilst this debate has not been settled, there is broad consensus within the literature 
that these two areas of the discipline remain divided, and this division is problematic.  
 
For the most part, the literature suggests that planning theory, rather than planning 
practice, is mostly responsible for the disconnection. For Breheny, the blame lies with 
theorists themselves whose work has been purposefully abstract, and misrepresentative 
of planning practice (Breheny, 1983: 114). Using Deleuzian terms, one explanation for 
this might be that this abstraction is the result a ‘publication machine’ that filters 
research becomings in favour of theoretical development rather than practice 
development.  
 
For Binder, the division between theory and practice is not owing to misrepresentation 
or ignorance alone, but in the direction taken by the academic community. Such 
theories, he argues, fail to, 
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… provide a useful analysis of the planning system which can inform 
change… and are of real use to practitioners. (Binder, 2012: 221-222) 
 
Thompson draws on a wealth of experience to offer his support to this stance. For 
Thompson, most academic publications make little attempt to consider how a planning 
theory might relate to practice, or whether practitioners will understand the concepts 
they allude to: 
 
The impression is of a small tribe of experts speaking to each other in 
strange tongues (Thompson, 2010: 132) 
 
This image of a ‘small tribe of experts’ speaking in ‘strange tongues’ could be applied 
to the Deleuzian community, whose work is often seen as impenetrable to many non-
Deleuzian academics, and probably all the more impenetrable to practitioners who are 
unlikely to have engaged directly with philosophical constructs on a regular basis. With 
this in mind, this thesis simplifies and translates Deleuze’s concepts into terms that may 
appeal to theorists and practitioners outside ‘the small tribe of (Deleuzian) experts’. 
This has been achieved in several ways: by drawing links to my experiences in practice 
(Chapter 1, 2 and 7), by defining and tabularising the concepts used by other Deleuze-
inspired theorists (Chapter 3) and by translating my own interpretation of Deleuze’s 
concepts into terms more commonly used by actors working in planning and 
development roles (Chapter 7). Such efforts have been mostly successful, at least in 
methodological terms. A good indication of this success can be seen in the interviews 
discussed in Research Stage B. The two concepts, ‘speculation’ and ‘immanence’ are 
not common terms in design and regulatory practice. However, none of the respondents 
interviewed struggled to understand these Deleuze-inspired concepts or questioned their 
use in a tool intended for practice.  
 
Whilst language presents an issue in the theory-practice debate, Poulton suggests 
another reason for planning theory’s estrangement from planning practice. Planning 
theory, she argues, is ‘lost’, with no clear idea as to its purpose or role in the discipline 
(Poulton, 1991: 225). Building on this claim, Poulton identifies four directions for 
subsequent research into planning theory. These include: attempts to theorise the ‘aims’ 
of planning; to theorise the procedures used by practitioners and how such procedures 
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can be improved; to develop ‘theories of social criticism’ whose aims are to critique and 
discuss the functions specific to planning; and ‘positive theories’ whose aims are to 
explain the activity of planning and how it evolved into its current state (Poutlon, 1991: 
230). Neuman captures these four roles for planning theory in much simpler terms, 
arguing that planning theory can be used as explanation, prediction, justification, and 
normative guidance (Neuman, 2005; see also Yiftachel, 1989; Lord, 2014). 
 
According to Neuman whilst explanatory theory accounts for the majority of theoretical 
studies within the field, it is normative theory that holds ‘the most promise’. For 
Neuman, it is not sufficient for theory to remain an explanatory endeavour either by 
‘describing practice’ or by ‘identifying pitfalls’ (Neuman, 2005: 137). Rather, he 
argues, theory should consider what planning practice should do, how it should operate 
and how it should respond to issues that are of immediate concern to practitioners 
(Neuman, 2005: 137). Similar calls for substantive engagement with issues facing 
practice are equally developed in Harrison’s review (2014). I believe that my attempts 
to translate philosophy into a practicable tool provide support to these arguments for 
normative practice. 
 
As noted above, an important concern in this thesis has been about translating theory 
into practice, not only in terms of the language used but also about its relevance and its 
usefulness. The idea of a theory-to-practice translation has been strongly debated by a 
number of key figures in the field. For the planning theorist, Ernest Alexander, 
translation is one of two ways for planning theory to form the basis of practical action. 
Translation, he notes, has been particularly successful in the natural sciences, with few 
such examples within the social sciences. Building on this observation, Alexander 
asserts that, if planning theory is to affect practical action then it is more likely to occur 
through a second route i.e. through enlightenment. This indirect link between theory and 
practice, he adds, accounts for the perceived ‘gap’ noted in the discipline, which he 
concludes, will remain ‘unbridgeable’ as long as the planning community continue their 
search for a translatable planning theory (Alexander, 1997: 4/5).  
 
Alexander’s call for planning theorists to focus on theoretical enlightenment of practice 
rather than translating theory into practice runs against the aims, and conclusions of this 
thesis. Contrary to Alexander’s assertion, the evidence from Research Stages A and B 
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suggest that translation is possible, as long as one is prepared to accept that the theory 
one aims to translate will need to be adapted to meet the specific demands of the field of 
enquiry. By extension, this study suggests that it is by adapting abstract concepts in this 
way that one might establish a ‘bridge’ between planning theory and practice. 
 
My conclusions regarding translation from planning theory to practice are supported by 
other planning theorists and planning practitioners. The idea that translating general 
theories into practice must also account for specific, contextual issues is reflected in a 
number of academic papers ranging from the 1970’s to the late 2010’s.  Scott and 
Roweis, for example, support attempts to identify abstract normative planning theories 
but argue that any such attempts should ask, ‘under what specific social circumstances 
will any given imperative be relevant and applicable in practice?’ (Scott and Roweis, 
1977: 1099).  
 
March makes a similar point when he notes that the contribution made by planning 
theory is dependent upon specific institutional circumstances. For March, it is important 
that the theory, and those using this theory, are aware of this relationship, and take 
actions to ensure that applying the theory does not lead to unintended outcomes (March, 
2010: 108). Similarly, Moroni suggests that certain kinds of theory are relevant to 
specific kinds of practice and this relationship should be explored and developed 
accordingly (Moroni, 2010: 138). 
 
These comments offer broad support to the conclusions drawn from Research Stages A 
and B. More specific support can be seen in Friedmann’s review of the translation 
process. In this review, Friedmann identifies three key lines of development within this 
process: considering how a given philosophy might relate to a specific area of practice; 
adapting normative practices to respond to a specific context and translating knowledge 
and ideas from other fields into planning (Friedmann, 2008). Whilst Friedmann does not 
suggest that these developments should follow a particular order, one can see parallels 
with the four strategies of development drawn from my case study of SIAM and as set 
out above. 
 
This brief review demonstrates that the conclusions I raise about translating Deleuze’s 
philosophy into practice are echoed in debates about the role of theory-building in 
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planning. It also suggests that these results might contribute to these on-going debates 
within the field. In the following sub-section I will look to a second theme surrounding 
the study. This theme concerns the role played by ‘the planner’. 
 
5. The role of planning 
 
Throughout this thesis I have focused on a specific image of planning: one that portrays 
the planner as a regulatory professional working as part of, or at least, intimately related 
to the development process. In my efforts to develop a Deleuze-inspired sustainability 
assessment, SIAM, I have tried to improve this relationship by ensuring that the tools 
used by planning are better connected to the unique sets of issues within a given design 
and development process.  
 
However, as noted above, the respondents’ support for essentialist models that relate to 
broader national or super-national objectives points to a second role for planning: one 
that takes account of issues beyond the immediate context of the scheme / locality. This 
aspect of planning is part of, what Pierre termed, ‘the processes of regulation, 
coordination and control’ (Pierre, 1999: 376). This role reflects the arguments made by 
Fischer (2005) in his support for universal assessments based on broader, policy 
initiatives (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
Klosterman shows that this broader role of planning has been fundamental to the 
establishment of a legitimate professional actor. Tracing the key stages in the history of 
planning, Klosterman notes that the,  
 
The profession's political roots in progressive reform were reflected in 
arguments for planning as an independent "fourth power" of government 
promoting the general or public interest over the narrow, conflicting 
interests of individuals and groups. (Klosterman, 1985:9-10) 
 
A similar historical study of the ‘public interest’ concept is offered by Campbell and 
Marshall who show that, since its inception in the 1940s, the field of planning has been 
underpinned by this concept, albeit in different forms (Campbell and Marshall, 2002; 
see also, Meyerson and Baufald, 1955; Gower Davies, 1972). Drawing on such 
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observations, Campbell argues that ‘the justification for planning rests ultimately on 
some conception of a desirable public good or interest’ (Campbell, 1998: 127; see also 
Campbell, 2012). This idea of the ‘public good’ finds its meaning in a much broader, 
conceptual scale than one might expect in the individual case, or, indeed, in a collection 
of individual cases.  
 
This stance is shared by a small group of planning theorists (Alexander, 2002; Campbell 
and Marshall, 2002; Klosterman, 1980) whose work aims to retain and renew the central 
position held by the idea of a ‘public interest’ in the field of planning. This is not limited 
to theoretical studies. From his ethnographic study of planning practice in Southern 
England, Malcolm Tait found that the ideological belief in a planning professional, 
‘working in the public interest’ and ‘upholding public values’ were key aspects of 
professional decision making (Tait, 2011: 165; see also Howe, 1994). Drawing on 
empirical research Tait found that planners identified the ‘public realm’ as a spatial 
phenomenon of ‘common interest’ in need of protection from private interests, but also 
as an interest related to shared economic growth (Tait, 2011: 165).  
 
Moroni argues that the idea of the ‘public interest’ has been ‘under severe attack’ for 
many years (Moroni, 2004: 152). For planning theorists such as Lowri, the idea of the 
public interest as a basis for professional legitimacy ‘sounds quaint’ and outdated 
(Lowri, 1994: 101). Whilst for Evans, ‘town planning's claim to function in the interests 
of the whole community is patently absurd’ (Evans, 1993: 10). Rather than dismiss the 
idea of the ‘public interest’ entirely, Reade (1997) suggests that the continued focus on 
this concept prevents any detailed evaluation of the way the planning systems affects 
the development process in practice.  
 
Such comments show that, whilst the role of the planner covered by this thesis (i.e. the 
planner as an actor engaged in the development process) is relatively uncontroversial, 
the second idea of a professional planner: one who works according to a holistic and 
universally applicable understanding of the ‘public good’ is highly contested. However, 
as Flathman notes, whilst this second role of the planning professional may be 
problematic it cannot be ignored. Rather, ‘we [planning theorists] will simply have to 
wrestle with the problems under some other heading’ (Flathman, 1966: 13).  
 
230 
 
One suggestion for wrestling with this issue has been to refine our understanding of the 
‘public interest’ in response to a specific case. Such measures suggest a shift away from 
essentialist definitions of the term, to definitions developed, or adapted within the 
specifics of a scheme. Such adaptations place far greater emphasis on the professional 
judgement of the planner as an expert in the field (Campbell, 1998; Vigar, 2012; 
Forester, 1991; Owens, 1994). This argument resonates with the Deleuzian argument 
presented by Hillier in response to, what she termed, the use of transcendental concepts 
or explanatory theory rather than the use of immanent conceptions. Like Gunder and 
Hillier, theorists like Campbell question the idea of a holistic idea of the ‘public good’ 
used to ‘coalesce … a field of diverse issues’ (Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 144). And, like 
Gunder and Hillier, such theorists suggest that this ‘desired societal goal’ (Gunder and 
Hillier, 2009: 144) should be replaced with a broader, undefined concept (empty 
signifier) that can be adapted and re-constructed to reflect the specific demands of a 
context as it is revealed through the planning and development process.  
 
It is perhaps in this idea of the ‘public good’ that SIAM can make the most valuable 
contribution to these debates. The idea of ‘the public good’ as something to be 
determined through reasonable judgements made within (immanent to) the design and 
development process reflects some of the arguments presented by respondents in 
Research Stage B. R9, for example, noted, ‘All you are trying to do really [as designers] 
is demonstrate that what you did was reasonable’. Later in the Research Stage B, R4 
makes a similar point in the context of assessment: 
 
…The assessment needs to give some autonomy and ownership to the 
assessor and designer. They should be able to make their own minds up 
whether a design has achieved certain criteria and allowing flexibility if for 
some justifiable reason it cannot achieve certain criteria. 
 
This idea of reasonable judgement evident in the data as well as in planning literature 
suggests that the designer, the assessor and the planner (as regulator) could share a 
common foundation for making regulatory or development decisions; be it in the 
interest of a site, sustainability or the public realm. In this sense, whilst this thesis 
focuses on only one role for planning (as part of the development process), the literature 
suggests that it could also contribute to a broader debate on the way one approaches and 
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understands the second role attributed to planning professionals (to act in the public 
interest). 
 
However, this general conclusion is not without problems. Tait’s ethnographic study of 
planning practice suggests that reasonable judgement does not always remove inherent 
tensions between the two roles played by the professional planner: to facilitate a 
development in the interest of a select group and to regulate in favour of a collective, 
‘public interest’ (Tait, 2011: 157). There are instances, he notes, when these two roles 
point to two opposing directions for development.  
 
By developing SIAM as an alternative to, but not a replacement for BREEAM, one 
could provide planners with a means to operationalise these two roles in different 
situations. In Deleuzian terms, SIAM and BREEAM act as two different machines both 
filtering different kinds of becomings to meet the operational demands of two different 
assemblages within a broader ‘planner assemblage’: the facilitator and the regulatory 
assemblage, which, in turn must operate with other assemblages forming a ‘complex 
space’.  
 
6. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have identified and discussed five strategies needed to make the 
transition from philosophy to planning theory and planning practice, and explained why 
I believe that these stages provide a positive response to the two research questions 
directing this thesis. 
This chapter has also considered how these conclusions contribute to two on-going 
debates in the field of planning: the relationship between theory and practice; and the 
relationship between the role of planning as facilitation and the role of planning as 
regulation. Whilst it is beyond the limitations of this study to explore these broader 
debates in detail, I have argued that the results from this study could contribute to 
proposals and arguments made by key figures in the literature.  
 
  
232 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
In this conclusion chapter I reflect on the thesis as a whole: the contributions made; 
their limitations; and how such limitations might be overcome in further research.  
 
1. Contributions of the study 
 
1.1. Principle contributions of the study 
 
The principle contribution made by this thesis concerns the translation of Deleuze’s 
seemingly obscure concepts into a new, practicable tool that can be used by actors in the 
design, development and regulatory process. As noted in the introduction, making this 
transition is difficult because it requires planning theorists to translate Deleuze’s work 
across three different bodies of knowledge: philosophy, planning theory and planning 
practice. Whilst a number of theorists support this transition on the basis that such links 
might create ‘…new practices and tools to increase the effectiveness of [the discipline]’ 
(de Roo et al, 2012: 20), few have successfully explored this transition in detail. 
 
1.1.1. Understanding and expanding Deleuze’s concepts 
 
This gap in knowledge is partly owing to the difficulties associated with Deleuzian 
terminology. Without a strong foundation in Deleuzian scholarship, Deleuze’s concepts 
can appear opaque and abstract. Over the last few years, several attempts have been 
made to resolve this issue. Adrian Parr’s edited collection of dictionary definitions is 
one of the most notable examples (Parr, 2005). However, whilst such publications 
provide a useful reference for philosophers, it does not fully reflect the demands of an 
audience working in other fields, such as planning. This is evident in the dictionary 
definition entry for the concept, ‘becoming’, for example, which reads: 
 
…Deleuze uses the term ‘becoming’ (devinir) to describe the continual 
production (or ‘return’) of difference immanent within the construction of 
events, whether physical or otherwise… Deleuze’s theory holds that things 
and states are products of becomings… (Parr, 2005: 22) 
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As this quotation suggests, the concept of ‘becoming’ is defined as part of a network of 
other Deleuzian concepts such as ‘difference’, ‘immanence’ ‘events’, and 
‘assemblages’41. Not only do these definitions demand prior knowledge of Deleuzian 
terminology, they also provide little indication as to their use outside philosophy, or 
explain why their definitions do not correspond to the definitions used by others. This 
thesis helps resolve this gap by defining such concepts according to a real-world 
example in the design and regulatory process (Chapter 2), defining and comparing the 
way others have used these concepts in other spatial disciplines (Chapter 3) and 
showing how these definitions relate to, and inform a specific area of planning practice 
(Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
In doing so, this study contributes to a community of spatial theorists interested in 
Deleuze’s ideas but who have experienced difficulties trying to make sense of concepts 
like, ‘assemblages’, ‘becomings’ and ‘multiplicities’. By presenting real-world 
examples of these concepts and showing how, why and when Deleuze’s concepts might 
be adapted to inform very practical problems it is hoped that planning theorists will be 
more open to using Deleuze’s philosophy, and derive a more realistic appreciation of 
what such theories can achieve. 
 
1.1.2. Understanding and expanding other Deleuzian studies 
 
My efforts at making Deleuze’s philosophy more accessible to a non-philosophical 
audience have not focused on Deleuze’s seminal texts alone. As part of this thesis I have 
reviewed three of the most developed, Deleuze-inspired studies undertaken in the spatial 
disciplines.  These studies are: Mark Bonta’s study of land use in Honduras; Mark 
Halsey’s study and proposals for environmental damage within the Goolengook Forest, 
Australia; and Jean Hillier’s proposals for a Deleuze-inspired approach to strategic 
planning. Whilst these studies have been championed by other scholars in the field (see 
Chapter 3), this literature fails to critically engage with these studies, and particularly, 
how they translate Deleuze’s philosophy in ways that made it relevant to specific issues 
within their respective disciplines. This gap in knowledge leaves many key questions 
unanswered. Such questions include: Why was one Deleuzian concept selected over 
                                                     
41 Assemblages being the ‘things’ produced by becomings (see Chapter 2) 
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another?; How were these concepts adapted to respond to the specific demands of the 
field?; How did these concepts feed into a broader theoretical framework?; What were 
the gaps in this framework and why did these gaps occur? 
 
By tackling these questions through a detailed, systematic review of the three studies, 
this thesis makes a valuable contribution to all three bodies of knowledge and Deleuzian 
scholarship more broadly. My efforts to capture the theoretical frameworks in tables 
provide subsequent geographers, environmentalists and strategic planners with a clear 
starting point to understand and expand on the contribution made by each. As part of 
this review I critically reviewed the contributions and gaps within the respective 
frameworks and explored opportunities for resolving these gaps to inform studies 
undertaken elsewhere. In Bonta’s study, I suggest that a more refined understanding of 
the concept, ‘complex space’ could contribute to studies in other spatial studies such as 
concept spaces’ in ANT (Callon and Law, 2004) and Healey’s study of ‘relational 
space’ (2006). Halsey’s concept of ‘judgement’, I argued, could contribute to the 
judgements made in planning policy (this is also discussed in Abrahams, 2013). In my 
review of Hillier’s study, I showed that Hillier’s multiplanar theory distinguishes three 
influences leading to the creation of a planned or designed assemblage: speculated 
potentials directed towards empty signifiers (or singularities); the un-speculated 
potentials that emerge over time; blueprints for a specific geographical location or for a 
specific area of design (such as established layouts for WC’s, houses or cul-de-sacs). 
Understanding these processes, I argued, could provide the basis for a new Deleuzian 
method of plan-making used by planners, masterplanners and architects alike.  
 
Not only did I identify opportunities within each study for further development, I also 
brought these conclusions together to identify generalisable conclusions about the 
measures needed to make Deleuze’s philosophy useful to the spatial disciplines. I 
showed that all three studies demonstrated that making Deleuze’s concepts useful meant 
adapting and expanding them to respond to the specific demands of problems identified 
in a field of knowledge. I showed that failures to develop a viable proposal for 
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engagement corresponded to areas of the theorist’s theoretical framework where such 
adaptations and expansions had not been made
42
.  
 
1.1.3. Impacts on the theory-practice ‘gap’ 
 
These arguments set out a foundation for the case study in Part 3. This study focused on 
an area of assessment dominated by a ‘universal method’ formulated by the BRE43 (see 
Chapter 4). The resulting case study was constructed into two stages. In Research Stage 
A I set out a theoretical framework and proposals for a Deleuze-inspired assessment 
tool, which I named the ‘Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method’ (SIAM). In 
Research B I tested this proposal through empirical enquiry. 
 
Taken together these two stages demonstrated that Deleuze’s abstract concepts can be 
translated into a practicable tool deemed useful to actors working in the development 
and regulatory process. Drawing on the results of the case study I identified four 
strategies needed to make this transition from Deleuzian philosophy to planning theory 
and planning practice:   
 
Strategy 1: Recreating Deleuze’s concepts 
Strategy 2: Borrowing Deleuze-inspired concepts from other studies 
Strategy 3: Learning from other tools used in the field 
Strategy 4: Moving away from an ontological framing  
 
These strategies show that the transition from philosophy to practice demands a steady 
shift away from primary source, to secondary Deleuzian sources, to sources with no 
explicit link to Deleuze’s philosophy. In the last chapter I argued that this shift away 
from Deleuze’s philosophy did not necessary imply that Deleuze’s concepts were less 
useful as the case study developed. Rather, I argued that this finding revealed the 
importance of individual interpretation, and the theorist’s ability to re-create concepts in 
new ways to respond to field specific demands. This reflects Richardson’s and 
                                                     
42 Halsey’s failure to adapt and expand Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming’ to meet his 
proposals for judging a machine provides a good example of this observation.  
43
 Both as the BREEAM suite of assessments and as the Code for Sustainable Homes 
assessment 
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Campbell’s point that abstract theory cannot be drawn directly into practically 
motivated disciplines like planning. I believe that these conclusions offer subsequent 
theorists a realistic expectation about what can be achieved by this Deleuze/planning 
link, as well as where and when this link might prove useful and effective.  
 
In the last chapter I also showed how these findings respond to a much broader debate 
in planning literature, described by Poulton as a ‘theory-practice gap’ (Poutlon, 1991). 
The four strategies noted above make a valuable contribution to this debate and reflect 
some of the conclusions drawn in the literature. Friedmann, for example, identifies three 
key lines of development needed to ‘bridge’ the theory practice gap: considering how a 
given philosophy might relate to a specific area of practice; adapting normative 
practices to respond to a specific context and translating knowledge and ideas from 
other fields into planning (Friedmann, 2008). Whilst Friedmann does not suggest that 
these developments should follow a particular order, one can see parallels with the four 
strategies of development drawn from my case study of SIAM and as set out above. 
 
1.2. A second set of contributions 
 
1.2.1. The ‘modelled concept’ in planning  
 
One of the further contributions made by this thesis concerns the kind of tools used in 
planning practice. In Chapter 1 and 2 I identified a common format used to construct 
impact assessment methods, indicators and design guides. This format, I demonstrated, 
was based around a concept like the ‘sustainable home’, defined according to its 
essential traits in order to provide a referential model for assessing a variety of different 
designs, projects or situations. Whilst there has been a great deal of debate surrounding 
the impacts of essentialism, and efforts to challenge its role in planning practice (see 
Harper and Stein, 2006), the literature does not offer a common vocabulary for 
discussing these essentialist models. This study contributes to this body of knowledge 
by offering the term ‘modelled concept’ into these debates and by showing the role 
played by ‘modelled concepts’ in normative planning practice. 
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1.2.2. Two kinds of tool and their uses 
 
Like pragmatists such as Stein and Harper, I argued that ‘modelled concepts’ do not 
offer a fair and reasonable reflection of the difficult decisions made during the design / 
development process, and that they are unable to take sufficient account of differing 
contextual factors (Stein and Harper, 2006; Stein and Harper, 2012). On this basis, this 
study develops a non-essentialist tool that I term the ‘Speculative and Immanent 
Assessment Method’ (SIAM). Unlike proposals made by Stein and Harper, this tool is 
not limited to a human-centric (non-realist) approach. Rather, it is designed to take 
account of human and non-human assemblages that form the project as a whole, and to 
focus on the pre-actual becomings that make such assemblages possible.  
 
Whilst the ‘modelled concept’ method noted above provides a new framework for 
discussing methods constructed using essentialist principles (such as BREEAM), the 
proposals for SIAM offer a new framework for discussing methods based on non-
essentialist principles. The CDM assessment method discussed in Chapter 7 and the 
BRE sustainability Checklist identified through empirical enquiry in Chapter 8 are both 
designed to prioritise speculations over properties, and are undertaken during the design 
process (immanent) by different members of the project team rather than by an external 
assessor.  
 
This distinction between essentialist assessments designed around ‘modelled concepts’ 
and non-essentialist tools designed as a Speculative and Immanent Assessment Method 
offer a strong contribution to assessment methodology. But the study also reveals 
problems in the simple dualism between a problematic essentialist method and a 
desirable non-essentialist method seen in assessment literature (see Chapter 2). This 
thesis has shown that modelled concept-based assessments and speculative and 
immanent assessment methods serve different roles, and support different potentials 
(becomings) favoured by different assemblages operating at different scales. As noted in 
the last chapter, the evidence from this study suggests that essentialist tools are very 
effective when used to relate a specific building, its context and the actors that form a 
given project team to a much broader, regional or national context, and to the actors that 
operate in that broader context (such as regional councils and UK government 
departments). The trade-off with such tools is that they are unable to take sufficient 
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account of the unique considerations specific to a given context. Non-essentialist 
assessments achieve the opposing benefits and limitations. They are very successful at 
accounting for the complexity of a specific scheme, but unable to account for the work 
undertaken by actors operating at much larger scales, and their attempts to steer change 
towards broadly defined objectives. As such, this thesis makes a valuable contribution 
to the way one thinks about and discusses assessment methodology, as well as the way 
one considers their application in different instances.  
 
1.2.3. Impacts on planning as facilitation and regulation. 
 
The more nuanced understanding of essentialist and non-essentialist methods described 
above contributes to the way one thinks about the role played by planning. As noted in 
Chapter 9, planning is often understood in two parts: as part of the development 
process; and as a form of regulation acting in the public interest (Tait, 2011). This study 
suggests that these two roles would benefit from the two kinds of assessment tools 
noted above. It suggests that, in order to establish a suitable role and set of tools, the 
planner must explore the complex set of relationships unique to a given site and context. 
Or, in Deleuzian terms, SIAM and BREEAM act as two different machines both 
filtering different kinds of becomings to meet the operational demands of two different 
assemblages within a broader ‘planner assemblage’: the facilitator and the regulatory 
assemblage, which, in turn must operate with other assemblages forming a ‘complex 
space’  
 
1.3. Other contributions 
 
The contributions outlined above reflect the contributions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. However, during the course of this thesis I have also indentified a number of 
other contributions not anticipated at the outset. 
 
1.3.1. Transcendental empirical methods  
 
These contributions centre on the difficulties associated with developing a research 
design suitable for testing the SIAM proposals through empirical enquiry. Such 
difficulties stem from an area of Deleuze’s epistemological stance termed 
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‘transcendental empiricism’. As an extension of Deleuze’s ontological frame, this stance 
argues that we, as researchers, are actualised assemblages operating in and around an 
actual realm. Given that our capacity to perceive the real is limited to this realm, 
Deleuze suggests that the researcher is unable to identify areas of reality that extend into 
the pre-actual, namely the virtual realm and the processes of actualisation (see Chapters 
2 and 6). My review of this epistemological assertion revealed a difficult question that 
has received little attention in research methods literature: how does one design 
empirical research to account for a pre-actual area of reality that cannot be accessed 
by our sensory observations?  
 
To respond to this question, I undertook a detailed review of recent efforts to develop a 
Deleuzian research method for the social sciences (Ringrose and Coleman, 2013). One 
of the most problematic issues surrounding this work concerns a common distinction 
between data generation and data analysis. All the studies in Ringrose and Coleman’s 
edited volume drew on Deleuze’s concepts to set out proposals for new data analytical 
methods but not for data generation methods. Instead, each study used established, 
sensory-based methods for generating qualitative data. This, I argued, did not reflect 
Deleuze’s arguments for transcendental empiricism and, as such, were not suitable to a 
Deleuze-compatible approach. My critical review of these Deleuzian research methods 
is the first of its kind, and introduces new lines of debate within this new and expanding 
body of literature. 
 
1.3.2. Critical realism and Deleuzian realism 
 
In the absence of an established set of Deleuzian empirical methods I looked to 
comparable efforts made by critical realists. This review compared the onto-
epistemological stance taken by these two forms of realism and identified a number of 
similarities and differences. This brief review offers some support to theorists working 
in one, or both of these areas, and reveals new opportunities for theorists to move 
between the two. 
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1.3.3. A speculative method of data generation  
 
To respond to the problems associated with existing Deleuzian research methods, and 
the differences between critical realism and Deleuzian realism, this study draws on 
some of the ideas presented in Hillier’s proposals for strategic planning as reviewed in 
Chapter 3, namely the concept of ‘speculated potentials’ (becomings) and the use of 
‘empty signifiers’. This study is the first attempt made to use these concepts as part of a 
research method. As such, it provides new opportunities for developing Hillier’s 
multiplanar theory in connection with the efforts made by Deleuzian research 
methodologists like Ringrose and Coleman. 
 
2. Limitations of the study 
 
The contributions made by this thesis are not without their limitations. Some of the most 
significant are identified and reviewed below. 
 
2.1. The limits of an essentialist/non-essentialist frame 
 
One of the most interesting findings of this study concerns the fourth strategy in the 
transition between Deleuze’s philosophy and planning practice: the shift away from the 
essentialist/non-essentialist ontological framing. In the last chapter I discussed why 
shifting away from the essentialist/non-essentialist, ontological frame did not invalidate 
the claim that Deleuze’s concepts can be made useful to practice.  
 
However, the fact that this shift was necessary demands further reflection about the 
framing and elaboration of the problem directing this thesis, namely, the idea that 
essentialist assessment methods are problematic because they do not take sufficient 
account of the complex decisions made during the design process.  
 
The evidence suggests that the use of essentialist principles to model concepts like ‘the 
sustainable home’ do block opportunities to respond to complex issues specific to a site 
or/and project. However, the evidence shows that these same essentialist assessment 
tools (machines) also create opportunities for linking a specific design to broader 
national targets. Inversely, non-essentialist tools (machines) encourage opportunities to 
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respond to the specific demands of a scheme but prevent links between different 
schemes, and to broader national targets. Another point raised in the empirical study, is 
that essentialist models are used in all aspects of design, development, assessment and 
regulation. They are not, as suggested in Chapter 1, limited to assessment practice.  
 
Thus, it seems that the problem for which Deleuze can be made useful is not about 
essentialism per se. Rather it is about the way one uses essentialist and non-essentialist 
tools (machines), as well as one’s awareness about what these tools do, and how they 
affect what other actors or tools do. These conclusions provide a much deeper insight 
into my own experiences within a specific area of practice, as well as insight into the 
experiences used to support the non-essentialist studies by pragmatists like Harper and 
Stein (see Chapter 2). This study offers some support to  Harper and Stein’s arguments 
for a non-essentialist approach to planning, but it also supports the broader point made 
by discourse analysts like Feinstein, who suggests that one must take account of the 
broader forces acting on practice. In other words, it suggests that it is only by moving in 
and out of a specific field or situation that one can better understand the role played by 
essentialism in planning, and, thus, to identify instances in which essentialism is 
problematic, and where it is beneficial. This conclusion provides a further interpretation 
of the Deleuzian message quoted at the beginning of this thesis
44
: 
 
…partir au milieu, par le milieu, entrer et sortir, non pas commencer ni 
finir… Ils ont su faire une pragmatique. C'est que le milieu n'est pas du tout 
une moyenne, c'est au contraire l'endroit où les choses prennent de la 
vitesse
45
. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980:37) 
 
2.2. Limits of the sample 
 
Whilst the findings from the empirical stage of the study (Research Stage B) are 
positive, it is important to recognise their limitations. One of the most important 
                                                     
44
 This quote was originally interpreted as a method for undertaking this PhD study 
rather than as a method for understanding and creating planning tools more broadly  
45 I translate this as follows: Start from a specific field, by that field, enter and leave it 
without starting or finishing…. This is how one acts pragmatically.  This field (also 
translates as middle) should not be understood as an average. It is quite the contrary, for 
it is in this place that things achieve the greatest speed.  
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limitations concerns the selection of respondents to test the SIAM proposals through 
empirical enquiry. In Chapter 6 I outlined the selection criteria used to identify the 11 
respondents in the sample.  
 
However, the data points to a number of roles not clearly represented by the sample. In 
Chapter 8, I identified and discussed a common theme in the data concerning the role 
played by private, commercial housing developers. Many respondents suggested that 
these actors in the development process are responsible for manipulating existing BRE 
assessments, and go on to suggest that the same actors would manipulate my proposals 
for SIAM. Whilst this stance is shared by many respondents I argued that it fails to fully 
explain why the methods used by private developers are different to those used by not-
for-profit developers. As I noted in Chapter 8, commercial and not-for-profit developers 
both use essentialist ‘modelled concepts’ to guide the design and assessment process. 
And both groups use these modelled concepts to reduce construction costs be it to 
increase ‘profit’ (private, commercial developer) or to make ‘cost savings’ (not-for-
profit developer). Of the 11 respondents only one respondent acknowledged this 
discrepancy. With this in mind, I believe that the inclusion of private, commercial 
developers in the sample selection would have offered further insight into this emerging 
theme.  
 
Another strong theme in the empirical stage of the research concerns the possibility of 
developing the SIAM proposal by linking it to a similar method developed by the BRE 
(the Sustainability Checklist) or by developing links with the latest revisions to the 
BREEAM suite. In light of these suggestions, I believe that the empirical stage of the 
research would have been improved if it had included a member of the BRE team. This 
respondent might have explained why some of the SIAM-like methods were not 
developed further and what might be inferred from this regarding the practicable 
limitations of SIAM. 
 
2.3. Limits of the empirical ‘test’ 
 
A final limitation of the research concerns the method used to test the practicability of 
the SIAM proposal. The observations, comments and speculations made by the 
respondents in Research Stage B were hypothetical. As such, any conclusions about the 
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practical viability of SIAM are limited to the respondents’ imagination and their 
experiences of other assessment methods. With this in mind, I believe that piloting 
SIAM in a ‘live’ project could offer an additional, more robust test of its practical 
viability. This ‘live’ project could be studied using ethnographic methods46 intended to 
reveal the way SIAM is interpreted and adapted into the design process. To do this, 
future research would need to navigate a number of difficulties associated with, but not 
limited to: case selection, access to decision making, the risk of bias drawn from the 
context of the ethnographic study, limitations on the scope of actors included. 
 
3. Opportunities for future research 
 
Based on the limitations discussed above I have identified four directions for future 
research: 
 
1. To return to the milieu outlined in Chapter 1 and map as many essentialist and 
non-essentialist machines in the design, assessment and regulatory process as 
possible. Such studies would look to better understand how these machines 
operate / filter potentials, and how these machines relate to different actors.  
2. To undertake a parallel study into other forms of assessment in a different field 
of planning, such as the development of Territorial Impact Assessments or 
European Territorial Cohesion Indicators. This study would ascertain which of 
the adapted, re-created and expanded concepts in my theoretical framework can 
be used to inform an assessment tool specific to this field. 
3. To undertake a second set of interviews with professionals working for private 
housing developers, the BRE and different levels of policymaking / 
implementation. The results from these interviews could be combined with the 
results noted in this thesis to offer a more detailed response to the issue of 
practicability.  
4. To test SIAM using a ‘live’ project. This pilot scheme for SIAM would offer a 
unique insight into the practical limitations and advantages offered by this 
method over existing BRE methods. Given the comments raised in the empirical 
                                                     
46
 Adapted to reflect the specific demands of the study and to take account of Deleuze’s 
epistemological stance. 
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stage of the research, I believe this pilot scheme would be best undertaken on a 
mixed-use scheme formed from private commercial and not-for-profit schemes.  
 
 
